The Works of Mr. George Gillespie Part 34
3. The reverend brother cited 1 Cor. x. 33, to prove that all government is either a heathenish government, or a Jewish government, or a church government. This I denied: "Because the government of generals, admirals, mayors, sheriffs, is neither a Jewish government, nor a church government, nor a heathenish government." What saith he to this? "I deny it; a Jewish general is a Jewish government," &c., _Male Dicis_, p. 6. Deny it? No, Sir, you must prove (because you are the affirmer) that a Christian general, a Christian admiral, are church governments. For I deny it. You tell us, p. 7, you are persuaded it will trouble the whole world to bound civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the one from the other. You shall have them bounded and distinguished ere long, and the world not troubled neither. Meanwhile you have not made out your a.s.sertion from 1 Cor. x. 33.
4. The reverend brother had cited Rom. xiii. 4, to prove that the corrective part of church government belongs to the Christian magistrate.
And now he brings in my reply thus: that I said he abuseth the place, "Because spiritual censures belong not to the civil magistrate;" which, saith he, begs the question, _Male Dicis_, p. 7. I replied no such thing upon this argument. Look at my words again. How can the brother answer it,-to shape answers of his own devising as if they were mine? My answer was, That the punitive part, Rom. xiii. 4, belongs to all magistrates, whether Christian or infidel; which he takes notice of in the second place, and bids me prove "that Scripture-commands belong to infidels;" not observing that the question is not of Scripture-commands, but whether a duty mentioned in this or that scripture may not belong to infidels. There are two sorts of duties in Scripture; some which are duties by the law of G.o.d, written in man's heart at his creation, some principles and notions whereof remain in the hearts of all nations, even infidels by nature; other duties are such, by virtue of special commands given to the church, which are not contained in the law of nature. The first sort (of which the punishing of evil doers, mentioned Rom. xiii. 4, is one) belongs to those that are without the church as well as those within. The other only to those that are within.
5. The reverend brother had said in his sermon, "Of other governments besides magistracy I find no inst.i.tution." I cited 1 Thess. v. 12; 1 Tim.
v. 17; Heb. xiii. 7, 17, to prove another government (yea, the inst.i.tution of another government) besides magistracy. And, in my _Nihil Respondes_, I told he had laughed, but had not yet loosed the knot. Now hear his two answers: _Male Dicis_, p. 8, "First, for the inst.i.tution; for the Commissioner affirms so much. Had he said that these texts hold out an office or officer already inst.i.tuted, the words would have borne him out,"
&c. "But the inst.i.tution in this place I cannot see." See the like in Mr Hussey, p. 19, 22. I thank them both. That Scripture which supposeth an inst.i.tution, and holds out an office already inst.i.tuted, shall to me (and, I am confident, to others also) prove an inst.i.tution; for no text of Scripture can suppose or hold out that which is not true. Nay, hath Mr Coleman forgotten that himself proved an inst.i.tution of magistracy from Rom. xiii. 1, 2? Yet that text doth but hold out the office of magistracy already inst.i.tuted: but the inst.i.tution itself is not in that place.
Secondly, Mr Coleman answereth to all these three texts. To that, 1 Thess.
v. 12, "Them which are over you in the Lord," he saith that these words prove not that it is not meant of magistracy. But he takes not the strength of the argument. My words were, "Here are some who are no civil magistrates set over the Thessalonians in the Lord." This the reverend brother must admit to be a good proof, or otherwise say that the civil magistrates set over the Thessalonians, though they were heathens, yet were set over them in the Lord.
For that of 1 Tim. v. 17, he saith it doth not hold out ruling elders.
Whether it doth hold ruling elders or not, doth not at all belong to the present question. It is easy to answer something, so that a man will not tie himself to the point. The place was brought by me to prove "another government beside magistracy," which he denied. Now suppose the place to be meant only of preaching elders, yet here is a rule or government: "Elders that rule well;" and these are no civil magistrates, but such as "labour in the word and doctrine." Come on now. "But I will deal clearly (saith the brother): These officers are ministers which are inst.i.tuted not here, but elsewhere,-and these are the rulers here mentioned. And so have I loosed the knot." Now, Sir, you shall see I will not _male dicere_, but _bene dicere_. My blessing on you for it. You have at last loosed the knot so perfectly, that you are come to an agreement with me in this great point, which I thus demonstrate: He that acknowledgeth ministers to be inst.i.tuted rulers, acknowledgeth another inst.i.tuted government beside magistracy. But Mr Coleman acknowledgeth ministers to be inst.i.tuted rulers, therefore Mr Coleman acknowledgeth another inst.i.tuted government beside magistracy.
To the other texts, Heb. xiii. 7, 17, he saith nothing against my argument, only expounds the rulers to be guides, as Mr Hussey also doth, of which more elsewhere; meanwhile it is certain that ? ????????? is usually taken for a name of highest authority, yea, given to emperors; for which see learned Salmasius in his _Walo Messalinus_, p. 219, 220. It is Joseph's highest t.i.tle to express his government of Egypt, Acts vii. 10.
