The Spirit Of Laws Part 43
Another advantage their education possessed over ours was that it never could be effaced by contrary impressions. Epaminondas, the last year of his life, said, heard, beheld, and performed the very same things as at the age in which he received the first principles of his education.
In our days we receive three different or contrary educations, namely, of our parents, of our masters, and of the world. What we learn in the latter effaces all the ideas of the former. This, in some measure, arises from the contrast we experience between our religious and worldly engagements,6 a thing unknown to the ancients.
5.-Of Education in a Republican Government It is in a republican government that the whole power of education is required. The fear of despotic governments naturally arises of itself amidst threats and punishments; the honor of monarchies is favored by the pa.s.sions, and favors them in its turn; but virtue is a self-renunciation,7 which is ever arduous and painful.
This virtue may be defined as the love of the laws and of our country. As such love requires a constant preference of public to private interest, it is the source of all private virtues; for they are nothing more than this very preference itself.
This love is peculiar to democracies. In these alone the government is intrusted to private citizens. Now, a government is like every thing else: to preserve it we must love it.
Has it ever been known that kings were not fond of monarchy, or that despotic princes hated arbitrary power?
Every thing, therefore, depends on establishing this love in a republic; and to inspire it ought to be the princ.i.p.al business of education: but the surest way of instilling it into children is for parents to set them an example.
People have it generally in their power to communicate their ideas to their children; but they are still better able to transfuse their pa.s.sions.
If it happens otherwise, it is because the impressions made at home are effaced by those they have received abroad.
It is not the young people that degenerate; they are not spoiled till those of maturer age are already sunk into corruption.
6.-Of some Inst.i.tutions among the Greeks The ancient Greeks, convinced of the necessity that people who live under a popular government should be trained up to virtue, made very singular inst.i.tutions in order to inspire it. Upon seeing in the life of Lycurgus the laws that legislator gave to the Lacedaemonians, I imagine I am reading the history of the Sevarambes.8 The laws of Crete were the model of those of Sparta; and those of Plato reformed them.
Let us reflect here a little on the extensive genius with which those legislators must have been endowed, to perceive that by striking at received customs, and by confounding all manner of virtues,9 they should display their wisdom to the universe. Lycurgus, by blending theft with the spirit of justice, the hardest servitude with excess of liberty, the most rigid sentiments with the greatest moderation, gave stability to his city. He seemed to deprive her of all resources, such as arts, commerce, money, and walls; ambition prevailed among the citizens without hopes of improving their fortune; they had natural sentiments without the tie of a son, husband, or father; and chast.i.ty was stripped even of modesty and shame. This was the road that led Sparta to grandeur and glory; and so infallible were these inst.i.tutions, that it signified nothing to gain a victory over that republic without subverting her polity.10 By these laws Crete and Laconia were governed. Sparta was the last that fell a prey to the Macedonians, and Crete to the Romans.11 The Samnites had the same inst.i.tutions, which furnished those very Romans with the subject of four-and-twenty triumphs.12 A character so extraordinary in the inst.i.tutions of Greece has shown itself lately in the dregs and corruptions of modern times.13 A very honest legislator has formed a people to whom probity seems as natural as bravery to the Spartans. Mr. Penn is a real Lycurgus: and though the former made peace his princ.i.p.al aim, as the latter did war, yet they resemble one another in the singular way of living to which they reduced their people, in the ascendant they had over free men, in the prejudices they overcame, and in the pa.s.sions which they subdued.
Another example we have from Paraguay. This has been the subject of an invidious charge against a society that considers the pleasure of commanding as the only happiness in life: but it will be ever a glorious undertaking to render a government subservient to human happiness.14 It is glorious indeed for this society to have been the first in pointing out to those countries the idea of religion joined with that of humanity. By repairing the devastations of the Spaniards, she has begun to heal one of the most dangerous wounds that the human species ever received.
An exquisite sensibility to whatever she distinguishes by the name of honor, joined to her zeal for a religion which is far more humbling in respect to those who receive than to those who preach its doctrines, has set her upon vast undertakings, which she has accomplished with success. She has drawn wild people from their woods, secured them a maintenance, and clothed their nakedness; and had she only by this step improved the industry of mankind, it would have been sufficient to eternize her fame.
