The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 5

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 5

M^r Gov^r Morris observed that the chances were almost infinite ag^{st} a majority of Electors from the same State.

On a question whether the last motion was in order, it was determined in the affirmative: 7 ays. 4 noes.

On the question of postponem^t it was agreed to nem. con.

M^r Carrol took occasion to observe that he considered the clause declaring that direct taxation on the States should be in proportion to representation, previous to the obtaining an actual census, as very objectionable, and that he reserved to himself the right of opposing it, if the Report of the Committee of detail should leave it in the plan.

M^r Gov^r Morris hoped the Committee would strike out the whole of the clause proportioning direct taxation to representation. He had only meant it as a bridge[10] to a.s.sist us over a certain gulph; having pa.s.sed the gulph the bridge may be removed. He thought the principle laid down with so much strictness, liable to strong objections.

[10] The object was to lessen the eagerness on one side, & the opposition on the other, to the share of representation claimed by the S. States on account of the Negroes.--Madison's Note.

On a ballot for a Committee to report a Const.i.tution conformable to the Resolutions pa.s.sed by the Convention, the members chosen were

M^r Rutlidge, M^r Randolph, M^r Ghorum, M^r Elseworth, M^r Wilson--

On motion to discharge the Com^e of the whole from the propositions submitted to the Convention by M^r C. Pinkney as the basis of a const.i.tution, and to refer them to the Committee of detail just appointed, it was ag^d to nem: con.

A like motion was then made & agreed to nem: con: with respect to the propositions of M^r Patterson.

Adjourned.

WEDNESDAY JULY 25. IN CONVENTION

Clause relating to the Executive being again under consideration[11]

[11] "Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise & seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the command in chief of the American army shall not be given to, nor devolve on, any but a natural _born_ citizen."--John Jay to Washington, July 25, 1787 (Wash. MSS.).

M^r Elseworth moved "that the Executive be appointed by the Legislature," except when the magistrate last chosen shall have continued in office the whole term for which he was chosen, & be reeligible, in which case the choice shall be by Electors appointed by the Legislatures of the States for that purpose. By this means a deserving magistrate may be reelected without making him dependent on the Legislature.

M^r Gerry repeated his remark that an election at all by the Nat^l Legislature was radically and incurably wrong; and moved that the Executive be appointed by the Governours & Presidents of the States, with advice of their Councils, and where there are no Councils by Electors chosen by the Legislatures. The executives to vote in the following proportions: viz--

M^r Madison. There are objections ag^{st} every mode that has been, or perhaps can be proposed. The election must be made either by some existing authority under the Nat^l or State Const.i.tutions--or by some special authority derived from the people--or by the people themselves.--The two Existing authorities under the Nat^l Const.i.tution w^d be the Legislative & Judiciary. The latter he presumed was out of the question. The former was in his Judgment liable to insuperable objections. Besides the general influence of that mode on the independence of the Executive, 1. the election of the Chief Magistrate would agitate & divide the legislature so much that the public interest would materially suffer by it. Public bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more violent ones by such occasions than by any others. 2. the candidate would intrigue with the Legislature, would derive his appointment from the predominant faction, and be apt to render his administration subservient to its views. 3. The Ministers of foreign powers would have and would make use of, the opportunity to mix their intrigues & influence with the Election. Limited as the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object of great moment with the great rival powers of Europe who have American possessions, to have at the head of our Governm^t a man attached to their respective politics & interests. No pains, nor perhaps expence, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature an appointm^t favorable to their wishes. Germany & Poland are witnesses of this danger. In the former, the election of the Head of the Empire, till it became in a manner hereditary, interested all Europe, and was much influenced by foreign interference. In the latter, altho' the elective Magistrate has very little real power, his election has at all times produced the most eager interference of foreign princes, and has in fact at length slid entirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities in the States are the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The appointment of the Nat^l Executive by the first was objectionable in many points of view, some of which had been already mentioned. He would mention one which of itself would decide his opinion. The Legislatures of the States had betrayed a strong propensity to a variety of pernicious measures. One object of the Nat^l Legisl^{re} was to controul this propensity. One object of the Nat^l Executive, so far as it would have a negative on the laws, was to controul the Nat^l Legislature so far as it might be infected with a similar propensity.

