The Works of Mr. George Gillespie Part 18
And further, if any such reasons be to be given forth for the ceremonies, why are they so long kept up from us? But if they hold them at the former, thereupon it will follow, that it shall be lawful for us to do every thing which the church shall judge to be agreeable to the law of G.o.d and nature, and consequently to all the Jewish, popish, and heathenish ceremonies, yea, to worship images, if it happen that the church judge these things to be agreeable to the law of G.o.d and nature.
It will be answered (I know), that if the church command anything repugnant to G.o.d's word we are not bound to do it, nor to receive it as lawful, though the church judge so of it; but otherwise, if that which the church judgeth to be agreeable to the law of G.o.d and nature (and in that respect prescribeth) be not repugnant to the word of G.o.d, but in itself indifferent, then are we to embrace it as convenient, and consonant to the law of G.o.d and nature, neither ought we to call in question the lawfulness of it.
But I reply, that either we must judge a thing to be repugnant or not repugnant to the word, to be indifferent or not indifferent in itself, because the church judgeth so of it, or else because the church proveth unto us by an evident reason that it is so. If the latter, we have what we would; if the former, we are just where we were: the argument is still set afoot; then we must receive everything (be it ever so bad) as indifferent, if only the church happen so to judge of it; for _quod compet.i.t alicui qua tale_, &c. So that if we receive anything as indifferent, for this respect, because the church judgeth it to be so, then shall we receive everything for indifferent which the church shall so judge of.
_Sect._ 10. 3d. The church is forbidden to add anything to the commandments of G.o.d which he hath given unto us, concerning his worship and service, Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32; Prov. x.x.x. 6; therefore she may not lawfully prescribe anything in the works of divine worship, if it be not a mere circ.u.mstance belonging to that kind of things which were not determinate by Scripture.
Our opposites have no other distinctions which they make any use of against this argument, but the very same which Papists use in defence of their unwritten dogmatical traditions, namely, that _additio corrumpens_ is forbidden, but not _additio perficiens_: that there is not alike reason of the Christian church and of the Jewish; that the church may not add to the essential parts of G.o.d's worship, but to the accidentary she may add.
To the first of those distinctions, we answer, 1. That the distinction itself is an addition to the word, and so doth but beg the question.
2. It is blasphemous; for it argueth that the commandments of G.o.d are imperfect, and that by addition they are made perfect.
3. Since our opposites will speak in this dialect, let them resolve us whether the washings of the Pharisees, condemned by Christ, were corrupting or perfecting additions. They cannot say they were corrupting, for there was no commandment of G.o.d which those washings did corrupt or destroy, except that commandment which forbiddeth men's additions. But for this respect our opposites dare not call them corrupting additions, for so they should condemn all additions whatsoever. Except, therefore, they can show us that those washings were not added by the Pharisees for perfecting, but for corrupting the law of G.o.d, let them consider how they rank their own ceremonial additions with those of the Pharisees. We read of no other reason wherefore Christ condemned them but because they were doctrines which had no other warrant than the commandments of men, Matt.
xv. 9; for as the law ordained divers washings, for teaching and signifying that true holiness and cleanness which ought to be among G.o.d's people, so the Pharisees would have perfected the law by adding other washings (and more than G.o.d had commanded) for the same end and purpose.
_Sect._ 11. To the second distinction, we say that the Christian church hath no more liberty to add to the commandments of G.o.d than the Jewish church had; for the second commandment is moral and perpetual, and forbiddeth to us as well as to them the additions and inventions of men in the worship of G.o.d. Nay, as Calvin noteth,(901) much more are we forbidden to add unto G.o.d's word than they were. "Before the coming of his well-beloved Son in the flesh (saith John Knox),(902) severely he punished all such as durst enterprise to alter or change his ceremonies and statutes,-as in Saul, (1 Kings xiii.; xv.) Uzziah, Nadab, Abihu, (Lev. x.) is to be read. And will he now, after that he hath opened his counsel to the world by his only Son, whom he commandeth to be heard, Matt, xvii.; and alter that, by his holy Spirit speaking by his apostles, he hath established the religion in which he will his true worshippers abide to the end,-will he now, I say, admit men's inventions in the matter of religion? &c., 2 Cor. xi.; Col. i.; ii. For this sentence he p.r.o.nounceth: 'Not that which seemeth good in thy eyes shalt thou do to the Lord thy G.o.d, but that which the Lord thy G.o.d commanded thee, that do thou: Add nothing unto it, diminish nothing from it,' Deut. iv. 12. Which, sealing up his New Testament, he repeateth in these words: 'That which ye have, hold till I come,' " &c., Rev. ii.