They who shall attempt hereafter to introduce like inst.i.tutions must establish the community of goods as prescribed in Plato's republic; that high respect he required for the G.o.ds; that separation from strangers, for the preservation of morals; and an extensive commerce carried on by the community, and not by private citizens: they must give our arts without our luxury, and our wants without our desires.
They must proscribe money, the effects of which are to swell people's fortunes beyond the bounds prescribed by nature; to learn to preserve for no purpose what has been idly h.o.a.rded up; to multiply without end our desires; and to supply the sterility of nature, from whom we have received very scanty means of inflaming our pa.s.sions, and of corrupting each other.
"The Epid.a.m.nians,15 perceiving their morals depraved by conversing with barbarians, chose a magistrate for making all contracts and sales in the name and behalf of the city." Commerce then does not corrupt the const.i.tution, and the const.i.tution does not deprive society of the advantages of commerce.16 7.-In what Cases these singular Inst.i.tutions may be of Service Inst.i.tutions of this kind may be proper in republics, because they have virtue for their principle; but to excite men to honor in monarchies, or to inspire fear in despotic governments, less trouble is necessary.
Besides, they can take place but in a small state,17 in which there is a possibility of general education, and of training up the body of the people like a single family.
The laws of Minos, of Lycurgus, and of Plato suppose a particular attention and care, which the citizens ought to have over one another's conduct. But an attention of this kind cannot be expected in the confusion and mult.i.tude of affairs in which a large nation is entangled.
In inst.i.tutions of this kind, money, as we have above observed, must be banished. But in great societies, the multiplicity, variety, embarra.s.sment, and importance of affairs, as well as the facility of purchasing, and the slowness of exchange, require a common measure. In order to support or extend our power, we must be possessed of the means to which, by the unanimous consent of mankind, this power is annexed.
8.-Explanation of a Paradox of the Ancients in respect to Manners That judicious writer, Polybius, informs us18 that music was necessary to soften the manners of the Arcadians, who lived in a cold, gloomy country; that the inhabitants of Cynete, who slighted music, were the cruellest of all the Greeks, and that no other town was so immersed in luxury and debauchery. Plato19 is not afraid to affirm that there is no possibility of making a change in music without altering the frame of government. Aristotle, who seems to have written his "Politics" only in order to contradict Plato, agrees with him, notwithstanding, in regard to the power and influence of music over the manners of the people.20 This was also the opinion of Theophrastus, of Plutarch,21 and of all the ancients-an opinion grounded on mature reflection; being one of the principles of their polity.22 Thus it was they enacted laws, and thus they required that cities should be governed.
This I fancy must be explained in the following manner. It is observable that in the cities of Greece, especially those whose princ.i.p.al object was war, all lucrative arts and professions were considered unworthy of a freeman. "Most arts," says Xenophon,23 "corrupt and enervate the bodies of those that exercise them; they oblige them to sit in the shade, or near the fire. They can find no leisure, either for their friends or for the republic." It was only by the corruption of some democracies that artisans became freemen. This we learn from Aristotle,24 who maintains that a well-regulated republic will never give them the right and freedom of the city.25 Agriculture was likewise a servile profession, and generally practised by the inhabitants of conquered countries, such as the Helotes among the Lacedaemonians, the Periecians among the Cretans, the Penestes among the Thessalians, and other conquered26 people in other republics.
In fine, every kind of low commerce27 was infamous among the Greeks; as it obliged a citizen to serve and wait on a slave, on a lodger, or a stranger. This was a notion that clashed with the spirit of Greek liberty; hence Plato28 in his laws orders a citizen to be punished if he attempts to concern himself with trade.
