The Works of Mr. George Gillespie Part 24
That whereby the Doctor either was deceived, or would deceive, appeareth to be this: That he taketh everything which agreeth to an individual thing to agree to it _quo ad individuum_, as if to speak of Peter _quatenus est h.o.m.o_, and to speak of him _quatenus est individuum signatum_, or _res singularis sub specie hominis_, were all one thing. Even so, to say of my individual action of hearing the word, that it is necessary because of the commandment of G.o.d (and in that respect remunerable), is not to speak of it _quo ad individuum_, but as the specifical nature of that action of hearing the word (which G.o.d hath commanded) is found in it; for if we speak of this individual action, _quo ad individuum_, we cannot consider it otherwise than _respectu adjecti modi_, because, in moral actions, _modus adjectus_ is _principium individuationis_, and nothing else doth individualise a moral action.
_Sect._ 4. Thus shall my position stand good, namely, that those individual actions which the Doctor calleth necessary, because their species is commanded of G.o.d, and those individual actions which he calleth indifferent, because their _species_ is not commanded, both being considered _quo ad individuum_, the former hath no other remunerable good in them than the latter, and the whole remunerable good which is in either of them standeth only _in objecto modo_; which being so, it is all one when we speak of any individual moral action _quo ad individuum_, whether we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are one. For, as is well said by Aquinas,(1177) _Necessarium est omnem actum hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere_.
And again: _Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus_; wherefore that distinction of a twofold goodness, _causans_ and _concomitans_, which the Doctor hath given us, hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and remunerable which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now moral goodness, saith Scalliger,(1178) _est perfectio actus c.u.m recta ratione_. Human moral actions are called good or evil, _in ordine ad rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum_, saith Aquinas,(1179) thereupon inferring that _illis mores dic.u.n.tur boni, qui rationi congruunt; mali autem, qui a ratione discordant_. Dr Forbesse doth therefore pervert the question whilst he saith,(1180) _in hac c.u.m fratribus quaestione, hoc bonum est quod necessarium_. Nay, those actions we call morally good which are agreeable to right reason, whether they be necessary or not. Since, then, those actions are laudable and remunerable which are morally good, and those are morally good which are agreeable to right reason, it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are, therefore, not only morally good, but also laudable and remunerable, and so not indifferent. Yea, those actions which he calleth necessary, being considered _quo ad individuum_, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable than those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner _quo ad individuum_, as hath been showed.
_Sect._ 5. And besides all this, we have somewhat more to say of the Doctor's speculation about the nature of things indifferent.
For, 1. The Doctor maketh that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary, and yet he maketh both these to be morally good. Now albeit in natural things one good is opponed to another good, as that which is hot to that which is cold, yet _bonum bona non contrariatur in moralibus_.(1181) The reason of the difference is, because _bonitas physica_, or _relativa est congruentia naturae quaedem_, saith Scalliger;(1182) and because two natures may be contrary one to another, therefore the good which is congruous to the one may be contrary to the good which is congruous to the other; but _bonum virtutis_, saith Aquinas(1183) _non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum, scilicet rationem_; so that it is impossible for one moral good to be opponed to another.
2. Since divines take a thing indifferent to be _medium inter bonum et malum morale_; and since (as the very notation of the word showeth) it is such a means as cometh not nearer to the one extreme than to the other, but is alike distant from both, how comes it that the Doctor so far departeth both from the tenet of divines and from the notation of the word, as to call some such actions indifferent as have a moral remunerable goodness, and yet not evil in them? or where learned he such a dialect as giveth to some good things the name of the things indifferent?
3. Why doth he also waver from himself; for he citeth(1184) out of the Helvetic Confessor Jerome's definition of a thing indifferent, and approveth it. _Indifferens_, saith he, _illud est quod nec bonum nec malum est, ut sive feceris sive non feceris, nec just.i.tiam habeas nec injust.i.tiam._ Behold the goodness which is excluded from the nature of a thing indifferent is not only necessity but righteousness also, yet hath the Doctor excluded only the good of necessity from things indifferent, making the other good of righteousness to stand with them; for things which are done in faith, and done for the right end (such as he acknowledgeth these things to be which he calleth indifferent), have righteousness in them, as all men know.