Wherefore, whilst Hooker saith,(903) that Christ hath not, by positive laws, so far descended into particularities with us as Moses with the Jews; whilst Camero saith,(904) _Non esse disputandum ita, ut quoniam in vetere Testamento, de rebus alioqui adiaphoris certa fuit lex, &c., id in novo Testamento habere loc.u.m_; and whilst Bishop Lindsey saith,(905) that in the particular circ.u.mstances of persons by whom, place where, time when, and of the form and order how, the worship and work of the ministry should be performed, the church hath power to define whatsoever is most expedient, and that this is a prerogative wherein the Christian church differeth from the Jewish synagogue, they do but speak their pleasure in vain, and cannot make it appear that the Christian church hath any more power to add to the commandments of G.o.d than the synagogue had of old.
It is well said by one:(906) "There were many points of service, as sacrifices, washings, anniversary days, &c., which we have not; but the determination of such as we have is as particular as theirs, except wherein the national circ.u.mstances make impediment." For one place not to be appointed for the worship of G.o.d, nor one tribe for the work of the ministry among us, as among them, not because more power was left to the Christian church for determining things that pertain to the worship of G.o.d than was to the Jewish, but because the Christian church was to spread itself over the whole earth, and not to be confined within the bounds of one nation as the synagogue was.
_Sect._ 12. Let us then here call to mind the distinction which hath been showed betwixt religious ceremonies and moral circ.u.mstances; for as touching moral circ.u.mstances, which serve for common order and decency in the worship of G.o.d, they being so many and so alterable, that they could not be particularly determined in Scripture, for all the different and almost infinite cases which might occur, the Jewish synagogue had the same power for determining things of this nature which the church of Christ now hath. For the law did not define, but left to be defined by the synagogue, the set hours for all public divine service,-when it should begin, how long it should last, the order that should be kept in the reading and expounding of the law, praying, singing, catechising, excommunicating, censuring, absolving of delinquents, &c., the circ.u.mstances of the celebration of marriage, of the education of youth in schools and colleges, &c.
But as for ceremonies which are proper to G.o.d's holy worship, shall we say that the fidelity of Christ, the Son, hath been less than the fidelity of Moses, the servant? Heb. iii. 2, which were to be said, if Christ had not, by as plain, plentiful, and particular directions and ordinances, provided for all the necessities of the Christian church in the matter of religion, as Moses for the Jewish; or if the least pin, and the meanest appurtenance of the tabernacle, and all the service thereof, behooved to be ordered according to the express commandment of G.o.d by the hand of Moses, how shall we think, that in the rearing, framing, ordering, and beautifying of the church, the house of the living G.o.d, he would have less honour and prerogative given than to his own well-beloved Son, by whom he hath spoken to us in these last days, and whom he hath commanded us to hear in all things? Or that he will accept, at our hands, any sacred ceremony which men have presumed to bring into his holy and pure worship, without the appointment of his own word and will revealed unto us? Albeit the worship of G.o.d and religion, in the church of the New Testament, be accompanied without ceremonies, _numero paucissimis, observatione facillimis, significatione proestantissimis_ (as Augustine speaketh of our sacraments,(907)) yet we have in Scripture, Eph. i. 18, no less particular determination and distinct direction for our few, easy, and plain ceremonies, than the Jews had for their many heavy and obscure ones.