Thus in the Greek republics the magistrates were extremely embarra.s.sed. They would not have the citizens apply themselves to trade, to agriculture, or to the arts, and yet they would not have them idle.29 They found, therefore, employment for them in gymnic and military exercises; and none else were allowed by their inst.i.tution.30 Hence the Greeks must be considered as a society of wrestlers and boxers. Now, these exercises having a natural tendency to render people hardy and fierce, there was a necessity for tempering them with others that might soften their manners.31 For this purpose, music, which influences the mind by means of the corporeal organs, was extremely proper. It is a kind of medium between manly exercises, which harden the body, and speculative sciences, which are apt to render us unsociable and sour. It cannot be said that music inspired virtue, for this would be inconceivable: but it prevented the effects of a savage inst.i.tution, and enabled the soul to have such a share in the education as it could never have had without the a.s.sistance of harmony.
Let us suppose among ourselves a society of men so pa.s.sionately fond of hunting as to make it their sole employment; they would doubtless contract thereby a kind of rusticity and fierceness. But if they happen to imbibe a taste for music, we should quickly perceive a sensible difference in their customs and manners. In short, the exercises used by the Greeks could raise but one kind of pa.s.sions, viz., fierceness, indignation, and cruelty. But music excites all these; and is likewise able to inspire the soul with a sense of pity, lenity, tenderness, and love. Our moral writers, who declaim so vehemently against the stage, sufficiently demonstrate the power of music over the mind.
If the society above mentioned were to have no other music than that of drums, and the sound of the trumpet, would it not be more difficult to accomplish this end than by the more melting tones of softer harmony? The ancients were, therefore, in the right when, under particular circ.u.mstances, they preferred one mode to another in regard to manners.
But some will ask, why should music be pitched upon as preferable to any other entertainment? It is because of all sensible pleasures there is none that less corrupts the soul. We blush to read in Plutarch32 that the Thebans, in order to soften the manners of their youth, authorized by law a pa.s.sion which ought to be proscribed by all nations.
1 See D'Aubigny's "History."
2 We mention here what actually is, and not what ought to be; honor is a prejudice, which religion sometimes endeavors to remove, and at other times to regulate.
3 By excessive obedience, Montesquieu intends blind obedience.-De Dupin.
4 "Polit." lib. I.
5 How can this be, asks one, when slaves have no will?-Ed.
6 The Christian religion forbids vengeance and prescribes humility; this is perhaps the point of contrast which the author notes. But these precepts have not made of Europe a world of poltroons. It is well known that officers most attached to the laws of this religion are commonly the most exact in fulfilling the duties of their state, and the most intrepid in danger.-D.
7 This virtue, which Montesquieu defines as "love of country," is not self-renunciation; far from urging man to abnegation of his interests, it permits him to see the state flourishing and tranquil. In this public prosperity the citizen often finds his own peace of mind and independence, the peaceable possession and enjoyment of his property, the hope of increasing it by liberty of commerce, and of being raised to posts of dignity.-D.
8 See Vaira.s.se d'Allais in his "Voyages Imaginaires," vol. v.-Ed.
9 The author intends that the Lacedaemonians confounded their virtues and vices.-D.
10 Philopmen obliged the Lacedaemonians to change their manner of educating their children, being convinced that if he did not take this measure they would always be noted for their magnanimity.-Plutarch, "Life of the Philopmen." See Livy, book x.x.xVIII.
11 She defended her laws and liberty for the s.p.a.ce of three years. See the 98th, 99th, and 100th books of Livy, in Florus's epitome. She made a braver resistance than the greatest kings.
12 Florus, lib. I., cap. xvi.
13 In "faece Romuli."-Cicero.
14 The Indians of Paraguay do not depend on any particular lord; they pay only a fifth of the taxes, and are allowed the use of firearms to defend themselves.
15 Plutarch in his "Questions concerning the Greek affairs." The Epid.a.m.nians were the inhabitants of Dyrrachium, now Durazzo.-Ed.
16 But it does away with compet.i.tion, and thus ruins commerce.-Anon. Ed. 1764.
17 Such as were formerly the cities of Greece.
18 "Hist." iv. 20 and 2I.
19 "De Repub." lib. IV.
20 Lib. VIII. cap. v.
21 "Life of Pelopidas."
22 Plato, in his fourth book of laws, says that the prefectures of music and gymnic exercises are the most important employments in the city; and, in his"Republic," book III., Damon will tell you, says he, what sounds are capable of corrupting the mind with base sentiments, or of inspiring the contrary virtues.