CHAPTER III.
WHETHER THERE BE ANYTHING INDIFFERENT IN ACTU EXERCITO.
_Sect._ 1. For our better light in this question I will premit these considerations, 1. When we measure the goodness or the badness of a human action, we must not only measure it by the object and the end, but by all the circ.u.mstances which accompany it. Fed. Morellus,(1185) upon those words of Seneca, _Refert quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi,_ &c., saith, that without those circ.u.mstances of things, persons, times, places, _facti ratio non constat_. Circ.u.mstances sometimes _const.i.tuunt rerum earum quae aguntur speciem_, say our divines,(1186) meaning that circ.u.mstances do make an action good or bad. _Humani actus_, say the schoolmen,(1187) _non solum ex objectis, verum ex circ.u.mstantiis boni vel mali esse dic.u.n.tur_.
It is not every man's part, saith one of our opposites,(1188) to judge _de circ.u.mstantia, quae reddit actionem vel bonam vel malam_. "Some circ.u.mstances, saith another of them,(1189) are intrinsical and essential to actions, and specially making up their nature." The princ.i.p.al circ.u.mstances which here we speak of, are comprehended in this versicle:-
Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur quomodo, quando.
The first circ.u.mstance which maketh an action good or bad is _quis_, which designeth the person: If a magistrate put to death a malefactor, the action is good; but if a private person put him to death, it is evil.
The second is _quid_, which noteth the quality or condition of the object: If a man take _sua_, the action is good; if _aliena_, it is evil.
The third is _ubi_: If men banquet in their own houses, the action is good; if in the church, it is evil.
The fourth is _quibus auxiliis_: If men seek health by lawful means, the action is good; if by the devil, or his instruments, it is evil.
The fifth is _cur_: If I rebuke my brother for his fault, out of my love to him, and desire to reclaim him, the action is good; if out of hatred and spleen, the action is evil.
The sixth is _quomodo_: For he who doth the work of the Lord carefully doth well; but he who doth it negligently doth evil.
The seventh is _quando_: To do servile work upon the six days of labour, is good; but to do it upon the Lord's Sabbath, is evil.
2. There is another consideration which followeth upon the former; and it is this: The goodness or badness of a human action may be considered two ways, viz., either _in actu signato_, and _quo ad speciem_; or _in actu exercito_, and _quo ad individuum_; for an action is said to be specificated by its object, and individuated by its circ.u.mstances; so that, when an action is good or evil in respect of the object of it, then it is called good or evil _quo ad speciem_: when it is good or evil in respect of the circ.u.mstances of it, then it is said to be good or evil _quo ad individuum_.
3. Human actions, whether considered _quo ad speciem_, or _quo ad individuum_, are either such as proceed from the deliberation of reason, or from bare imagination only. To this latter kind we refer such actions as are done through incogitancy, while the mind is taken up with other thoughts; for example, to scratch the head, to handle the beard, to move the foot, &c.; which sort of things proceed only from a certain stirring or fleeting of the imagination.
4. Let it be remembered, that those things we call morally good, which agree to right reason; those morally evil which disagree from right reason; and those indifferent which include nothing belonging to the order of reason, and so are neither consonant unto nor dissonant from the same.
5. When we speak of the indifferency of an individual action, it may be conceived two ways: either _absolute et sine respectu ad aliud_; or _comparate et c.u.m respectu ad aliud_. In the free-will offerings, if so be a man offered according as G.o.d had blessed and prospered his estate, it was indifferent to offer either a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat; but if he chose to offer any of them, his action of offering could not be indifferent, but either good or evil. When we speak of the indifferency of an action _comparate_, the sense is only this, that it is neither better nor worse than another action, and that there is no reason to make us choose to do it more than another thing; but when we speak of the indifferency of an action considered absolutely and by itself, the simple meaning is, whether it be either good or evil, and whether the doing of the same must needs be either sin or evil doing.
