The Philosophy of Spinoza Part 7
CHAPTER IV
OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS[6]
Every man's true happiness and blessedness consist solely in the enjoyment of what is good, not in the pride that he alone is enjoying it, to the exclusion of others. He who thinks himself the more blessed because he is enjoying benefits which others are not, or because he is more blessed or more fortunate than his fellows, is ignorant of true happiness and blessedness, and the joy which he feels is either childish or envious and malicious. For instance, a man's true happiness consists only in wisdom, and the knowledge of the truth, not at all in the fact that he is wiser than others, or that others lack such knowledge: such considerations do not increase his wisdom or true happiness.
Whoever, therefore, rejoices for such reasons, rejoices in another's misfortune, and is, so far, malicious and bad, knowing neither true happiness nor the peace of the true life.
When Scripture, therefore, in exhorting the Hebrews to obey the law, says that the Lord has chosen them for Himself before other nations (Deut. x. 15); that He is near them, but not near others (Deut. iv. 7); that to them alone He has given just laws (Deut. iv. 8); and, lastly, that He has marked them out before others (Deut. iv. 32); it speaks only according to the understanding of its hearers, who, as we have shown in the last chapter, and as Moses also testified (Deut. ix. 6, 7), knew not true blessedness. For in good sooth they would have been no less blessed if G.o.d had called all men equally to salvation, nor would G.o.d have been less present to them for being equally present to others; their laws would have been no less just if they had been ordained for all, and they themselves would have been no less wise. The miracles would have shown G.o.d's power no less by being wrought for other nations also; lastly, the Hebrews would have been just as much bound to worship G.o.d if He had bestowed all these gifts equally on all men.
When G.o.d tells Solomon (1 Kings iii. 12) that no one shall be as wise as he in time to come, it seems to be only a manner of expressing surpa.s.sing wisdom; it is little to be believed that G.o.d would have promised Solomon, for his greater happiness, that He would never endow any one with so much wisdom in time to come; this would in no wise have increased Solomon's intellect, and the wise king would have given equal thanks to the Lord if every one had been gifted with the same faculties.
Still, though we a.s.sert that Moses, in the pa.s.sages of the Pentateuch just cited, spoke only according to the understanding of the Hebrews, we have no wish to deny that G.o.d ordained the Mosaic law for them alone, nor that He spoke to them alone, nor that they witnessed marvels beyond those which happened to any other nation; but we wish to emphasize that Moses desired to admonish the Hebrews in such a manner and with such reasonings as would appeal most forcibly to their childish understanding and constrain them to worship the Deity. Further, we wished to show that the Hebrews did not surpa.s.s other nations in knowledge, or in piety, but evidently in some attribute different from these; or (to speak like the Scriptures, according to their understanding), that the Hebrews were not chosen by G.o.d before others for the sake of the true life and sublime ideas, though they were often thereto admonished, but with some other object. What that object was I will duly show.
But before I begin, I wish in a few words to explain what I mean by the guidance of G.o.d, by the help of G.o.d, external and inward, and lastly, what I understand by fortune.
By the help of G.o.d, I mean the fixed and unchangeable order of nature or the chain of natural events: for I have said before and shown elsewhere that the universal laws of nature, according to which all things exist and are determined, are only another name for the eternal decrees of G.o.d, which always involve eternal truth and necessity.
So that to say that everything happens according to natural laws, and to say that everything is ordained by the decree and ordinance of G.o.d, is the same thing. Now since the power in Nature is identical with the power of G.o.d, by which alone all things happen and are determined, it follows that whatsoever man, as a part of Nature, provides himself with to aid and preserve his existence, or whatsoever Nature affords him without his help, is given to him solely by the Divine power, acting either through human nature or through external circ.u.mstance. So whatever human nature can furnish itself with by its own efforts to preserve its existence, may be fitly called the inward aid of G.o.d, whereas whatever else accrues to man's profit from outward causes may be called the external aid of G.o.d.
We can now easily understand what is meant by the election of G.o.d. For since no one can do anything save by the predetermined order of Nature, that is by G.o.d's eternal ordinance and decree, it follows that no one can choose a plan of life for himself, or accomplish any work save by G.o.d's vocation choosing him for the work or the plan of life in question, rather than any other. Lastly, by fortune, I mean the ordinance of G.o.d in so far as it directs human life through external and unexpected means. With these preliminaries I return to my purpose of discovering the reason why the Hebrews were said to be elected by G.o.d before other nations, and with the demonstration I thus proceed.