_Sect._ 13. As for the third distinction, of adding to the accidentary parts of it, I remember that I heard in the logics, of _pars essentialis_ or _physica,_ and _pars integralis_ or _mathematica_; of _pars similaris_ and _pars dissimilaris_; of _pars continua_ and _pars discreta_; but of _para accidentaria_ heard I never till now. There is (I know) such a distinction of _pars integralis_, that it is either _princ.i.p.alis_ and _necessaria_, or _minus princ.i.p.alis_ and _non necessaria_; but we cannot understand their _pars cultus accidentaria_ to be _pars integralis non necessaria_, because, then, their distribution of worship into essential and accidentary parts could not answer to the rules of a just distribution, of which one is, that _distributio debet exhaurire totum distributum_. Now, there are some parts of worship which cannot be comprehended in the foresaid distribution, namely, _partes integrales necessarioe_. What then? Shall we let this wild distinction pa.s.s, because it cannot be well nor formally interpreted? Nay, but we will observe their meaning who make use of it; for unto all such parts of worship as are not essential (and which they are pleased to call accidentary), they hold the church may make addition, whereunto I answer, 1. Let them make us understand what they mean by those essential parts to which the church may add nothing, and let them beware lest they give us an identical description of the same.
2. That there are many parts of G.o.d's worship which are not essential, yet such as will not suffer any addition of the church: for proof whereof I demand, Were all the ceremonies commanded to be used in the legal sacraments and sacrifices essential parts of those worships? No man will say so. Yet the synagogue was tied to observe those (and no other than those) ceremonies which the word prescribed. When Israel was again to keep the pa.s.sover, it was said, Num. ix. 3, "In the fourteenth day of this month at even, ye shall keep it in his appointed season, according to all the rites of it, and according to all the ceremonies of it, shall ye keep it." And again, ver. 5, "According to all that the Lord commanded Moses, so did the children of Israel." _Ritibus et ceremoniis divinitus inst.i.tutis, non licuit homini suo arbitrio aliquid adjicere aut detrahere_, saith P. Martyr.(908)
_Sect._ 14. 3. If those accidentary parts of worship, which are commanded in the word, be both necessary to be used _necessitate praecepti_, and likewise sufficient means fully adequate and proportioned to that end, for which G.o.d hath destinated such parts of his worship as are not essential (which must be granted by every one who will not accuse the Scripture of some defect and imperfection), then it followeth that other accidentary parts of worship, which the church addeth thereto, are but superfluous and superst.i.tious.
4. I call to mind another logical maxim: _Sublata una parte, tolitur totum._ An essential part being taken away, _totum essentiale_ is taken away also. In like manner, an integrant part being taken away, _totum integrum_ cannot remain behind. When a man hath lost his hand or his foot, though he be still a man physically, _totum essentiale_, yet he is not a man mathematically, he is no longer _totum integrale_. Just so if we reckon any additions (as the cross, kneeling, holidays, &c.) among the parts of G.o.d's worship, then put the case, that those additions were taken away, it followeth that all the worship which remaineth still will not be the whole and entire worship of G.o.d, but only a part of it, or at the best, a defective, wanting, lame, and maimed worship.
5. I have made it evident that our opposites make the controverted ceremonies to be worship,(909) in as proper and peculiar sense as anything can be, and that they are equalled to the chief and princ.i.p.al parts of worship, not ranked among the secondary or less princ.i.p.al parts of it.
6. Do not our divines condemn the addition of rites and ceremonies to that worship which the word prescribeth, as well as the addition of other things which are thought more essential? We have heard Martyr's words to this purpose.
Zanchius will have us to learn from the second commandment,(910) in _externo cultu qui Deo debetur, seu in ceremonus nihil n.o.bis esse ex nostro capite comminiscendum_, whether in sacraments or sacrifices, or other sacred things, such as temples, altars, clothes, and vessels, necessary for the external worship; but that we ought to be contented with those ceremonies which G.o.d hath prescribed.
And in another place,(911) he condemneth the addition of any other rite whatsoever, to those rites of every sacrament which have been ordained of Christ, _Si ceremoniis cujusvis sacramenti, alios addas ritus_, &c. Dr Fulk p.r.o.nounceth,(912) even of signs and rites, that "we must do in religion and G.o.d's service, not that which seemeth good to us, but that only which he commandeth," Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32.
And Calvin p.r.o.nounceth generally,(913) _Caenam domini rem adeo sacrosanctam esse, ut ullis hominum additamentis eam conspurcare sit nefas._
_Sect._ 15. And thus have we made good our argument, that the lawfulness of the ceremonies cannot be warranted by any ecclesiastical law. If we had no more against them this were enough, that they are but human additions, and want the warrant of the word. When Nadab and Abihu offered strange fire before the Lord, and when the Jews burnt their sons and their daughters in the valley of the son of Hinnon, howsoever manifold wickedness might have been challenged in that which they did, yet if any would dispute with G.o.d upon the matter, he stoppeth their mouths with this one answer: "I commanded it not, neither came it into my heart," Lev. x.