6. Every thing which is indifferent in the nature of it, is not by and by indifferent in the use of it. But the use of a thing indifferent ought evermore to be either chosen or refused, followed or forsaken, according to these three rules delivered to us in G.o.d's word: 1. The rule of piety; 2. The rule of charity; 3. The rule of purity.
The first of these rules we find, 1 Cor. x. 31, "Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of G.o.d;" and Rom.
xiv. 7, 8, "For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself.
For whether we live, we live unto the Lord, and whether we die, we die unto the Lord:" where the Apostle, as Calvin noteth,(1190) reasoneth from the whole to the part. Our whole life, and, by consequence, all the particular actions of it, ought to be referred to G.o.d's glory, and ordered according to his will. Again, Col. iii. 17, "And whatsoever ye do, in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus." In the expounding of which words Dr Davenant saith well, that _Etiam ille actiones quae sunt sua natura adiaphorae, debent tamen a Christianis fieri in nomine Christi, hoc est, juxta voluntatem Christi, et ad gloriam Christi_.
The second rule is the rule of charity; which teacheth us not to use anything indifferent when scandal riseth out of it: Rom. xiv. 21, "It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak;" yea, though it do not weaken, if it be not expedient for edifying our brother, be it never so lawful or indifferent in its own nature, the law of charity bindeth us to abstain from it: Rom. xiv. 19, "Let us therefore follow after the things which make for peace, and the things wherewith one may edify another;"
Rom. xv. 2, "Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification;" 1 Cor. x. 23, "All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient: all things are lawful for me, but all things edify not:" where the Apostle teacheth, that _in cibo_, &c.,(1191) "In meat, drink, and the whole kind of things indifferent, it is not enough to look whether they be lawful, but that, farther, we are to look whether to do or omit the same be expedient, and may edify." The Bishop of Winchester, preaching upon John xvi. 7, "I tell you the truth: it is expedient for you that I go away," &c., marketh, that Christ would not go away without acquainting his disciples with the reason of it; and that reason was, because it was for their good: whereupon he inferreth, 1. That we should avoid Hophni's _non vult enim_, and make our _vult_ our _enim_, 1 Sam. ii.
15; that is, that we should not give our will for a reason, but a reason for our will; 2. That we should not, with the Corinthians, stand upon _licet_,-it is lawful, but frame our rule by _expedit_,-it is expedient, 1 Cor. vi. 13; x. 23; 3. That our rule should not be Caiaphas' _expedit n.o.bis_, but Christ's _expedit vobis_,-for you it is good, you, the disciples, John xi. 50; and make that the rule of our going out and our coming in. The heathens themselves could say that we are born, partly for G.o.d, partly for our country, partly for our friends, &c. How much more ought Christians to understand that we are not born for ourselves, but for Christ and his church. And as in the whole course of our life, so especially in the policy of the church, we may do nothing (be it never so indifferent in itself) which is not profitable for edification: 1 Cor.
xiii. 26, "Let all things be done to edifying." From which precept Pareus inferreth, that nothing ought to be done in the church which doth not manifestly make for the utility of all and every one; and that therefore not only unknown tongues, but cold ceremonies and idle gestures should be exploded out of the church.
The third rule is the rule of purity, which respecteth our peace and plerophory of conscience, without which anything is unclean to us, though it be clean and lawful in its own nature: Rom xiv. 14, "To him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean," therefore _si quis aliquam in cibo immunditiem imagineter, eo libere uti non potest_.(1192) Whatsoever indifferent thing a man in his conscience judgeth to be unlawful, he may not lawfully do it: Rom xiv. 5, "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind;" and verse 23, "He that doubteth is d.a.m.ned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin." _Nefas est omnino_, saith Calvin,(1193) _quippiam aggredi quod putes illi (domino) displicere, imo quod non persuasus sis illi placere_. Now if a thing indifferent be used according to these three rules, the use of it is not only lawful but expedient also; but if it be not used according to these rules, the use of it is altogether unlawful.