It must the rather be a name of government and authority in this place, Heb. xiii. 17, because subjection and obedience is required: "Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves." When the word signifieth ?d????, _seu viae ducem_ (and it is very rarely so used by the Septuagints, but frequently, and almost in innumerable places, they use it for a name of rule and authority), obedience and subjection is not due to such an one _qua talis_; for obedience and subjection cannot be _correlata_ to the leading of the way, when it is without authority and government.
6. I having charged Mr Coleman's doctrine with this consequence, "That there ought to be neither suspension from the sacrament, nor excommunication, nor ordination, nor deposition of ministers, nor receiving of appeals, except all these things be done by the civil magistrate," which things, I said, "are most of them corrective, and all of them more than doctrinal,"-instead of making answer, the reverend brother expresseth the error, which I objected to him, thus: "That here are no church censures," which is the _quaesitum_, saith he, _Male Dicis_, p. 10. Here, again, he brings an imagination of his own, both for matter and words, instead of that which I said, and doth not take the argument right. If the minister's power be merely doctrinal, and government wholly in the magistrate's hands, then all the particulars enumerated; for instance, suspension from the sacrament, and the receiving of appeals (which he must not bring under the _quaesitum_, except he bring the ordinance of Parliament under the _quaesitum_), shall be wholly in the magistrate's hand; and elderships may not suspend from the sacrament; cla.s.ses and synods may not receive appeals, which yet, by the ordinance, they have power to do. One of the particulars, and but one, the reverend brother hath here touched, and it is this: "For ordination of ministers, I say, it is within the commission of teaching, and so appertains to the doctrinal part." This is the effect of his zeal to maintain that all ecclesiastical ministerial power is merely doctrinal. But mark the consequence of it: He that holds ordination of ministers to be within the commission of teaching, and to appertain to the doctrinal part, must hold, by consequence, that the power of ordination is given _uni_ as well as _unitati_; that is, that every single minister hath power to ordain, as well as the cla.s.ses. But Mr Coleman holds ordination of ministers to be within the commission of teaching, &c. The reason of the proposition is clear, because the commission of teaching belongs to every single minister, so that if the power of ordination be within that commission, it must needs belong to every single minister. _Quid respondes_?
7. The reverend brother having brought an odious argument against me, which did conclude the magistrate to manage his office for and under the devil, if not for and under Christ, I show his syllogism to have four terms, and therefore worthy to be exploded. I get now two replies:
First, "This is an error (if one) in logic, not divinity. Is it an error in divinity to make a syllogism with four terms?" _Male Dicis_, p. 15. See now if he be a fit man to call others to school, who puts an _if_ in this business-_if one_. Who did ever doubt of it? And if it be an error in divinity to be fallacious, and to deceive, then it is an error in divinity to make a syllogism with four terms, yea, as foul an error as can be.
Secondly, He admitteth not my distinction of those words, "Under Christ, and for Christ." I said the Christian magistrate is under Christ, and for Christ, that is, he is serviceable to Christ, but he is not under Christ nor for Christ as Christ's vicegerent, _vice Christi_, in Christ's stead, as Christ is Mediator. The reverend brother saith, He foresaw that this would be said (the greater fault it was to make his argument so unclear and undistinct), but he rejecteth the distinction as being _distinctio sine differentia_. "If a magistrate (saith he) be thus far a servant of Christ, as Mediator, that he is to do his work, to take part with him, to be for his glory, then he doth it _vice Christi_." He adds the simile of a servant. Hence it follows, by the reverend brother's principles, that the king's cook, because he doth work and service for the king, therefore he doth it _vice regis_, and as the king's vicegerent. Likewise, that a servant who obeyeth his master's wife, and executeth her commands, because it is his master's will, and for his master's honour, doth therefore obey his master's wife _vice domini_, as his master's vicegerent; and, by consequence, that the duty of obedience to the wife doth originally belong to the husband; for the capacity of a vicegerent, which he hath by his vicegerentship, is primarily the capacity of him whose vicegerent he is.
These, and the like absurd consequences, will unavoidably follow upon the reverend brother's argumentation, that he who doth Christ service doth it _vice Christi_, as Christ's vicegerent; and that to be a man's vicegerent, and to do a man's work or service, which I made two different things, are all one. But, further, observe his tergiversation. I had, p. 13, proved my distinction out of these words of his own: "The Commissioner saith, Magistracy is not derived from Christ. I say, magistracy is given to Christ to be serviceable in his kingdom; so that, though the Commissioner's a.s.sertion be sound (which in due place will be discussed), yet it infringeth nothing that I said." I asked, therefore, _qua fide_ he could confound in his argument brought against me those two things which himself had so carefully distinguished. There is no reply to this in _Male Dicis_. When the brother thought it for his advantage, he denied that the magistrate's being serviceable to Christ doth enter the derivation of his power by a commission of vicegerentship from Christ (for that was the derivation spoken of), and yielded that the magistrate may be said to be serviceable to Christ, though his power be not derived from Christ. Now he denieth the very same distinction for substance.