1; Jer. vii. 31. May we, last of all, hear what the canon law itself decreeth:(914) _Is qui praeest, si praeter voluntatem Dei, vel praeter quod in sanctis Scripturis evidenter praecipitur, vel dicit aliquid, vel imperat, tanquam falsus testis Dei, aut sacrilegus habeatur._
CHAPTER VIII.
THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY ANY ORDINANCE OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE; WHOSE POWER IN THINGS SPIRITUAL OR ECCLESIASTICAL IS EXPLAINED.
_Sect._ 1. Now are we fallen upon the stronghold of our opposites, which is the king's majesty's supremacy in things ecclesiastical. If they did mean, in good earnest, to qualify the lawfulness of the ceremonies from holy Scripture, why have they not taken more pains and travail to debate the matter from thence? And if they meant to justify them by the laws and const.i.tutions of the church, why did they not study to an orderly peaceable proceeding, and to have things concluded in a lawful national synod, after free reasoning and mature advis.e.m.e.nt? Why did they carry matters so factiously and violently? The truth is, they would have us to acquiesce, and to say no more against the ceremonies, when once we hear that they are enjoined by his Majesty, our only supreme governor. What I am here to say shall not derogate anything from his Highness's supremacy, because it includeth no such thing as a nomothetical power to prescribe and appoint such sacred and significant ceremonies as he shall think good.
The Archbishop of Armagh, in his speech which he delivered concerning the King's supremacy (for which king James returned him, in a letter, his princely and gracious thanks, for that he had defended his just and lawful power with so much learning and reason), whilst he treateth of the supremacy, and expoundeth that t.i.tle of "the only supreme governor of all his Highness's dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal," mentioneth no such thing as any power to dispose, by his laws and ordinances, of things external in the worship of G.o.d. Neither yet shall this following discourse tend to the cooling and abating of that care and zeal which princes owe to the oversight and promotion of religion. For alas! the corruptions which have stept into religion, and the decays which it hath felt since princes began to take small thought of it, and to leave the care of it to popes, bishops, monks, &c., can never be enough bewailed. _Nihil enim_, &c. "For there is nothing (saith Zanchius(915)) more pernicious, either to the commonwealth or to the church, than if a prince do all things by the judgment of others, and he himself understand not those things which are propounded to be done."
Nor, lastly, are we to sound an alarm of rebellion; for to say that subjects are not bound to obey such laws and statutes of their prince, as impose upon them a yoke of ceremonies which he hath no power to impose, is one thing, and to say that they are not bound to subject themselves unto him faithfully and loyally, is another thing. _Recte Gerson: Qui abusui potestatis resist.i.t, non resist.i.t divinae ordinationi_, saith the Bishop of Salisbury.(916) "Subjection (saith Dr Field(917)) is required generally and absolutely, where obedience is not." If we have leave to speak with divines,(918) the bond and sign of subjection is only homage, or the oath of fidelity, whereby subjects bind themselves to be faithful to their prince; and we take the Judge of all flesh to witness, before whose dreadful tribunal we must stand at that great day, how free we are of thoughts of rebellion, and how uprightly we mean to be his Majesty's most true and loyal subjects to the end of our lives, and to devote ourselves, our bodies, lives, goods, and estates, and all that we have in the world, to his Highness's service, and to the honour of his royal crown.
_Sect._ 2. Now, for the purpose in hand, we will first examine what the Archbishop of Spalato saith; for he discourseth much of the jurisdiction and office of princes, in things and causes ecclesiastical. The t.i.tle of the first chapter of his sixth book, _de Rep. Eccl._, holdeth, that it is the duty of princes _super ecclesiastica invigilare_; but in the body of the chapter he laboureth to prove that the power of governing ecclesiastical things belongeth to princes (which is far more than to watch carefully over them). This the reader will easily perceive. Nay, he himself, num. 115 and 174, professeth he hath been proving, that divine and ecclesiastical things are to be ruled and governed by the authority and laws of princes. The t.i.tle prefixed to the sixth chapter of that same book is this, _Legibus et edictis principum laicorum, et ecclesiastica et ecclesiasticos gubernari_. So that in both chapters he treateth of one and the same office of princes about things ecclesiastical.