_Sect._ 3. And since a thing indifferent in the nature of it can never be lawfully used, except according to these rules, hence it followeth, that the use of a thing indifferent is never lawful to us when we have no other warrant for using the same beside our own will and arbitrement.
Dr Forbesse speaks unadvisedly whilst he saith,(1194) _Evenit nonnunquam_, &c.: "It falleth out sometimes that that which was expedient for thee to do yesterday, and to omit this day, thou mayest, notwithstanding, afterward either do it, or not do it, according to thy arbitrement:" As if, forsooth, our using of things indifferent should not evermore be determined by the rule of expediency which G.o.d's word giveth us, but sometimes by our own will. Dr Davenant(1195) could not dream that any, except the ignorant common people, could be of this opinion which Dr Forbesse holdeth _Fallitur vulgus_, saith he, _dum judicat licere __ sibi, uti victu, vest.i.tu, sermone, aut quacunque re adiaphora pro arbitrio suo; nam haec omnia ad regulam adhibenda sunt_.
Moreover, as we may not use any indifferent thing at our own pleasure; so neither may the church, at her will and pleasure, command the use of it: but as our practice, so the church's injunction must be determined and squared according to the former rules. And if any man think that, in the using of things indifferent, he may be led and ruled by the church's determination, without examining any further, let him understand that the church's determination is but a subordinate rule, or a rule ruled by higher rules.
Dr Forbesse, perceiving how these rules of Scripture may subvert his cause, desireth to subject them to the church's determination, and to make it our highest rule. _Jam autem_, saith he,(1196) _in talium rerum usu, id edificat, quod pacific.u.m; illud est pacific.u.m quod est ordinatum; is autem decens ordo est in ecclesia ab ipso Christo const.i.tutus, ut in talibus non suo quisque se gerat arbitratu, sed audiatur ecclesia, et exhibeatur praepositis obedientia._
He hath been speaking of the rules which G.o.d's word giveth us concerning the use of things indifferent; and all of them he comprehendeth under this rule, that we should hear the church, and obey them who are set over us, as if G.o.d's rules were subordinate to men's rules, and not theirs to his.
We say not that every man may use things indifferent _sua arbitratu_, but we say withal, that neither may the church command the use of things indifferent _suo arbitratu_. Both she in commanding and we in obeying must be guided by the rules of Scripture.
They who are set over us in the church have no power given them of Christ which is not for edifying, Eph. iv. 12. The counsel of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem (which is a lively pattern of a lawful synod to the world's end) professed they would lay no other burden upon the disciples except such things as the law of charity made necessary for shunning of scandal, Acts xv. 28; and so that which they decreed had force and strength to bind _a charitate propter scandalum_, saith Sanctius;(1197) but _suo arbitratu_ they enjoined nothing. Cartwright saith, "It appeareth by this place that there may be no abridgement of liberty simply decreed, but in regard of circ.u.mstance, according to the rule of edification."(1198) And if the church's decrees and canons be not according to the rules of the word; yet, forasmuch as every one of us shall give account of himself and his own deeds, we must look that whatsoever the church decree, yet our practice, in the use or omission of a thing indifferent, be according to the foresaid rules.