23 Book 5th of" Memorable Sayings."
24 "Polit." book III. chap. iv.
25 Diophantes, says Aristotle, "Polit." chap. vii., made a law formerly at Athens, that artisans should be slaves to the republic.
26 Plato, likewise, and Aristotle require slaves to till the land. ("Laws," book V., "Polit." book VII., chap. x.) True it is that agriculture was not everywhere exercised by slaves: on the contrary, Aristotle observes the best republics were those in which the citizens themselves tilled the land: but this was brought about by the corruption of the ancient governments, which had become democratic: for in earlier times the cities of Greece were subject to an aristocratic government.
27 Cauponatio.
28 Book XI.
29 Arist. "Polit." lib. X.
30 "Ars corporum exercendorum gymnastica, variis certaminibus terendorum pdotribica."-Arist. "Polit." lib. VIII. cap. iii.
31 Aristotle observes that the children of the Lacedaemonians, who began these exercises at a very tender age, contracted thence too great a ferocity and rudeness of behavior.-"Polit." lib. VIII. cap. iv.
32 "Life of Pelopidas."
Book V
That the Laws Given by the Legislator Ought to be in Relation to the Principle of Government 1.-Idea of this Book THAT the laws of education should relate to the principle of each government has been shown in the preceding book. Now the same may be said of those which the legislator gives to the whole society. The relation of laws to this principle strengthens the several springs of government; and this principle derives thence, in its turn, a new degree of vigor. And thus it is in mechanics, that action is always followed by reaction.
Our design is, to examine this relation in each government, beginning with the republican state, the principle of which is virtue.
2.-What is meant by Virtue in a political State Virtue in a republic is a most simple thing; it is a love of the republic; it is a sensation, and not a consequence of acquired knowledge, a sensation that may be felt by the meanest as well as by the highest person in the state. When the common people adopt good maxims, they adhere to them more steadily than those whom we call gentlemen. It is very rarely that corruption commences with the former: nay, they frequently derive from their imperfect light a stronger attachment to the established laws and customs.
The love of our country is conducive to a purity of morals, and the latter is again conducive to the former. The less we are able to satisfy our private pa.s.sions, the more we abandon ourselves to those of a general nature. How comes it that monks are so fond of their order? It is owing to the very cause that renders the order insupportable. Their rule debars them from all those things by which the ordinary pa.s.sions are fed; there remains therefore only this pa.s.sion for the very rule that torments them. The more austere it is, that is, the more it curbs their inclinations, the more force it gives to the only pa.s.sion left them.
3.-What is meant by a Love of the Republic in a Democracy A love of the republic in a democracy is a love of the democracy; as the latter is that of equality.
A love of the democracy is likewise that of frugality. Since every individual ought here to enjoy the same happiness and the same advantages, they should consequently taste the same pleasures and form the same hopes, which cannot be expected but from a general frugality.
The love of equality in a democracy limits ambition to the sole desire, to the sole happiness, of doing greater services to our country than the rest of our fellow-citizens. They cannot all render her equal services, but they all ought to serve her with equal alacrity. At our coming into the world, we contract an immense debt to our country, which we can never discharge.
Hence distinctions here arise from the principle of equality, even when it seems to be removed by signal services or superior abilities.
The love of frugality limits the desire of having to the study of procuring necessaries to our family, and superfluities to our country. Riches give a power which a citizen cannot use for himself, for then he would be no longer equal. They likewise procure pleasures which he ought not to enjoy, because these would be also repugnant to the equality.
Thus well-regulated democracies, by establishing domestic frugality, made way at the same time for public expenses, as was the case at Rome and Athens, when magnificence and profusion arose from the very fund of frugality. And as religion commands us to have pure and unspotted hands when we make our offerings to the G.o.ds, the laws required a frugality of life to enable them to be liberal to our country.
The good sense and happiness of individuals depend greatly upon the mediocrity of their abilities and fortunes. Therefore, as a republic, where the laws have placed many in a middling station, is composed of wise men, it will be wisely governed; as it is composed of happy men, it will be extremely happy.