8. Whereas the reverend brother had told the Parliament that he seeth not, in the whole Bible, any one act of that church government which is now in controversy, I brought some scriptural instances against his opinion, not losing either the argument from Matt. xviii. (concerning which he asketh what is become of it), or other scriptural arguments, which I intend, by G.o.d's a.s.sistance, to prosecute elsewhere. Now hear what is replied to the instances which were given. First, To that, 1 Cor. v. 13, "Put away that wicked person from among you," his answer is, "I say, and it is sufficient against the Commissioner, If this be a church censure, then the whole church jointly, and every particular person, hath power of church censure." _Male Dicis_, p. 10. I hope, Sir, it is not sufficient against me that you say it, so long as you say nothing to prove it. I told you that Mr Prynne himself (who holds not that every particular person hath power of church censure) acknowledged that text to be a warrant for excommunication, and when you say "every particular person," you say more than the Independents say, and I am sure more than the text will admit, for the text saith, "Put away from among you," therefore this power was given not _uni_, but _unitati_, and this _unitas_ was the presbytery of Corinth. The sentence was inflicted ?p? t?? p?e?????,-_by many_, 2 Cor.
ii. 6, it is not said _by all_. I might say much for this, but I will not now leave the argument in hand; for it is enough against Mr Coleman that the place prove an act of church government, flowing from a power not civil but ecclesiastical. To whom the power belonged is another question.
To the next instance, from 2 Cor. ii. 6, which is coincident with the former, a punishment or censure inflicted _by many_. "It is only a reprehension (saith he),-?p?t??a,-which, by all the places in the New Testament, can amount no higher than to an objurgation, and so is doctrinal." _Ans._ 1. He made it even now an act of the whole church jointly, and of every particular person. Why did he not clear himself in this,-how the whole church, men, women, children and all, did doctrinally reprehend him? 2. If the objurgation must be restricted, To whom? Not to a single minister (yet every single minister hath power of doctrinal objurgation), but to the presbytery. It was an act of those p?e???e? I spake of; and this is a ground for that distinction between ministerial and presbyterial admonition, which Mr Coleman, p. 22, doth not admit. 3.
If it were granted that ?p?t??a in this text amounteth to no more but an objurgation, yet our argument stands good; for the Apostle having, in his first epistle, required the Corinthians to put away from among them that wicked person, which they did accordingly resolve to do (which makes the Apostle commend their obedience, 2 Cor. ii. 9), no doubt either the offender was at this time actually excommunicated and cast out of the church, or (as others think) they were about to excommunicate him, if the Apostle had not, by his second epistle, prevented them, and taken them off with this _sufficit_: Such a degree of censure is enough, the party is penitent, go no higher. 4. When the reverend brother appealeth to all the places in the New Testament, he may take notice that the word ?p?t??a is nowhere found in the New Testament, except in this very text. And if his meaning be concerning the verb ?p?t???? he may find it used to express a coercive power, as in Christ's rebuking of the winds and waves, Matt.
viii. 26; Mark iv. 39; his rebuking of the fever, Luke iv. 39; his rebuking of the devil (which was not a doctrinal, but a coercive rebuke), Mark i. 25; ix. 25; Luke iv. 35; ix. 42. Sometimes it is put for an authoritative charge, laying a restraint upon a man, and binding him from liberty in this or that particular, as Matt. xii. 16; Mark iii. 12; viii.
30; Luke ix. 21. The word ?p?t??a I find in the apocryphal book of Wisdom, chap. iii. 10. It is said of the wicked, ????s?? ?p?t??a?, they shall have _correction_ or _punishment_. The whole chapter maketh an opposition between the G.o.dly and the wicked, in reference to punishments and judgments. The Hebrew ??? (which, if the observation hold which is made by Arias Monta.n.u.s, and divers others, following Kimchi, when it is construed with ? signifieth _objurgavit_, _duriter reprehendit_; when without ?, it signifieth _corrupit_, _perdidit_, or _maledixit_), the Septuagint do most usually turn it ?p?t??? and that in some places where it is without ?, as Psal. cxix. 21, "Thou hast rebuked the proud that are cursed;" ?p?t??sa?,-Pagnin, _disperdidisti_,-thou hast destroyed, so the sense is; it is rebuke, with a judgment or a curse upon them. The second part of the verse, in the Greek, is exegetical to the first part, "Thou hast rebuked the proud, ?p??at??at??, cursed are they," &c.; so Zech. iii.
2, "The Lord rebuke (?p?t??sa?) thee, O Satan." The same phrase is used in Jude, ver. 9, which must needs be meant of a coercive, efficacious, divine power, restraining Satan. The same original word they render by ?f?????, which signifieth to separate and to excommunicate, Mal. ii. 3, "Behold I will corrupt your seed," &c. In the preceding words, G.o.d told them that he would curse them. The same word they render by ?p?s???a????, _extermino_, Isa. xvii. 13, a place which speaks of a judgment to be inflicted, not of a doctrinal reproof. Yet Aquila readeth there ?p?t??se?; likewise the word which the Septuagint render ?p??e?a, _perdition_, Prov. xiii. 6, and ????, _wrath_, Isa. li. 20, in other places they render it ?p?t??s??: Psal. lxxvi. 6, "At thy rebuke, O G.o.d of Jacob, both the chariot and horse are cast into a dead sleep;" lx.x.x. 16, "They perish at the rebuke of thy countenance." These are _real_ rebukes, that is, judgments and punishments.
