The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 15

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 15

On 10 years moved by Gen^l Pinkney

N. H. ay. Ma.s.s. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.

V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

D^r Franklin reminded the Convention that it did not follow from an omission to insert the restriction in the Const.i.tution that the persons in question w^d be actually chosen into the Legislature.

M^r Rutlidge. 7 years of Citizenship have been required for the House of Representatives. Surely a longer time is requisite for the Senate, which will have more power.

M^r Williamson. It is more necessary to guard the Senate in this case than the other House. Bribery & cabal can be more easily practised in the choice of the Senate which is to be made by the Legislatures composed of a few men, than of the House of Represent^s who will be chosen by the people.

M^r Randolph will agree to 9 years with the expectation that it will be reduced to seven if M^r Wilson's motion to reconsider the vote fixing 7 years for the House of Representatives should produce a reduction of that period.

On a question for 9 years

N. H. ay. Ma.s.s. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d no.

V^a ay. N. C. div^d. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The term "Resident" was struck out, & "inhabitant" inserted nem. con.

Art. V. Sect. 3. as amended agreed to nem. con.

Sect. 4. agreed to nem. con.

Article VI. Sect. 1. taken up.

M^r Madison & M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out "each House" & to insert "the House of Representatives;" the right of the Legislatures to regulate the times & places &c. in the election of Senators being involved in the right of appointing them, which was disagreed to.

Division of the question being called, it was taken on the first part down to "but their provisions concerning &c."

The first part was agreed to nem. con.

M^r Pinkney & M^r Rutlidge moved to strike out the remaining part viz but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the Legislature of the United States. The States they contended could & must be relied on in such cases.

M^r Ghorum. It would be as improper take this power from the Nat^l Legislature, as to Restrain the British Parliament from regulating the circ.u.mstances of elections, leaving this business to the Counties themselves--

M^r Madison.[20] The necessity of a Gen^l Gov^t supposes that the State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expence of their local conveniency or prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures of the States, supposes that the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrouled right of regulating the times places & manner of holding elections. These were words of great lat.i.tude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce, should a.s.semble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place, sh^d all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district; these & many other points would depend on the Legislatures, and might materially affect the appointments. Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would produce a like inequality in their representation in the Nat^l Legislature, as it was presumable that the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter. What danger could there be in giving a controuling power to the Nat^l Legislature? Of whom was it to consist?

1. of a Senate to be chosen by the State Legislatures. If the latter therefore could be trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. 2. of Representatives elected by the same people who elect the State Legislatures; Surely then if confidence is due to the latter, it must be due to the former. It seemed as improper in principle, though it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the State Legislatures this great authority over the election of the Representatives of the people in the Gen^l Legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their Representatives in the State Legislatures.

[20] Madison wrote to Jefferson, July 18:

"I have taken lengthy notes of everything that has yet pa.s.sed, and mean to go on with the drudgery, if no indisposition obliges me to discontinue it. It is not possible to form any judgment of the future duration of the Session. I am led by sundry circ.u.mstances to guess that the residue of the work will not be very quickly despatched. The public mind is very impatient for ye event, and various reports are circulating which tend to inflame curiosity. I do not learn however that any discontent is expressed at the concealment; and have little doubt that the people will be as ready to receive as we shall be able to propose, a Government that will secure their liberties & happiness."--Mad. MSS.

M^r King. If this power be not given to the Nat^l Legislature, their right of judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated. No probability has been suggested of its being abused by them. Altho this scheme of erecting the Gen^l Gov^t on the authority of the State Legislatures has been fatal to the federal establishment, it would seem as if many gentlemen, still foster the dangerous idea.

M^r Gov^r Morris observed that the States might make false returns and then make no provisions for new elections.

M^r Sherman did not know but it might be best to retain the clause, though he had himself sufficient confidence in the State Legislatures.

The motion of M^r P. & M^r R. did not prevail.

The word "respectively" was inserted after the word "State."

On the motion of M^r Read the word "their" was struck out, & "regulations in such cases" inserted in place of "provisions concerning them" the clause then reading--"but regulations in each of the foregoing cases may at any time, be made or altered by the Legislature of the U.

S." This was meant to give the Nat^l Legislature a power not only to alter the provisions of the States, but to make regulations in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.