All objects of legitimate desire fall, generally speaking, under one of these three categories:--
1. The knowledge of things through their primary causes.
2. The government of the pa.s.sions, or the acquirement of the habit of virtue.
3. Secure and healthy life.
The means which most directly conduce towards the first two of these ends, and which may be considered their proximate and efficient causes are contained in human nature itself, so that their acquisition hinges only on our own power, and on the laws of human nature. It may be concluded that these gifts are not peculiar to any nation, but have always been shared by the whole human race, unless, indeed, we would indulge the dream that Nature formerly created men of different kinds.
But the means which conduce to security and health are chiefly in external circ.u.mstance, and are called the gifts of fortune because they depend chiefly on objective causes of which we are ignorant; for a fool may be almost as liable to happiness or unhappiness as a wise man.
Nevertheless, human management and watchfulness can greatly a.s.sist towards living in security and warding off the injuries of our fellow men, and even of beasts. Reason and experience show no more certain means of attaining this object than the formation of a society with fixed laws, the occupation of a strip of territory, and the concentration of all forces, as it were, into one body, that is the social body. Now for forming and preserving a society, no ordinary ability and care is required: that society will be most secure, most stable, and least liable to reverses, which is founded and directed by far-seeing and careful men; while, on the other hand, a society const.i.tuted by men without trained skill, depends in a great measure on fortune, and is less constant. If, in spite of all, such a society lasts a long time, it is owing to some other directing influence than its own; if it overcomes great perils and its affairs prosper, it will perforce marvel at and adore the guiding Spirit of G.o.d (in so far, that is, as G.o.d works through hidden means, and not through the nature and mind of man), for everything happens to it unexpectedly and contrary to antic.i.p.ation, it may even be said and thought to be by miracle. Nations, then, are distinguished from one another in respect to the social organization and the laws under which they live and are governed; the Hebrew nation was not chosen by G.o.d in respect to its wisdom nor its tranquillity of mind, but in respect to its social organization and the good fortune with which it obtained supremacy and kept it so many years.
This is abundantly clear from Scripture. Even a cursory perusal will show us that the only respects in which the Hebrews surpa.s.sed other nations, are in their successful conduct of matters relating to government, and in their surmounting great perils solely by G.o.d's external aid; in other ways they were on a par with their fellows, and G.o.d was equally gracious to all. For in respect to intellect (as we have shown in the last chapter) they held very ordinary ideas about G.o.d and Nature, so that they cannot have been G.o.d's chosen in this respect; nor were they so chosen in respect of virtue and the true life, for here again they, with the exception of a very few elect, were on an equality with other nations: therefore their choice and vocation consisted only in the temporal happiness and advantages of independent rule. In fact, we do not see that G.o.d promised anything beyond this to the patriarchs or their successors; in the law no other reward is offered for obedience than the continual happiness of an independent commonwealth and other goods of this life; while, on the other hand, against contumacy and the breaking of the covenant is threatened the downfall of the commonwealth and great hardships. Nor is this to be wondered at; for the ends of every social organization and commonwealth are (as appears from what we have said, and as we will explain more at length hereafter) security and comfort; a commonwealth can only exist by the laws being binding on all. If all the members of a state wish to disregard the law, by that very fact they dissolve the state and destroy the commonwealth. Thus, the only reward which could be promised to the Hebrews for continued obedience to the law was security and its attendant advantages, while no surer punishment could be threatened for disobedience, than the ruin of the state and the evils which generally follow therefrom, in addition to such further consequences as might accrue to the Jews in particular from the ruin of their especial state. But there is no need here to go into this point at more length. I will only add that the laws of the Old Testament were revealed and ordained to the Jews only, for as G.o.d chose them in respect to the special const.i.tution of their society and government, they must, of course, have had special laws. Whether G.o.d ordained special laws for other nations also, and revealed Himself to their lawgivers prophetically, that is, under the attributes by which the latter were accustomed to imagine Him, I cannot sufficiently determine. It is evident from Scripture itself that other nations acquired supremacy and particular laws by the external aid of G.o.d.
If any one wishes to maintain that the Jews ... have been chosen by G.o.d for ever, I will not gainsay him if he will admit that this choice, whether temporary or eternal, has no regard, in so far as it is peculiar to the Jews, to aught but dominion and physical advantages (for by such alone can one nation be distinguished from another), whereas in regard to intellect and true virtue, every nation is on a par with the rest, and G.o.d has not in these respects chosen one people rather than another.
FOOTNOTES:
[6] From the _Tr. Th.-P._, ch. iii, same t.i.tle.