4. What saith Mr Coleman to Pasor, who expounds ?p?t??a to be the same with ?p?t????, _mulcta_, and that, 2 Cor. ii. 6. it is meant of excommunication; which he proves by this reason, Because, in the same place, the Apostle exhorteth the Corinthians to forgive him. Add hereunto Erasmus's observation upon the word ????sa?(1348) (ver. 8, to "confirm your love toward him"); that it implies an authoritative ratification of a thing by judicial suffrage and sentence. Which well agreeth to the p?e???e?, ver. 6; that is, that they who had judicially censured him, should also judicially loose him and make him free. Now, therefore, the circ.u.mstances and context being observed, and the practice, 2 Cor. ii. 6, compared with the precept, 1 Cor. v. 13, I conclude, that, whether this ?p?t??a was excommunication already inflicted, or whether it was a lesser degree of censure, tending to excommunication,-a censure it was, and more than ministerial objurgation. And it is rightly rendered by the English translators _punishment_ or _censure;_ which well agreeth with the signification of the verb ?p?t??? given us by Hesychius,(1349) and by Julius Pollux;(1350) who makes ?p?t???, to _punish_ or _chastise_, and ?p?t??a, _punishment_ or _chastis.e.m.e.nt_. Clemens Alexandrinus(1351) useth ?p?t??a as well as ?p?t????, _pro poena vel supplicio_. So Stepha.n.u.s, in _Thes. Ling. Gr._ From all which it may appear that the text in hand holds forth a corrective church government in the hands of church officers; the thing which Mr Coleman denieth.
To the next instance, from 1 Tim. v. 19, "Against an elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses," the reverend brother answereth, "It is either in relation to the judgment of charity, or ministerial conviction, as the verses following." _Ans._ 1. That of two or three witnesses is taken from the law of Moses, where it is referred only to a forensical proceeding. But in relation either to the judgment of charity, or ministerial conviction, it is not necessary that there be two or three witnesses. If a scandalous sin be certainly known to a minister, though the thing be not certified by two or three witnesses, yet a minister, upon certain knowledge had of the fact, may both believe it and ministerially convince the offender. But there may not be a consistorial proceeding without two or three witnesses. 2. Since he appealeth to the following verses, let ver. 22 decide it: "Lay hands suddenly on no man."
To whom the laying on of hands or ordination did belong, to them also it did belong to receive an accusation against an elder: but to the presbytery did belong the laying on of hands, or ordination, 1 Tim. iv.
14; therefore to the presbytery did belong the receiving of an accusation against an elder. And so it was not the act of a single minister, as ministerial conviction is.
To the last instance, from Rev. ii. 14, 15, 20, the reverend brother answers, That he had striven to find out how church censures might be there grounded, but was constrained to let it alone. But what is it, in his opinion, which is there blamed in the angels of those churches? Doth he imagine that those who are so much commended by Christ himself for their holding fast of his name, and of the true faith, did not so much as doctrinally or ministerially oppose the foul errors of the Balaamites and of Jezebel? No doubt but this was done: but Christ reproves them, because such scandalous persons were yet suffered to be in the church, and were not cast out. "I have a few things against thee, because thou hast there them that hold the doctrine of Balaam;" and, ver. 20, "Thou sufferest that woman Jezebel." And why was the very having or suffering them in the church a fault, if it had not been a duty to cast them out of the church?
which casting out could not be by banishment, but by excommunication. It did not belong to the angel to cast out the Balaamites out of Pergamos, but he might, and ought to have cast them out of the church in Pergamos.
9. Mr Coleman hath another pa.s.sage against the distinction of church censures and civil punishments. "But what are ecclesiastical censures (saith he)? Let us take a taste. Is deposition from the ministry? This kings have done," &c., _Male Dicis_, p. 7. Now _similia labra lactucis_.
But for all that, the taste is vitiated, and doth not put a difference between things that are different. Deposition is sometimes taken, improperly, for expulsion; as Balsamon, in _Conc. Nicoen._, can. 19, doth observe. And so the Christian magistrate may remove or put away ministers when they deserve to be put away, that is, by a coercive power to restrain them, imprison or banish them, and, in case of capital crimes, punish them with capital punishments. King James, having once heard a dispute in St.
Andrews about the deposition of ministers, was convinced that it doth not belong to the civil magistrate, "yet (said he) I can depose a minister's head from his shoulders." Which was better divinity than this of Mr Coleman. If we take deposition properly, as it is more than the expelling, sequestering or removing of a minister from this or that place, and comprehendeth that which the Council of Ancyra, can. 18, calls ?fa??e?s?a?
t?? t??? t?? p?es?te????, _the honour of presbytership to be taken away_, or a privation of that _presbyteratus_, the order of a presbyter, and that ????s?a, the authority and power of dispensing the word, sacraments, and discipline, which was given in ordination, so none have power to depose who have not power to ordain. It belongeth not to the magistrate either to make or unmake ministers. Therefore, in the ancient church, the bishops had power of the deposition as well as of the ordination of presbyters, yet they were bound up that they might not depose either presbyter or deacon without the concurrence of a presbytery or synod in the business.(1352) Mark, of the _synod_, not of the magistrate. As for the testimonies brought by Mr Coleman, he doth, both here and in divers other places, name his authors, without quoting the places. It seems he hath either found the words cited by others, but durst not trust the quotations, or else hath found somewhat in those places which might make against him. However, all that he can cite of that kind concerning deposition of ministers by emperors, is meant of a coercive expulsion, not of that which we call properly deposition. And to this purpose let him take the observation of a great antiquary.(1353)
And, withal, he may take notice that Protestant writers(1354) do disclaim the magistrate's power of deposing ministers, and hold that deposition is a part of ecclesiastical jurisdiction: ministers being always punishable (as other members of the commonwealth), according to the law of the land, for any offence committed against law.