We may not, for the commandment of men, transgress the rule of piety, by doing anything which is not for G.o.d's glory, and ordered according to his will; neither ought any of us to obey men, except "for the Lord's sake," 1 Pet. ii. 13, and "as the servants of Christ, doing the will of G.o.d," Eph.
vi. 6; which teacheth us the manner how we ought to obey men, namely, _propter Christum et sicut Christus praecipit_;(1199) for if we should know no more but the will of man for that which we do, then we should be the "servants of men," not the servants of Christ. Neither yet may we for any human ordinance break the rule of charity; "But whatsoever either would weaken, or not edify our brother, be it never so lawful, never so profitable to ourselves, never so powerfully by earthly authority enjoined, Christians, who are not born unto themselves, but unto Christ, unto his church, and unto the fellow-members, must not dare to meddle with it."(1200)
Nor, lastly, may we obey men, so as to break the law of purity, and "perform any action with a doubtful conscience; that is, whereof either the world hath not,(1201) nor we out of it have no warrant, in which case tender consciences must be tendered rather than be racked by authority, for be the things in themselves never so lawful, &c., they are utterly unlawful to me without such information." Whereas, therefore, some say, that in the use of matters indifferent, the laws of those who are set over us ought to rule us; we still answer that our practice may not be ruled by any law of man, except it be according to the rules of the word, whereof one is this, _Tantum oportere esse obedientiae studium in Christianis,_(_1202_)_ ut nihil agant, quod non existiment vel potius certi sint placere Deo_.
_Sect._ 4. These considerations being permitted, for resolution of the question in hand, we say, 1. As touching those actions which proceed from bare imagination, whether they be evil and inordinate _quo ad speciem_, forsomuch as the imagination from which they have their original doth not in those actions subject itself to the conduct and moderation of reason, but is like Gehazi, running away without his master's leave, let the learned give their judgment. Howsoever, it cannot be denied, that such actions may be and are of a civil _quo ad individuum_,(1203) or in respect of the circ.u.mstances, which show forth in them reprovable temerity, incogitancy, levity, and indecency. But such actions belong not to our purpose. 2. As for those actions which proceed from the deliberation of reason, howbeit many of them be indifferent, _quo ad speciem_, yet none of them are, nor can be indifferent, _quo ad individuum_. The reason of this difference and distinction is, because every action hath its species or kind,(1204) from the object, and a human moral action hath its species or kind from the object referred to the original of human actions, which is reason. Whereupon it cometh, that if the object of the action include something that agreeth to the order of reason, it shall be a good action, according to its kind; for example, to give alms to an indigent man. But if it include something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it shall be an evil action according to its kind; as to steal or take away another man's goods. Now sometimes it happeneth that the object of an action doth not include something that belongeth to the order of reason; as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, &c., such actions are indifferent, according to their kind. But we must p.r.o.nounce far otherwise of them when we speak of them _quo ad individuum_, because as they are individuated by their circ.u.mstances, so in their individual being, they have their goodness or badness from the same circ.u.mstances, as hath been showed. So that no such action as is deliberated upon can be indifferent, _quo ad individuum_; because _oportet_ (saith Thomas(1205)) _quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circ.u.mstantiam, per quam trahetur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis_. Friar Ambrosius Catarinus, following the doctrine of Thomas, maintained in the Council of Trent,(1206) that to do good was a work, the concurrences of all circ.u.mstances is necessary, but the want of one only is sufficient for an evil, so that howsoever among the works considered in general, some are indifferent, yet in the singular there is no medium between having all the circ.u.mstances and wanting some; therefore every particular action is good or evil; and because among the circ.u.mstances the end is one, all works referred to a bad end are infected. He further alleged St. Augustine, that it is sin not only to refer the action to a bad end, but also not to refer it to a good end. Thus spake the learned friar very appositely; and the same is the judgment of our own divines. _De bis rebus indifferentibus_ (saith Martyr(1207)) _statuendum est, quod tantummodo ex genere atque natura sua indifferentiam habeant, sed quando ad electionem descenditur nihil est indifferens_; and so saith Pareus likewise.(1208)
_Sect._ 5. These things are so plain and undeniable, that Dr Forbesse(1209) himself acknowledged no less than that every individual human action is either good or bad morally; and that there is a goodness which is necessary to every action, namely, the referring of it to the last end, and the doing of it in faith; which goodness, if it be wanting, the action is evil. Notwithstanding, he will have some actions, even _quo ad individuum_, called indifferent, for this respect, because they are neither commanded of G.o.d, and so necessary to be done, nor yet forbidden, and so necessary to be omitted.