Now, if we would learn what he means by those _ecclesiastica_ which he will have to be governed by princes, he resolves us(919) that he means not things internal, such as the deciding of controversies in matters of faith, feeding with the word of G.o.d, binding and loosing, and ministering of the sacraments (for _in pure spiritualibus_, as he speaketh in _Summa_, cap. 5,) he yieldeth them not the power of judging and defining, but only things external, which pertain to the external worship of G.o.d, or concern external ecclesiastical discipline; such things he acknowledged to be _res spirituales_;(920) but _vera spiritualia_ he will have to comprehend only things internal, which he removeth from the power of princes. Thus we have his judgment as plain as himself hath delivered it unto us.
_Sect._ 3. But I demand, 1. Why yieldeth he the same power to princes in governing _ecclesiastica_ which he yieldeth them in governing _ecclesiasticos_? For ecclesiastical persons, being members of the commonwealth no less than laics, have the same king and governor with them, for which reason it is (as the Bishop himself showeth out of Molina(921)) that they are bound to be subject to their prince's laws, which pertain to the whole commonwealth. But the like cannot be alleged, for the power of princes to govern _ecclesiastica_, for the Bishop, I trust, would not have said that things ecclesiastical and things civil do equally and alike belong to their power and jurisdiction.
2. Why confoundeth he the governing of things and causes ecclesiastical with watching over and taking care for the same? Let us only call to mind the native signification of the word ??e????, _guberno_ signifieth properly to rule or govern the course of a ship; and in a ship there may be many watchful and careful eyes over her course, and yet but one governor directing the same.
3. Why holdeth he that things external in the worship of G.o.d are not _vera spiritualia_? For if they be ecclesiastical and sacred ceremonies (not fleshly and worldly), why will he not also acknowledge them for true spiritual things? And if they be not _vera spiritualia_, why calls he them _res spirituales_? for are not _res_ and _verum_ reciprocal as well as _ens_ and _verum_.
4. Even as a prince in his sea voyage is supreme governor of all which are in the ship with him, and, by consequence, of the governor who directs her course, yet doth he not govern the actions of governing or directing the course of a ship, so, though a prince be the only supreme governor of all his dominions, and, by consequence, of ecclesiastical persons in his dominions, yet he cannot be said to govern all their ecclesiastical actions and causes. And as the governor of a ship acknowledgeth his prince for his only supreme governor even then whilst he is governing and directing the course of the ship (otherwise whilst he is governing her course he should not be his prince's subject), yet he doth not thereby acknowledge that his prince governeth his action of directing the course of the ship (for then should the prince be the pilot); so when one hath acknowledged the prince to be the only supreme governor upon earth of all ecclesiastical persons in his dominions, even whilst they are ordering and determining ecclesiastical causes, yet he hath not thereby acknowledged that the prince governeth the ecclesiastical causes. Wherefore, whilst the Bishop(922) taketh the English oath of supremacy to acknowledge the same which he teacheth touching the prince's power, he giveth it another sense than the words of it can bear; for it saith not that the king's majesty is the only supreme governor of all his Highness's dominions, and _of_ all things and causes therein, as well ecclesiastical or spiritual as temporal,-but it saith that he is the only supreme governor of all his Highness's dominions in all things or causes, &c. Now, the spiritual guides of the church, subst.i.tuted by Christ as deputies in his stead, who is the most supreme Governor of his own church, and on whose shoulder the government resteth, Isa. ix. 6, as his royal prerogative, even then, whilst they are governing and putting order to ecclesiastical or spiritual causes, they acknowledge their prince to be their only supreme governor upon earth, yet hereby they imply not that he governeth their governing of ecclesiastical causes, as hath been shown by that simile of governing a ship.
_Sect._ 4. 5. Whereas the Bishop leaveth all things external, which pertain to the worship of G.o.d, to be governed by princes, I object, that the version of the holy Scripture out of Hebrew and Greek into the vulgar tongue is an external thing, belonging to the worship of G.o.d, yet it cannot be governed by a prince who is not learned in the original tongues.