CHAPTER III.
THAT MR COLEMAN'S AND MR HUSSEY'S OPPOSING OF CHURCH GOVERNMENT NEITHER IS NOR CAN BE RECONCILED WITH THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT.
Mr Coleman's doctrine was by me charged to be a violation of the solemn league and covenant. This he acknowledged in his _Re-examination_, p. 13, 17, to be a very grievous charge, and a greater fault in him than in divers others, if made out; and he desired seriously, yea, challenged it by the right of a Christian, and by the right of a minister, that I should prosecute this charge; whereupon I did, in my _Nihil Respondes_, prosecute it so far, that, by five strong arguments, I did demonstrate the repugnancy of his doctrine to the covenant. About a month afterward comes out Mr Hussey's book, wherein the charge itself (before desired to be prosecuted) is declined expressly by Mr Coleman in the few lines by him prefixed (which are ranked together with the errata), in which he desires that the argumentative part may be so prosecuted as that the charge of covenant-breaking may be laid aside; which, if it be taken up, he lets me know beforehand it shall be esteemed by them a _nihil respondes_. It is also declined by Mr Hussey, p. 15: "The argument of the covenant is too low to be thought on in the discourse: we are now in an higher region than the words of the covenant," &c.:-a tenet looked upon by the reformed churches as proper to those that are inspired with the ghost of Arminius;(1355) for the remonstrants, both at and after the Synod of Dort, did cry down the obligation of all national covenants, oaths, &c., in matters of religion, under the colour of taking the Scripture only for a rule. Well, we see the charge declined as nothing. But this is not all.
Almost two months after my proof of the charge, Mr Coleman comes out with his _Male Dicis_, and declines both the charge itself (which he calls an "impertinent charge," p. 22), and my five arguments too, without so much as taking notice of them, or offering replies to them; yea, all that I said in my _Nihil Respondes_, p. 27-34, in prosecution of this argument concerning covenant-breaking, the reverend brother hath skipped over _sicco pede_ in the half of one page, p. 23; all that follows is new and other matter, wherein he did not mind his own answer to the learned viewer, p. 33, "I will keep you to the laws of disputation, and will not answer but as it is to the matter in hand." I leave it to be judged by men of knowledge and piety, whether such an one doth not give them some ground to apprehend that he is a?t??at????t??, that is, self-judged, who first calleth so eagerly for making out a charge against him, and then when it is made out, doth decline the charge, and not answer the arguments; and such as esteem the charge of covenant-breaking to be a _nihil respondes_, and the argument of the covenant too low to be thought on in a controversy about church government, "O my soul, come not thou into their secret; unto their a.s.sembly, mine honour, be not thou united." It is in vain for them to palliate or shelter their covenant-breaking with appealing from the covenant to the Scripture, for _subordinata non pugnant_. The covenant is _norma recta_,-a right rule, though the Scripture alone be _norma recti_,-the rule of right. If they hold the covenant to be unlawful, or to have anything in it contrary to the word of G.o.d, let them speak out. But to profess the breach of the covenant to be a grievous and great fault, and worthy of a severe censure, and yet to decline the charge and proofs thereof, is a most horrible scandal; yea, be astonished, O ye heavens, at this, and give ear, O earth! how small regard is had to the oath of G.o.d by men professing the name of G.o.d.
As for that little which the reverend brother hath replied unto; first, he takes notice of a pa.s.sage of his sermon at the taking of the covenant, which I had put him in mind of, but he answereth only to one particular, viz., concerning that clause, "Doubtless many materials of Prelacy must of necessity be retained, as absolutely necessary." I asked what he understood by this clause? Now observe his answer: "I answer ingenuously, as he desires, and fully, as I conceive, These materials of Prelacy are ordination." Remember you said, "_many_ materials of Prelacy." I beseech you, Sir, How many is ordination? Ordination, ordination, ordination; tell on till you think you have made many materials; and, withal, tell us (if this be the meaning, that ordination should be retained without any power of ecclesiastical government in the ministry) how was it imaginable that he could hereby satisfy that scruple which then he spoke to, viz., the scruple about the purging away of the exorbitances of Prelacy, and retaining a regulated Prelacy? And after all this, I shall desire him to expound that other clause (which I desired before, but he hath not done it), "Taking away (said he) the exorbitancies, the remaining will be a new government, and no Prelacy." Either he means this of a new church government distinct from the civil, so that the ministry should have new power of government; or he meant it of the way which now he pleads for. If the former, I have what I would. Mr Coleman himself, as well as other men, took the covenant with an intention to have an ecclesiastical government distinct from the civil. If the latter, then let him answer these two things: 1. What good sense there was in applying such an answer to such a scruple, as if the Erastian way, or the appropriating of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction wholly to the civil magistrate, could be the way to satisfy those who scrupled the total abolition of Prelacy. 2. How will he reconcile himself with himself; for here, p. 22, he saith, That his way was in practice before I was born, "and the constant practice of England always." This, as it is a most notorious untruth (for the constant practice of England hath granted to the clergy, as he calls them, after the popish dialect, a power of deposition and excommunication, whereas his way denies all corrective power or church censures to the ministry), so, if it were a truth, it is utterly inconsistent with that which he said of the remaining part, namely, that it will be a new government. If it be his way, how will he make it the constant practice of England always, and a new government too?