CHAPTER V
OF THE DIVINE LAW[7]
The word law, taken in the abstract means that by which an individual, or all things, or as many things as belong to a particular species, act in one and the same fixed and definite manner, which manner depends either on natural necessity or on human decree. A law which depends on natural necessity is one which necessarily follows from the nature, or from the definition of the thing in question; a law which depends on human decree, and which is more correctly called an ordinance, is one which men have laid down for themselves and others in order to live more safely or conveniently, or from some similar reason.
For example, the law that all bodies impinging on lesser bodies, lose as much of their own motion as they communicate to the latter is a universal law of all bodies, and depends on natural necessity. So, too, the law that a man in remembering one thing, straightway remembers another either like it, or which he had perceived simultaneously with it, is a law which necessarily follows from the nature of man. But the law that men must yield, or be compelled to yield, somewhat of their natural right, and that they bind themselves to live in a certain way, depends on human decree. Now, though I freely admit that all things are predetermined by universal natural laws to exist and operate in a given, fixed, and definite manner, I still a.s.sert that the laws I have just mentioned depend on human decree.
(1.) Because man, in so far as he is a part of Nature, const.i.tutes a part of the power of Nature. Whatever, therefore, follows necessarily from the necessity of human nature (that is, from Nature herself, in so far as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows, even though it be necessarily, from human power. Hence the sanction of such laws may very well be said to depend on man's decree, for it princ.i.p.ally depends on the power of the human mind; so that the human mind in respect to its perception of things as true and false, can readily be conceived as without such laws, but not without necessary law as we have just defined it.
(2.) I have stated that these laws depend on human decree because it is well to define and explain things by their proximate causes. The general consideration of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us very little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning particular questions. Let us add that as to the actual coordination and concatenation of things, that is how things are ordained and linked together, we are obviously ignorant; therefore, it is more profitable for right living, nay, it is necessary for us to consider things as contingent. So much about law in the abstract.
Now the word law seems to be only applied to natural phenomena by a.n.a.logy, and is commonly taken to signify a command which men can either obey or neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within certain originally exceeded limits, and therefore lays down no rule beyond human strength. Thus it is expedient to define law more particularly as a plan of life laid down by man for himself or others with a certain object.
However, as the true object of legislation is only perceived by a few, and most men are almost incapable of grasping it, though they live under its conditions, legislators, with a view to exacting general obedience, have wisely put forward another object, very different from that which necessarily follows from the nature of law: they promise to the observers of the law that which the ma.s.ses chiefly desire, and threaten its violators with that which they chiefly fear: thus endeavoring to restrain the ma.s.ses, as far as may be, like a horse with a curb; whence it follows that the word law is chiefly applied to the modes of life enjoined on men by the sway of others; hence those who obey the law are said to live under it and to be under compulsion. In truth, a man who renders every one their due because he fears the gallows, acts under the sway and compulsion of others, and cannot be called just. But a man who does the same from a knowledge of the true reason for laws and their necessity, acts from a firm purpose and of his own accord, and is therefore properly called just. This, I take it, is Paul's meaning when he says, that those who live under the law cannot be justified through the law, for justice, as commonly defined, is the constant and perpetual will to render every man his due. Thus Solomon says (Prov. xxi. 15), "It is a joy to the just to do judgment," but the wicked fear.
Law, then, being a plan of living which men have for a certain object laid down for themselves or others, may, as it seems, be divided into human law and Divine law.
By human law I mean a plan of living which serves only to render life and the state secure.
By Divine law I mean that which only regards the highest good, in other words, the true knowledge of G.o.d and love.
I call this law Divine because of the nature of the highest good, which I will here shortly explain as clearly as I can.
Inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our being, it is evident that we should make every effort to perfect it as far as possible if we desire to search for what is really profitable to us. For in intellectual perfection the highest good should consist. Now, since all our knowledge, and the certainty which removes every doubt, depend solely on the knowledge of G.o.d;--firstly, because without G.o.d nothing can exist or be conceived; secondly, because so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of G.o.d we may remain in universal doubt--it follows that our highest good and perfection also depend solely on the knowledge of G.o.d. Further, since without G.o.d nothing can exist or be conceived, it is evident that all natural phenomena involve and express the conception of G.o.d as far as their essence and perfection extend, so that we have greater and more perfect knowledge of G.o.d in proportion to our knowledge of natural phenomena: conversely (since the knowledge of an effect through its cause is the same thing as the knowledge of a particular property of a cause) the greater our knowledge of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of the essence of G.o.d (which is the cause of all things). So, then, our highest good not only depends on the knowledge of G.o.d, but wholly consists therein; and it further follows that man is perfect or the reverse in proportion to the nature and perfection of the object of his special desire; hence the most perfect and the chief sharer in the highest blessedness is he who prizes above all else, and takes especial delight in the intellectual knowledge of G.o.d, the most perfect Being.