6. Whereas he yieldeth to princes the power of governing _in spiritualibus_, but not _in pure spiritualibus_, I cannot comprehend this distinction. All sacred and ecclesiastical things belonging to the worship of G.o.d are spiritual things.
What, then, understands he by things purely spiritual? If he mean things which are in such sort spiritual, that they have nothing earthly nor external in them,-in this sense the sacraments are not purely spiritual, because they consist of two parts; one earthly, and another heavenly, as Rheneus saith of the eucharist;-and so the sacraments, not being things purely spiritual, shall be left to the power and government of princes. If it be said that by things purely spiritual he means things which concern our spirits only, and not the outward man, I still urge the same instance; for the sacraments are not in this sense spiritual, because a part of the sacraments, to wit, the sacramental signs or elements, concern our external and bodily senses of seeing, touching, and tasting.
7. The Bishop also contradicteth himself unawares; for in one place(923) he reserveth and excepteth from the power of princes the judging and deciding of controversies and questions of faith. Yet in another place(924) he exhorteth kings, and princes to compel the divines of both sides (of the Roman and reformed churches) to come to a free conference, and to debate the matters controverted betwixt them; in which conference he requireth the princes themselves to be judges.
_Sect._ 5. It remaineth to try what force of reason the Bishop hath to back his opinion. As for the ragged rabble of human testimonies which he raketh together, I should but weary my reader, and spend paper and ink in vain, if I should insist to answer them one by one. Only thus much I say of all those sentences of the fathers and const.i.tutions of princes and emperors about things ecclesiastical, together with the histories of the submission of some ecclesiastical causes to emperors,-let him who pleaseth read them; and it shall appear,
1. That some of those things whereunto the power of princes was applied were unlawful.
2. There were many of them things temporal or civil, not ecclesiastical or spiritual, nor such as pertain to the worship of G.o.d.
3. There were some of them ecclesiastical or spiritual things, but then princes did only ratify that which had been determined by councils, and punish with the civil sword such as did stubbornly disobey the church's lawful const.i.tutions. Neither were princes allowed to do any more.
4. Sometimes they interposed their authority, and meddled in causes spiritual or ecclesiastical, even before the definition of councils; yet did they not judge nor decide those matters, but did only convocate councils, and urge the clergy to see to the mis-ordered and troubled state of the church, and by their wholesome laws and ordinances, to provide the best remedies for the same which they could.
5. At other times princes have done somewhat more in ecclesiastical matters; but this was only in extraordinary cases, when the clergy were so corrupted, that either through ignorance they were unable, or through malice and perverseness unwilling, to do their duty in deciding of controversies, making of canons, using the keys, and managing of other ecclesiastical matters, in which case princes might and did, by their coactive temporal jurisdiction, avoid disorder, error, and superst.i.tion, and cause a reformation of the church.
6. Princes have likewise, in rightly const.i.tuted and well reformed churches, by their own regal authority, straitly enjoined things pertaining to the worship of G.o.d, but those things were the very same which G.o.d's own written word had expressly commanded.
7. When princes went beyond those limits and bounds, they took upon them to judge and command more than G.o.d hath put within the compa.s.s of their power.
_Sect._ 6. But as touching the pa.s.sages of holy Scripture which the Bishop allegeth, I will answer thereto particularly. And first, he produceth that place, Deut. xvii. 19, where the king was appointed to have the book of the law of G.o.d with him, that he might learn to fear the Lord his G.o.d, and to keep all the words of this law and these statutes to do them. What logic, I pray, can from this place infer that princes have the supreme power of governing all ecclesiastical causes? Next, the Bishop tells us of David's appointing of the offices of the Levites, and dividing of their courses, 1 Chron. xxiii and his commending of the same to Solomon, 1 Chron. xxviii.; but he might have observed that David did not this as a king, but as a prophet, or man of G.o.d, 2 Chron. viii. 14, yea, those orders and courses of the Levites were also commanded by other prophets of the Lord, 2 Chron. xxix. 25. As touching Solomon's appointing of the courses and charges of the priests, Levites, and porters, he did not of himself, nor by his own princely authority, but because David, the man of G.o.d, had so commanded, 2 Chron. viii. 24. For Solomon received from David a pattern for all that which he was to do in the work of the house of the Lord, and also for the courses of the priests and Levites, 1 Chron.