The Loyalists of America and Their Times Volume II Part 1
The Loyalists of America and Their Times.
by Egerton Ryerson.
VOL. II.
TORONTO:
WILLIAM BRIGGS, 80 KING STREET EAST;
JAMES CAMPBELL & SON, AND WILLING & WILLIAMSON.
MONTREAL: DAWSON BROTHERS.
1880.
ENTERED, according to the Act of the Parliament of Canada, in the year One thousand eight hundred and eighty, by the REV. EGERTON RYERSON, D.D., LL.D, in the Office of the Minister of Agriculture.
CHAPTER XXVII.
THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AFTER THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE--THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND KING OF FRANCE--THE ALLIANCE NOT PRODUCTIVE OF THE EFFECTS ANTIc.i.p.aTED--EFFORTS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR RECONCILIATION WITH THE COLONIES NOT SUCCESSFUL.
It was supposed, both in America and France, that when the alliance between the King of France and Congress, referred to in the last chapter of the previous volume, became known in England, though it was not publicly avowed until February, 1778, England would be weakened and discouraged from further warlike effort, and immediately offer terms of peace, upon the ground of American independence; but the reverse was the case.
The alliance between Congress and the King of France was kept in abeyance by the latter during more than a twelvemonth after it was applied for by the agents of Congress, until after the defeat and capture of General Burgoyne and the refusal of Congress to confer with Lord and General Howe, as British Commissioners, without the previous acknowledgment by the Commissioners of the independence of the United States.[1]
Lord Admiral Howe, having spent some months with his fleet at Halifax, did not arrive at Sandy Hook until the 12th of July, eight days after the Declaration of Independence. "Besides the troops, Lord Howe had brought with him a doc.u.ment which it was hoped might render them unnecessary--the Royal warrant appointing himself and General Howe Commissioners under the Act of Parliament for the pacification of America. No doubt the selection of such men was most wisely made. The memory of their elder brother, who had fallen gloriously in the wars against the French in Canada, was endeared to the colonists, who had fought by his side. Both Lord Howe and the General, but Lord Howe especially, had ever since cultivated a friendly intercourse with Americans, and now entertained a most earnest wish to conclude the strife against them. But judicious as was the choice of the Commissioners, the restricted terms of the Commission were certainly in the highest degree impolitic. Lord Howe had laboured, but vainly, to obtain its enlargement; it amounted, in fact, to little more than the power, first, of receiving submissions, and then, but not till then, of granting pardons and inquiring into grievances.[2] Yet, still, since these terms had not been divulged, and were much magnified by common rumour, the name of the Commission was not ill adapted for popular effect. Had Lord Howe arrived with it a few weeks before, as he might and should have done, we are a.s.sured by American writers that an impression might have been produced by it, in some at least of the thirteen colonies, to an extent which they 'cannot calculate,' or rather, perhaps, which they do not like to own. But these few months had been decisive in another direction. During these months both the feeling and the position of the insurgents had most materially changed."[3]
"The two Royal Commissioners," says Dr. Ramsay, "Admiral and General Howe, thought proper, before they commenced their military operations, to try what might be done in their civil capacity towards effecting a reunion between Great Britain and the colonies. It was one of the first acts of Lord Howe to send on sh.o.r.e a circular letter to several of the Royal Governors in America, informing them of the late Act of Parliament 'for restoring peace to the colonies, and granting pardon to such as should deserve mercy,' and desiring them to publish a declaration which accompanied the same. In this, he informed the colonists of the power with which his brother and he were entrusted 'of granting general or particular pardons to all those who, though they had deviated from their allegiance, were willing to return to their duty:' and of declaring 'any colony, province, county or town, port, district or place, to be in the peace of his Majesty.' Congress, impressed with the belief that the proposals of the Commissioners, instead of disuniting the people, would have a contrary effect, ordered them to be speedily published in the several American newspapers. Had a _redress of grievances_ been at this late hour offered, though the honour of the States was involved in supporting their late Declaration of Independence, yet the love of peace, and the bias of great numbers to their parent State, would, in all probability, have made a powerful party for rescinding the Act of Separation, and for re-uniting with Great Britain; but when it appeared that the power of the Royal Commissioners was little more than to grant pardons, Congress appealed to the good sense of the people for the necessity of adhering to the Act of Independence."[4]
It was a diplomatic blunder and an unwise policy for the English Commissioners to make known to the public the restricted authority of their commission, instead of simply stating in general terms their commission under the authority of the Act of Parliament "for restoring peace to the colonies." On such grounds and for such an object the Congress could have offered no justifiable excuse for refusing a conference with the Royal Commissioners; and when, in the course of the discussion, it should have been found that the Commissioners could not agree with, and did not feel themselves authorized to accede to, all the demands of the agents of Congress, the Royal Commissioners (both of whom were known to be friends of the colonies, and opposed to the high-handed measures of the Parliament) could have noted the points of difference, and agreed to recommend the demands made upon them to the most favourable consideration of the King's Government: at all events, friendly intercourse and negotiations would have been opened which would have been probably followed by a suspension of hostilities, if not complete reconciliation. But this was what Congress, led by John Adams and Dr. Franklin--bitter enemies to reconciliation--dreaded; and they very shrewdly saw and improved the imprudent exposure of the Royal Commissioners, by directing the publication of their circular letter and declaration in all the provincial newspapers, "that the good people of the United States may be informed of what nature are the Commissioners, and what the terms, with expectation of which the insidious Court of Great Britain had endeavoured to amuse and disarm them; and that the few who still remain suspended by a hope, founded either on the justice or moderation of their late King, might now at length be convinced that the valour alone of their country is to save its liberties."