Refer the appointm^t of the Nat^l Executive to the State Legislatures, and this controuling purpose may be defeated. The Legislatures can & will act with some kind of regular plan, and will promote the appointm^t of a man who will not oppose himself to a favorite object. Should a majority of the Legislatures at the time of election have the same object, or different objects of the same kind, The Nat^l Executive would be rendered subservient to them.--An appointment by the State Executives, was liable among other objections to this insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they could & would be courted, and intrigued with by the Candidates, by their partizans, and by the Ministers of foreign powers. The State Judiciary had not & he presumed w^d not be proposed as a proper source of appointment. The option before us then lay between an appointment by Electors chosen by the people--and an immediate appointment by the people. He thought the former mode free from many of the objections which had been urged ag^{st} it, and greatly preferable to an appointment by the Nat^l Legislature. As the electors would be chosen for the occasion, would meet at once, & proceed immediately to an appointment, there would be very little opportunity for cabal, or corruption. As a further precaution, it might be required that they should meet at some place, distinct from the seat of Gov^t and even that no person within a certain distance of the place at the time sh^d be eligible. This Mode however had been rejected so recently & by so great a majority that it probably would not be proposed anew. The remaining mode was an election by the people or rather by the qualified part of them, at large: With all its imperfections he liked this best.

He would not repeat either the general argum^{ts}. for or the objections ag^{st} this mode. He would only take notice of two difficulties which he admitted to have weight. The first arose from the disposition in the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and the disadvantage this w^d throw on the smaller States. Great as this objection might be he did not think it equal to such as lay ag^{st} every other mode which had been proposed. He thought too that some expedient might be hit upon that would obviate it. The second difficulty arose from the disproportion of qualified voters in the N. & S. States, and the disadvantages which this mode would throw on the latter. The answer to this objection was 1. that this disproportion would be continually decreasing under the influence of the Republican laws introduced in the S. States, and the more rapid increase of their population. 2. That local considerations must give way to the general interest. As an individual from the S. States, he was willing to make the sacrifice.

M^r Elseworth. The objection drawn from the different sizes of the States, is unanswerable. The Citizens of the largest States would invariably prefer the candidate within the State; and the largest States w^d invariably have the man.

Question on M^r Elseworth's motion as above.

N. H. ay. Ma.s.s. no. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay.

V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Pinkney moved that the election by the Legislature be qualified with a proviso that no person be eligible for more than 6 years in any twelve years. He thought this would have all the advantage & at the same time avoid in some degree the inconveniency, of an absolute ineligibility a 2^d time.

Col. Mason approved the idea. It had the sanction of experience in the instance of Cong^s and some of the Executives of the States. It rendered the Executive as effectually independent, as an ineligibility after his first election, and opened the way at the same time for the advantage of his future services. He preferred on the whole the election by the Nat^l Legislature: Tho' Candor obliged him to admit, that there was great danger of foreign influence, as had been suggested. This was the most serious objection with him that had been urged.

M^r Butler. The two great evils to be avoided are cabal at home, & influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either if the Election be made by the Nat^l Legislature. On the other hand. The Gov^t should not be made so complex & unwieldy as to disgust the States. This would be the case, if the election sh^d be referred to the people. He liked best an election by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the States. He was ag^{st} a re-eligibility at all events. He was also ag^{st} a ratio of votes in the States. An equality should prevail in this case. The reasons for departing from it do not hold in the case of the Executive as in that of the Legislature.

M^r Gerry approved of M^r Pinkney's motion as lessening the evil.

M^r Gov^r Morris was ag^{st} a rotation in every case. It formed a political School, in w^{ch} we were always governed by the scholars, and not by the Masters. The evils to be guarded ag^{st} in this case are. 1. the undue influence of the Legislature. 2. instability of Councils. 3. misconduct in office. To guard ag^{st} the first, we run into the second evil. We adopt a rotation which produces instability of Councils. To avoid Sylla we fall into Charibdis. A change of men is ever followed by a change of measures. We see this fully exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves, particularly in the State of Pen^a. The self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to tread in the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not imitate Soloman. 2. the Rotation in office will not prevent intrigue and dependence on the Legislature. The man in office will look forward to the period at which he will become re-eligible. The distance of the period, the improbability of such a protraction of his life will be no obstacle.