Hither, then, our highest good and our highest blessedness aim--namely, to the knowledge and love of G.o.d; therefore the means demanded by this aim of all human actions, that is, by G.o.d in so far as the idea of him is in us, may be called the commands of G.o.d, because they proceed, as it were, from G.o.d Himself, inasmuch as He exists in our minds, and the plan of life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called the law of G.o.d.
The nature of the means, and the plan of life which this aim demands, how the foundations of the best states follow its lines, and how men's life is conducted, are questions pertaining to general ethics. Here I only proceed to treat of the Divine law in a particular application.
As the love of G.o.d is man's highest happiness and blessedness, and the ultimate end and aim of all human actions, it follows that he alone lives by the Divine law who loves G.o.d not from fear of punishment, or from love of any other object, such as sensual pleasure, fame, or the like; but solely because he has knowledge of G.o.d, or is convinced that the knowledge and love of G.o.d is the highest good. The sum and chief precept, then, of the Divine law is to love G.o.d as the highest good, namely, as we have said, not from fear of any pains and penalties or from the love of any other object in which we desire to take pleasure.
The idea of G.o.d lays down the rule that G.o.d is our highest good--in other words, that the knowledge and love of G.o.d is the ultimate aim to which all our actions should be directed. The worldling cannot understand these things, they appear foolishness to him, because he has too meager a knowledge of G.o.d, and also because in this highest good he can discover nothing which he can handle or eat, or which affects the fleshly appet.i.tes wherein he chiefly delights, for it consists solely in thought and the pure reason. They, on the other hand, who know that they possess no greater gift than intellect and sound reason, will doubtless accept what I have said without question.
We have now explained that wherein the Divine law chiefly consists, and what are human laws, namely, all those which have a different aim unless they have been ratified by revelation, for in this respect also things are referred to G.o.d (as we have shown above) and in this sense the law of Moses, although it was not universal, but entirely adapted to the disposition and particular preservation of a single people, may yet be called a law of G.o.d or Divine law, inasmuch as we believe that it was ratified by prophetic insight. If we consider the nature of natural Divine law as we have just explained it, we shall see
I. That it is universal or common to all men, for we have deduced it from universal human nature.
II. That it does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative whatsoever, for inasmuch as this natural Divine law is comprehended solely by the consideration of human nature, it is plain that we can conceive it as existing as well in Adam as in any other man, as well in a man living among his fellows as in a man who lives by himself.
The truth of a historical narrative, however a.s.sured, cannot give us the knowledge nor consequently the love of G.o.d, for love of G.o.d springs from knowledge of Him, and knowledge of Him should be derived from general ideas, in themselves certain and known, so that the truth of a historical narrative is very far from being a necessary requisite for our attaining our highest good.
Still, though the truth of histories cannot give us the knowledge and love of G.o.d, I do not deny that reading them is very useful with a view to life in the world, for the more we have observed and known of men's customs and circ.u.mstances, which are best revealed by their actions, the more warily we shall be able to order our lives among them, and so far as reason dictates to adapt our actions to their dispositions.
III. We see that this natural Divine law does not demand the performance of ceremonies--that is, actions in themselves indifferent, which are called good from the fact of their inst.i.tution, or actions symbolizing something profitable for salvation, or (if one prefers this definition) actions of which the meaning surpa.s.ses human understanding. The natural light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself unable to supply, but only such as it can very clearly show to be good, or a means to our blessedness. Such things as are good simply because they have been commanded or inst.i.tuted, or as being symbols of something good, are mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among actions that are the offspring, as it were, or fruit of a sound mind and of intellect. There is no need for me to go into this now in more detail.
IV. Lastly, we see that the highest reward of the Divine law is the law itself, namely, to know G.o.d and to love Him of our free choice, and with an undivided and fruitful spirit; while its penalty is the absence of these things, and being in bondage to the flesh--that is, having an inconstant and wavering spirit.
These points being noted, I must now inquire
I. Whether by the natural light of reason we can conceive of G.o.d as a lawgiver or potentate ordaining laws for men?
II. What is the teaching of Holy Writ concerning this natural light of reason and natural law?
III. With what objects were ceremonies formerly inst.i.tuted?