4.-In what Manner the Love of Equality and Frugality is inspired The love of equality and of a frugal economy is greatly excited by equality and frugality themselves, in societies where both these virtues are established by law.
In monarchies and despotic governments, n.o.body aims at equality; this does not so much as enter their thoughts; they all aspire to superiority. People of the very lowest condition desire to emerge from their obscurity, only to lord it over their fellow-subjects.
It is the same with respect to frugality. To love it, we must practise and enjoy it. It is not those who are enervated by pleasure that are fond of a frugal life; were this natural and common, Alcibiades would never have been the admiration of the universe.1 Neither is it those who envy or admire the luxury of the great; people that have present to their view none but rich men, or men miserable like themselves, detest their wretched condition, without loving or knowing the real term or point of misery.
A true maxim it is, therefore, that in order to love equality and frugality in a republic, these virtues must have been previously established by law.
5.-In what Manner the Laws establish Equality in a Democracy Some ancient legislators, as Lycurgus and Romulus, made an equal division of lands. A settlement of this kind can never take place except upon the foundation of a new republic; or when the old one is so corrupt, and the minds of the people are so disposed, that the poor think themselves obliged to demand, and the rich obliged to consent to, a remedy of this nature.
If the legislator, in making a division of this kind, does not enact laws at the same time to support it, he forms only a temporary const.i.tution; inequality will break in where the laws have not precluded it, and the republic will be utterly undone.
Hence for the preservation of this equality it is absolutely necessary there should be some regulation in respect to women's dowries donations, successions, testamentary settlements, and all other forms of contracting. For were we once allowed to dispose of our property to whom and how we pleased, the will of each individual would disturb the order of the fundamental law.
Solon, by permitting the Athenians, upon failure of issue,2 to leave their estates to whom they pleased, acted contrary to the ancient laws, by which the estates were ordered to continue in the family of the testator;3 and even contrary to his own laws, for by abolishing debts he had aimed at equality.
The law which prohibited people having two inheritances4 was extremely well adapted for a democracy. It derived its origin from the equal distribution of lands and portions made to each citizen. The law would not permit a single man to possess more than a single portion.
From the same source arose those laws by which the next relative was ordered to marry the heiress. This law was given to the Jews after the like distribution. Plato,5 who grounds his laws on this division, made the same regulation which had been received as a law by the Athenians.
At Athens there was a law whose spirit, in my opinion, has not been hitherto rightly understood. It was lawful to marry a sister only by the father's side, but it was not permitted to espouse a sister by the same venter.6 This custom was originally owing to republics, whose spirit would not permit that two portions of land, and consequently two inheritances, should devolve on the same person. A man who married his sister only by the father's side could inherit but one estate, namely, that of his father; but by espousing his sister by the same venter, it might happen that this sister's father, having no male issue, might leave her his estate, and consequently the brother who married her might be possessed of two.
Little will it avail to object to what Philo says,7 that although the Athenians were allowed to marry a sister by the father's side, and not by the mother's, yet the contrary practice prevailed among the Lacedaemonians, who were permitted to espouse a sister by the mother's side, and not by the father's. For I find in Strabo8 that at Sparta, whenever a woman was married to her brother she had half his portion for her dowry. Plain is it that this second law was made in order to prevent the bad consequences of the former. That the estate belonging to the sister's family might not devolve on the brother's, they gave half the brother's estate to the sister for her dowry.
Seneca,9 speaking of Sila.n.u.s, who had married his sister,10 says that the permission was limited at Athens, but general at Alexandria. In a monarchical government there was very little concern about any such thing as a division of estates.
Excellent was that law which, in order to maintain this division of lands in a democracy, ordained that a father who had several children should pitch upon one of them to inherit his portion,11 and leave the others to be adopted, to the end that the numbers of citizens might always be kept upon an equality with that of the divisions.