In the next place, the reverend brother makes short work of my five arguments to prove the repugnancy of his doctrine to the solemn league and covenant. They were too hot for him to be much touched upon: "All is but this much (saith he), the covenant mentioneth and supposeth a distinct church government." It is hard when arguments are neither repeated nor answered. He repeats a point which was proved (and but a part of that), but not the proofs; and so he answereth (rather to the conclusion than to the arguments) these two things: "First (saith he), the expressions in the covenant are according to the general apprehensions of the times, which took such a thing for granted, yet I believe Mr Gillespie cannot make such a supposition obligatory." Now you yield, Sir, what before you eagerly contended against, viz., that the covenant doth suppose a church government. Remember your simile of the jury sworn to inquire into the felony of a prisoner, which oath doth not suppose the prisoner to be guilty of felony, but he is to be tried, guilty or not guilty. We are now so far agreed, that the covenant doth suppose a church government distinct from the civil government, and yet not merely doctrinal, for that was the point which I proved, and which here he yields. As for the obligation of an oath sworn upon such supposition, I answer, 1. It is more than supposed, the words and expressions of the covenant do plainly hold out the thing as I proved, and as the reverend brother here seems to yield. 2.
That which an oath doth necessarily suppose, if the oath be lawful, and the thing supposed lawful, is without all controversy obligatory. Now the reverend brother doth acknowledge both the covenant itself to be a lawful oath, and that which the covenant supposeth, namely, a church government distinct from the civil government, and yet not merely doctrinal, to be a lawful thing; for he professeth to yield it (though not _jure divino_, yet) in prudence, which he cannot do, if he make the thing unlawful. 3.
That which an oath doth suppose is sometimes supposed _vi materiae_, or _consequentiae_, that is, the words of the oath do necessarily imply such a thing, though it be not intended by the swearer; and here I will tell Mr Coleman one story of Alexander for another: When Alexander was coming against a town to destroy it, he met Anaximenes, who, as he understood, came to make intercession and supplication for sparing the town. Alexander prevented him with an oath that he would not do that thing which Anaximenes should make pet.i.tion for, whereupon Anaximenes made pet.i.tion that he would destroy the town. Alexander found himself bound by the plain words of his oath not to do what he intended, and so did forbear. And to add a divine story to an human, Joshua and the princes of Israel did swear to the Gibeonites upon a supposition that was not true, yet they found themselves tied by their oath. So he that sweareth to his own hurt must not change, the oath being otherwise lawful, Psal. xv. 4, yet that self-hurt which is wrapped up in the matter of his oath was not intended in swearing. Sometimes, again, that which is supposed and implied in an oath, lieth also in the thoughts and intentions of those that swear. Now, where those two are coincident, that is, where the thing supposed in an oath is both implied necessarily in the words of the oath, and is also according to the apprehensions of those that swear (which is the case here in the covenant, and is acknowledged by the reverend brother), I should think it most strange how any divine can have the least doubt concerning the obligation of such a thing, except he conceive the thing itself to be unlawful.
His second answer is this: "In my way (saith he) the governments, civil and ecclesiastical, are in the subject matter clearly distinct. When the Parliament handles matters of war, it is a military court; when business of state, it is a civil court; when matters of religion, it is an ecclesiastical court." If this hold good, then it will follow, 1. That the Parliament, when they deliberate about matters of war or matters of religion, are not, at least formally and properly, a civil court, else how makes he these so clearly distinct? 2. That ministers may be called civil officers, for consider his words in his _Re-examination_, p. 11: "I do not exclude ministers, neither from ecclesiastical nor civil government, in a ministerial way, doctrinally and declaratively." Compare this with his present answer, it will amount to thus much: That different denominations being taken from the different subject matter, ministers, when they handle doctrinally matters of religion, are ecclesiastical ministers; and when they handle doctrinally matters of civil government, which himself alloweth them to do, they are civil ministers. But now to apply his answer to the argument, How doth all this solve the repugnancy of his doctrine to the covenant? If he had examined my arguments, he had found that most of them prove from the covenant a church government distinct from civil government, subjective as well as objective; that is, another government besides magistracy; different agents as well as different acts; different hands as well as handling of different matters. I know the Christian magistrate may and ought to have a great influence in matters of religion; and whatsoever is due to him by the word of G.o.d, or by the doctrine either of the ancient or reformed churches, I do not infringe, but do maintain and strengthen it. But the point in hand is, that the covenant doth undeniably suppose, and clearly hold forth a government in the church distinct from magistracy, which is proved by these arguments (which, as they are not yet answered, so I will briefly apply them to the proof of that point which now Mr Coleman sticks at): 1. The church covenant mentioned in the covenant is as distinct from the privileges of parliament, as the first article of the covenant is distinct from the third article. 2. The church government in the first article of the covenant, the reformation whereof we are to endeavour, differeth from church government by archbishops, bishops, &c., mentioned in the second article, as much as a thing to be reformed differeth from a thing to be extirpated; so that the church government formerly used in the church of England is looked upon two ways in the covenant, either _qua_ church government, and so we swear to endeavour the reformation of it (which I hope was not meant of reforming that part of the privileges of Parliament whereby they meddle with religion in a parliamentary way), or _qua_ church government, by archbishops, bishops, &c., and so we swear to endeavour the extirpation of it. This difference between the first and second articles, between reformation and extirpation, proveth that the covenant doth suppose that the church government formerly used in the church of England, in so far as it was a church government, is not _eatenus_ to be abolished, but in so far as it was a corrupt church government, that is, prelatical.