Such is the nature of man, formed by his benevolent author no doubt for wise ends, that altho' he knows his existence to be limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were to live for ever. But taking another supposition, the inefficacy of the expedient will be manifest. If the magistrate does not look forward to his re-election to the Executive, he will be pretty sure to keep in view the opportunity of his going into the Legislature itself. He will have little objection then to an extension of power on a theatre where he expects to act a distinguished part; and will be very unwilling to take any step that may endanger his popularity with the Legislature, on his influence over which the figure he is to make will depend. 3. To avoid the third evil, impeachments will be essential. And hence an additional reason ag^{st} an election by the Legislature. He considered an election by the people as the best, by the Legislature as the worst, mode. Putting both these aside, he could not but favor the idea of M^r Wilson, of introducing a mixture of lot. It will diminish, if not destroy both cabal & dependence.

M^r Williamson was sensible that strong objections lay ag^{st} an election of the Executive by the Legislature, and that it opened a door for foreign influence. The princ.i.p.al objection ag^{st} an election by the people seemed to be, the disadvantage under which it would place the smaller States. He suggested as a cure for this difficulty, that each man should vote for 3 candidates, one of them he observed would be probably of his own State, the other 2. of some other States; and as probably of a small as a large one.

M^r Gov^r Morris liked the idea, suggesting as an amendment that each man should vote for two persons one of whom at least should not be of his own State.

M^r Madison also thought something valuable might be made of the suggestion with the proposed amendment of it. The second best man in this case would probably be the first, in fact. The only objection which occurred was that each Citizen after hav^g given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen, w^d throw away his second on some obscure Citizen of another State, in order to ensure the object of his first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that the Citizens of many States would be so sanguine of having their favorite elected, as not to give their second vote with sincerity to the next object of their choice. It might moreover be provided in favor of the smaller States that the Executive should not be eligible more than ---- times in ---- years from the same State.

M^r Gerry. A popular election in this case is radically vicious. The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert to delude them into any appointment. He observed that such a Society of men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati. They are respectable, united, and influential. They will in fact elect the chief Magistrate in every instance, if the election be referred to the people. His respect for the characters composing this Society could not blind him to the danger & impropriety of throwing such a power into their hands.

M^r d.i.c.kinson. As far as he could judge from the discussions which had taken place during his attendance, insuperable objections lay ag^{st} an election of the Executive by the Nat^l Legislature; as also by the Legislatures or Executives of the States. He had long leaned towards an election by the people which he regarded as the best & purest source.

Objections he was aware lay ag^{st} this mode, but not so great he thought as ag^{st} the other modes. The greatest difficulty in the opinion of the House seemed to arise from the partiality of the States to their respective Citizens. But might not this very partiality be turned to a useful purpose. Let the people of each State chuse its best Citizen. The people will know the most eminent characters of their own States, and the people of different States will feel an emulation in selecting those of which they will have the greatest reason to be proud.

Out of the thirteen names thus selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen either by the Nat^l Legislature, or by Electors appointed by it.

On a Question which was moved for postponing M^r Pinkney's motion, in order to make way for some such proposition as had been hinted by M^r Williamson & others, it pa.s.sed in the negative.

N. H. no. Ma.s.s. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay.

V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On M^r Pinkney's motion that no person shall serve in the Executive more than 6 years in 12. years, it pa.s.sed in the negative.

N. H. ay. Ma.s.s. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.

V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On a motion that the members of the Committee be furnished with copies of the proceedings it was so determined; S. Carolina alone being in the negative.

It was then moved that the members of the House might take copies of the Resolutions which had been agreed to; which pa.s.sed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Con. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.

Mary^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Gerry & M^r Butler moved to refer the resolution relating to the Executive (except the clause making it consist of a single person) to the Co[~m]ittee of detail.

M^r Wilson hoped that so important a branch of the System w^d not be committed untill a general principle sh^d be fixed by a vote of the House.

M^r Langdon. was for the commitment--Adj^d.

THURSDAY JULY. 26. IN CONVENTION.[12]

[12] "The affairs of the federal government are, I believe, in the utmost confusion: The convention is an expedient that will produce a decisive effect. It will either recover us from our present embarra.s.sments or complete our ruin; for I do suspect that if what they recommend sho^d be rejected this wo^d be the case. But I trust that the presence of Gen^l Washington will have great weight in the body itself so as to overawe & keep under the demon of party, & that the signature of his name to whatever act shall be the result of their deliberations will secure its pa.s.sage thro' the union."--Monroe to Jefferson, July 27, 1787 (_Writings of Monroe_, i., 173).