Of an individual action of this kind, he saith: _Manet homini respectu istius actus plena arbitrii libertas moralis; tum ea quae exercitii seu contradictionis dicitur, tum etiam ea quae specificationis seu contrarietatis libertas appellatur._ He holdeth, that though such an action be done in faith, and for the right end (which general goodness, he saith, is necessary to the action, and commendeth a man to G.o.d), yet the action itself is indifferent, because it is not necessary; for a man hath liberty to omit the same, or to do another thing; which he ill.u.s.trateth by this example:-
If the widow Semp.r.o.nia marry at all, it is faith, because, as the Apostle teacheth, whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Now whilst everything is condemned which is not of faith, two sorts of actions are rejected, as Calvin observeth:(1210) 1. Such actions as are not grounded upon, nor approven by the word of G.o.d. 2. Such actions, as though they be approven by the word of G.o.d, yet the mind, wanting this persuasion, doth not cheerfully address itself to the doing of them. But, I pray, doth the word underprop or approve the use of anything indifferent, if it be not used according to the foresaid rules, and, by consequence, conveniently and profitably?
_Sect._ 9. The Doctor thinks it enough that, in the use of a thing indifferent, I believe it is lawful for me to do this thing, albeit I believe and certainly know that it is lawful to me to omit it, or do the contrary; so that the doing of a thing in faith inferreth not the necessity of doing it: but for answer hereunto we say,
1. We have sufficiently proven that it is never lawful for us to do anything which is in the nature of it indifferent, except we be persuaded not only of the lawfulness of the thing, but of the expediency of doing it.
2. Of his comparing of things indifferent together, and not considering them positively and by themselves, we have also said enough before.
3. The doing of a thing in faith inferreth the expediency and profit of doing it, and that is enough to take away the indifferency of doing it; for since every indifferent thing is either expedient to be done, or else unlawful to be done (as hath been showed), it followeth that either it ought to be done, or else it ought to be left undone; therefore it is never indifferent nor free to us to do it, or leave it undone, at our pleasure.
4. Because the Doctor (I perceive) sticketh upon the term of necessity, and will have everything which is not necessary to be indifferent; therefore, to remove this scruple, beside that Chrysostom and the author of the interlineary gloss upon Matt. xviii. 7, take the meaning of those words, "It must needs be that offences come," to be this, _it is profitable that offences come_. Which gloss, though it be not to be received, yet as Camero noteth,(1211) it is ordinary to call that necessary which is very profitable and expedient. Besides this, I say, we further maintain, that in the use of things indifferent, that which we deliberate upon to do is never lawful to be done except it be also necessary, though not _necessitate absoluta seu consequentis_, yet _necessitate consequentiae seu ex suppositione_. Paul's circ.u.mcising of Timothy was lawful only because it was necessary, for he behoved by this means to win the good will of the people of Lystra who had once stoned him,(1212) otherwise he could not safely have preached the gospel among them. Therefore he had done wrong if he had not circ.u.mcised Timothy, since the circ.u.mcising of him was according to the rules of the word, and it was expedient to circ.u.mcise him, and unexpedient to do otherwise. And (because _de partibus idem est judicium_) whensoever the use of any indifferent thing is according to the rules of the word, that is, when it is profitable for G.o.d's glory, and man's edification, and the doer is persuaded of so much, I say, putting this case, then (forsomuch as not only it may, but ought to be done) the use of it is not only lawful but necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but ought not to be admitted) the omission of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful.
Again, put the case, that the use of a thing indifferent be either against or not according to the said rules, then (forsomuch as not only it may, but ought to be admitted) the omission of it is not only lawful but necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but may not, neither ought to be done) the doing of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful. For which it maketh, that the apostles in their decree, allege no other ground for abstinence from blood and things strangled (which were in their nature indifferent), but the necessity of abstaining caused and induced by the foresaid rules, Acts xv. 28.