3. Church government, in the covenant, is matched with doctrine, worship, and catechising. Now these are subjectively different from civil government, for the civil magistrate doth not act doctrinally nor catechetically, neither can he dispense the word and sacraments, as Mr Coleman acknowledgeth. 4. In the first part of the first article of the covenant, concerning "the preservation of the reformed religion in the church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government," it is uncontroverted, that discipline and government are ecclesiastical, and subjectively different from civil government, that is, though divers who have a hand in the civil government are ruling elders, yet it is as true that divers members of Parliament and inferior civil courts are not church officers; and of the ministry none are civil governors which makes the two governments clearly distinct subjectively. Now the second part of that article concerning "the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government," cannot so far differ from the first part of that article in the sense of the words, "discipline and government," as that the same words, in the same article of the same covenant, should signify things differing _toto genere_, which will follow, unless "discipline and government" in the second branch, and "form of church government" in the third branch, be understood of the power of church officers, and not of the magistrate. 6. We did swear to "endeavour the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, according to the word of G.o.d and the example of the best reformed churches." Now the word of G.o.d holds forth another government besides magistracy; for Mr Coleman himself hath acknowledged, that he finds in the New Testament ministers to be rulers, yea, inst.i.tuted rulers; and the example of the best reformed churches, without all doubt, leadeth us to an ecclesiastical government different from magistracy. Neither hath the reverend brother so much as once adventured to allege the contrary, except of the church of Israel, which, as it is heterogeneous, being none of the reformed churches mentioned in the covenant, so it shall be discussed in due place; from all which reasons I conclude, that the wit of man cannot reconcile Mr Coleman's doctrine with the covenant. 6. I add a confutation of him out of himself, thus: No such church government as Mr Coleman casts upon an uncertainty, whether the word hold out any such thing, can be, by his principles, the power of magistracy in things ecclesiastical, but another government beside magistracy. But the church government, mentioned in the first article of the covenant, is such a church government as Mr Coleman casts upon an uncertainty, whether the word hold out any such thing; therefore the church government mentioned in the first article of the covenant cannot be, by his principles, the power of magistracy, but another government beside magistracy. The proposition he will easily admit, unless he alter his a.s.sertions; the a.s.sumption is clear from his _Re-examination,_ p. 15.
CHAPTER IV.
MR COLEMAN AND MR HUSSEY'S ERRORS IN DIVINITY.
Mr Hussey all along calls for divinity schools: I confess himself hath much need of them, that he may be better grounded in his divinity; and that if he will plead any more for Christian magistracy, he may not involve himself into such dangerous heterodoxies as have fallen from his pen in this short tractate. I instance in these:-
First, In his epistle to the Parliament he hath divers pa.s.sages against synodical votes; he will have no putting to the vote: "For votes (saith he, p. 6) are of no other use but to gather parties, and ought nowhere to be used but by those that have the power of the sword." And, p. 3, he will have the business of a.s.semblies to be only doctrinal, and "by dispute to find out truth. Their disputes ought to end in a brotherly accord, as in Acts xv., much disputing, but all ended in accord, no putting to the vote." And, p. 5, he will have things carried "with strength of argument and unanimous consent of the whole clergy." Behold how he joineth issue with the remonstrants against the contra-remonstrants, to introduce not only an academical, but a sceptical and Pyrrhonian dubitation and uncertainty, so that there shall never be an end of controversy, nor any settlement of truth and of the ordinances of Jesus Christ, so long as there shall be but one tenacious disputer to hold up the ball of contention. One egg is not liker another than Mr Hussey's tenet is like that of the Arminians, for which see the Synod of Dort, sess. 25.(1356) It was the ninth condition which the Arminians required in a lawful and well-const.i.tuted synod, that there might be no decision of the controverted articles, but only such an accommodation as both sides might agree to. And, generally, they hold that synods ought not to meet for decision, or determination, but for examining, disputing, discussing; so their _Examen Censurae_, cap. 25; and their _Vindiciae_, lib. 2, cap. 6, p. 131, 133.
Secondly, In that same epistle to the Parliament, p. 4, he hath this pa.s.sage: "Will-worship is unlawful, I mean in matters that are essential to G.o.d's worship, which are matters of duty; as for circ.u.mstantials of time and place, except the Sabbath, which are matters of liberty, in these the commonwealth may vote, &c.; and this is your Christian liberty, that in matters of liberty ye make rules and laws to yourselves, not crossing the ends that you are tied to in duty." And is the Sabbath only a circ.u.mstantial of time contradistinct from matters of duty? It seems he will cry down not only the _jus divinum_ of church censures with the Erastians, but the _jus divinum_ of the Sabbath with the Canterburians.