Art. VI. Sect. 1. as thus amended was agreed to nem. con.

Adjourned.

FRIDAY AUG^{ST} 10. IN CONVENTION

Art. VI. Sect. 2. taken up.

M^r Pinkney. The Committee as he had conceived were instructed to report the proper qualifications of property for the members of the Nat^l Legislature; instead of which they have referred the task to the Nat^l Legislature itself. Should it be left on this footing, the first Legislature will meet without any particular qualifications of property; and if it should happen to consist of rich men they might fix such qualifications as may be too favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run into. He was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristocratic influence in the Const.i.tution but he thought it essential that the members of the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judges, should be possessed of competent property to make them independent & respectable. It was prudent when such great powers were to be trusted to connect the tie of property with that of reputation in securing a faithful administration. The Legislature would have the fate of the Nation put into their hands. The President would also have a very great influence on it. The Judges would have not only important causes between Citizen & Citizen but also where foreigners are concerned. They will even be the Umpires between the U. States and individual States as well as between one State & another. Were he to fix the quantum of property which should be required, he should not think of less than one hundred thousand dollars for the President, half of that sum for each of the Judges, and in like proportion for the members of the Nat^l Legislature. He would however leave the sums blank. His motion was that the President of the U. S. the Judges, and members of the Legislature should be required to swear that they were respectively possessed of a cleared uninc.u.mbered Estate to the amount of ---- in the case of the President &c &c.

M^r Rutlidge seconded the motion, observing that the Committee had reported no qualifications because they could not agree on any among themselves, being embarra.s.sed by the danger on one side of displeasing the people by making them high, and on the other of rendering them nugatory by making them low.

M^r Elseworth. The different circ.u.mstances of different parts of the U.

S. and the probable difference between the present and future circ.u.mstances of the whole, render it improper to have either _uniform_ or _fixed_ qualifications. Make them so high as to be useful in the S.

States, and they will be inapplicable to the E. States. Suit them to the latter, and they will serve no purpose in the former. In like manner what may be accommodated to the existing State of things among us, may be very inconvenient in some future state of them. He thought for these reasons that it was better to leave this matter to the Legislative discretion than to attempt a provision for it in the Const.i.tution.

Doct^r Franklin expressed his dislike of every thing that tended to debase the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the companion of wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation, it was not less true that the possession of property increased the desire of more property. Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with, were the richest rogues. We should remember the character which the Scripture requires in Rulers, that they should be men hating covetousness. This Const.i.tution will be much read and attended to in Europe, and if it should betray a great partiality to the rich will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most liberal and enlightened men there, but discourage the common people from removing to this Country.

The Motion of M^r Pinkney was rejected by so general a _no_, that the States were not called.

M^r Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Gov^t and ought to be fixed by the Const.i.tution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Const.i.tution. A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number authorized to elect. In all cases where the representatives of the people will have a personal interest distinct from that of their Const.i.tuents, there was the same reason for being jealous of them, as there was for relying on them with full confidence, when they had a common interest. This was one of the former cases. It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own privileges. It was a power also which might be made subservient to the views of one faction ag^{st} another. Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction.

M^r Elseworth, admitted that the power was not unexceptionable; but he could not view it as dangerous. Such a power with regard to the electors would be dangerous because it would be much more liable to abuse.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out "with regard to property" in order to leave the Legislature entirely at large.

M^r Williamson. This would surely never be admitted. Should a majority of the Legislature be composed of any particular description of men, of lawyers for example, which is no improbable supposition, the future elections might be secured to their own body.

M^r Madison observed that the British Parliam^t possessed the power of regulating the qualifications both of the electors, and the elected; and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had made the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the views of political or Religious parties.

Question on the motion to strike out with regard to property

N. H. no. Ma.s.s. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del.[21] no.

M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

[21] In the printed Journal Delaware did not vote--Madison's Note.

M^r Rutlidge was opposed to leaving the power to the Legislature--He proposed that the qualifications should be the same as for members of the State Legislatures.

M^r Wilson thought it would be best on the whole to let the Section go out. A uniform rule would probably never be fixed by the Legislature, and this particular power would constructively exclude every other power of regulating qualifications.

On the question for agreeing to Art. VI. Sect. 2^d