Phaleas of Chalcedon12 contrived a very extraordinary method of rendering all fortunes equal, in a republic where there was the greatest inequality. This was, that the rich should give fortunes with their daughters to the poor, but receive none themselves; and that the poor should receive money for their daughters, instead of giving them fortunes. But I do not remember that a regulation of this kind ever took place in any republic. It lays the citizens under such hard and oppressive conditions as would make them detest the very equality which they designed to establish. It is proper sometimes that the laws should not seem to tend so directly to the end they propose.
Though real equality be the very soul of a democracy, it is so difficult to establish, that an extreme exactness in this respect would not be always convenient. Sufficient is it to establish a census,13 which shall reduce or fix the differences to a certain point: it is afterwards the business of particular laws to level, as it were, the inequalities, by the duties laid upon the rich, and by the ease afforded to the poor. It is moderate riches alone that can give or suffer this sort of compensation; for as to men of overgrown estates, everything which does not contribute to advance their power and honor is considered by them as an injury.
All inequality in democracies ought to be derived from the nature of the government, and even from the principle of equality. For example, it may be apprehended that people who are obliged to live by their labor would be too much impoverished by a public employment, or neglect the duties attending it; that artisans would grow insolent, and that too great a number of freemen would overpower the ancient citizens. In this case the equality14 in a democracy may be suppressed for the good of the state. But this is only an apparent equality; for a man ruined by a public employment would be in a worse condition than his fellow-citizens; and this same man, being obliged to neglect his duty, would reduce the rest to a worse condition than himself, and so on.
6.-In what Manner the Laws ought to maintain Frugality in a Democracy It is not sufficient in a well-regulated democracy that the divisions of land be equal; they ought also to be small, as was customary among the Romans. "G.o.d forbid," said Curius to his soldiers,15 "that a citizen should look upon that as a small piece of land which is sufficient to maintain him."
As equality of fortunes supports frugality, so the latter maintains the former. These things, though in themselves different, are of such a nature as to be unable to subsist separately; they reciprocally act upon each other; if one withdraws itself from a democracy, the other surely follows it.
True is it that when a democracy is founded on commerce, private people may acquire vast riches without a corruption of morals. This is because the spirit of commerce is naturally attended with that of frugality, economy, moderation, labor, prudence, tranquillity, order, and rule. So long as this spirit subsists, the riches it produces have no bad effect. The mischief is, when excessive wealth destroys the spirit of commerce, then it is that the inconveniences of inequality begin to be felt.
In order to support this spirit, commerce should be carried on by the princ.i.p.al citizens; this should be their sole aim and study; this the chief object of the laws: and these very laws, by dividing the estates of individuals in proportion to the increase of commerce, should set every poor citizen so far at his ease as to be able to work like the rest, and every wealthy citizen in such a mediocrity as to be obliged to take some pains either in preserving or acquiring a fortune.
It is an excellent law in a trading republic to make an equal division of the paternal estate among the children. The consequence of this is, that how great so ever a fortune the father has made, his children, being not so rich as he, are induced to avoid luxury, and to work as he has done. I speak here only of trading republics; as to those that have no commerce, the legislator must pursue quite different measures.16 In Greece there were two sorts of republics: the one military, like Sparta; the other commercial, as Athens. In the former, the citizens were obliged to be idle; in the latter, endeavors were used to inspire them with the love of industry and labor. Solon made idleness a crime, and insisted that each citizen should give an account of his manner of getting a livelihood. And, indeed, in a well-regulated democracy, where people's expenses should extend only to what is necessary, every one ought to have it; for how should their wants be otherwise supplied?
7.-Other Methods of favoring the Principle of Democracy An equal division of lands cannot be established in all democracies. There are some circ.u.mstances in which a regulation of this nature would be impracticable, dangerous, and even subversive of the const.i.tution. We are not always obliged to proceed to extremes. If it appears that this division of lands, which was designed to preserve the people's morals, does not suit the democracy, recourse must be had to other methods.
If a permanent body be established to serve as a rule and pattern of manners; a senate, to which years, virtue, gravity, and eminent services procure admittance; the senators, by being exposed to public view like the statues of the G.o.ds, must naturally inspire every family with sentiments of virtue.
Above all, this senate must steadily adhere to the ancient inst.i.tutions, and mind that the people and the magistrates never swerve from them.