And if will-worship be unlawful only in the essentials of G.o.d's worship, why was the argument of will-worship so much tossed, not only between Prelates and Nonconformists, but between Papists and Protestants, even in reference to ceremonies? And whether hath not Mr Hussey here engaged himself to hold it free and lawful to the Christian magistrate, yea, to private Christians (for he calls it Christian liberty, not parliamentary liberty-now Christian liberty belongs to all sorts of Christians), to make laws to themselves for taking the sacrament anniversarily on Christmas, Good-Friday, and Easter, or to appoint a perpetual monthly fast or thanksgiving; yea, another Parliament may, if so it should seem good to them, impose again the surplice and cross in baptism, fonts, railing of communion tables, the reading of divert pa.s.sages of Apocrypha to the congregations, doxologies, anthems, responsories, &c., as heretofore they were used; or they may appoint all and every one to sit in the church with their faces towards the east, to stand up at the epistles and gospels, &c.; yea, what ceremonies, Jewish, popish, heathenish, may they not impose, provided they only hold the foundation, and keep to those essentials which he calls matters of duty? By restraining the unlawfulness of will-worship to the essentials, he leaves men free to do anything in religion, _praeter verb.u.m_, so that it appear not to them to be _contra verb.u.m_; anything they may add to the word, or do beside the word, so that the thing cannot be proved contrary to the word.
Thirdly, Mr Hussey, ibid., p. 4, 5, saith, That the Parliament may require such as they receive for preachers of truth, "to send out able men to supply the places, and that without any regard to the allowance or disallowance of the people," where, in the first part of that which he saith, there is either a heterodoxy or a contradiction. A heterodoxy, if he mean that ministers are to be sent out without ordination: a contradiction, if he mean that they must be ordained; for then he gives cla.s.ses a work which is not merely doctrinal. But most strange it is, that he so far departeth from Protestant divines in point of the church's liberty in choosing ministers. He tells us, p. 14, that Mr Herle, "for want of skill and theological disputations," hath granted to people a right to choose their minister. Mr Herle's skill, both logical and theological, is greater than it seems he can well judge of; neither can this bold arrogant censure of his derogate from Mr Herle's, but from his own reputation. For the matter itself, it is one, and not the least, of the controversies between the Papists and Protestants, what right the church hath in the vocation of ministers: read Bellarmine, _de Cleric._, and those that write against him, and see whether it be not so. The Helvetic Confession tells us that the right choosing of ministers is by the consent of the church, and the Belgic Confession saith, "We believe that the ministers, seniors and deacons, ought to be called to those their functions, and by the lawful elections of the church to be advanced into those rooms." See both these in the _Harmony of Confessions_, sect. 11. I might here, if it were requisite, bring a heap of testimonies from Protestant writers; the least thing which they can admit of is, that a minister be not obtruded _renitente ecclesia. Factum valet, fieri non debet._ It may be helped after it is done, without making null or void the ministry; but in a well-const.i.tuted church there ought to be no intrusion into the ministry, the church's consent is requisite; for which also I might bring both scripture and antiquity, but that is not my present business. One thing I must needs put Mr Hussey in mind of, that when the prelates did intrude ministers, without any regard to the disallowance of the people, it was cried out against as an oppression and usurpation, and we are often warned by Mr Prynne, by Mr Coleman, and by myself, to cast away the prelates' usurpation with themselves. But who lords it now over the Lord's inheritance, the Presbyterians or the Erastians? Nay, he who will have ministers put in churches "without any regard to the allowance or disallowance of people," falls far short of divers prelatical men, who did much commend the ancient primitive form of calling ministers, not without the church's consent. See Dr Field, _Of the Church_, lib. 5, cap.
54; Bilson, _de Gubern. Eccl._, cap. 15, p. 417; the author of _The History of Episcopacy_, part 2, p. 360.
Fourthly, Mr Hussey, _Epist._, p. 7, saith, That upon further consideration he found "the minister charged only with preaching and baptising." The like he hath afterwards, p. 39, "Let any man prove that a minister hath any more to do from Christ than to teach and baptise." And again, p. 44, he propounds this query, "Whether Christ gave any more government (he should have said any more to do, for preaching and baptising are not acts of government) than is contained in preaching and baptising," and he holds the negative. If only preaching and baptising, then not praying and reading in the congregation, ministering the Lord's supper, visiting the sick and particular families.
Fifthly, He holdeth, p. 20, That a heathen magistrate is unlawful, "and for his government, if sin be lawful, it is lawful." A gross heterodoxy.
The Apostle exhorteth to be subject even to heathen magistrates, Rom.
xiii., for there were no other at that time, and to pray for them, 1 Tim.
ii.; so that by Mr Hussey's divinity, the Apostle would have men to be subject unto, and to pray for an unlawful government. It is an anabaptistical tenet, that an heathen magistrate is not from G.o.d, which Gerhard, _de Magistrate Politico_, p. 498, 499, fully confutes.