Thus all conference with the Royal Commissioners was refused on the part of the leaders in Congress; war and bloodshed followed, and a year of disastrous defeats to the Revolutionists; but the position of the Loyalists may be inferred from the resolution of the New York Revolutionary Convention, adopted a few days after the Declaration of Independence, and before the actual commencement of hostilities, and which was as follows: "That all persons residing within the State of New York, and claiming protection from its laws, owed it allegiance; and that any person owing it allegiance, and levying war against the State, _or being an adherent to the King of Great Britain, should be deemed guilty of treason and suffer death_." The Convention also resolved: "That as the inhabitants of King's County had determined not to oppose the enemy, a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the authenticity of these reports, and to _disarm and secure the disaffected, to remove or destroy the stock of grain, and, if necessary, to lay the whole county waste_." Such treatment of adherents to the unity of the empire, and of even neutrals, at the very commencement of the war, goes far to account for the warfare of extermination in many places between the two parties in subsequent years. This mode of warfare was first inst.i.tuted against the Loyalists, who acted on the defensive, and who have been loudly complained of by American historians for having afterwards, and on some occasions cruelly retaliated upon those who had driven them to desperation.
A little more than eighteen months after the Declaration of Independence, 17th of February, 1778, three Bills were introduced into and pa.s.sed by the British Parliament, which entirely removed all the grounds of complaint made by the colonists in previous years, and provided for the appointment of Commissioners to settle all differences between the colonies and the mother country. The first of these Bills was ent.i.tled, "For removing Doubts and Apprehensions concerning Taxation by the Parliament of Great Britain in any of the Colonies." It expressly repealed by name the tea duty in America, and declared: "That from and after the pa.s.sing of this Act the King and Parliament of Great Britain will not impose any duty, tax, or a.s.sessment whatever in any of his Majesty's (American) colonies, except only such duties as it may be expedient to impose for the regulation of commerce; the net produce of such duties to be always paid and applied to and for the use of the colony in which the same shall be levied." "Thus," says Lord Mahon, "was the claim of parliamentary taxation fully, at last, renounced."
The second Bill was "To enable his Majesty to appoint Commissioners with sufficient power to treat, consult, and agree upon the means of quieting the disorders now subsisting in certain of the colonies, plantations, and provinces of North America." The Commissioners were to be five in number, and were invested with extensive powers; they were to raise no difficulties as to the rank or t.i.tle of the leaders on either side, but were left at liberty to treat, consult, and agree with any body or bodies politic, or any person or persons whatsoever; they might proclaim a cessation of hostilities on the part of the King's forces by sea or land, for any time, or under any conditions or restrictions; they might suspend any Act of Parliament relating to America pa.s.sed since the 10th of February, 1763. In short, it was intimated that the Commissioners might accept almost any terms of reconciliation short of independence, and subject to be confirmed by a vote of Parliament.
Lord North introduced his Bills in an able and eloquent speech of two hours, in which he reviewed his own career and the several questions of dispute with the colonies.[5]
But though taunted from all sides, his Bills pa.s.sed speedily through both Houses of Parliament. Lord Mahon remarks: "In spite of such taunts and far from friendly feelings on all sides, the Conciliatory Bills, as they have been termed, were not in reality opposed from any quarter.
There was only one division on a clause moved by Mr. Powys, to repeal expressly by name the Ma.s.sachusetts Charter Act. Lord North induced a large majority to vote against that clause, but agreed that the object in view should be attained by a separate measure. A Bill for that purpose was therefore introduced by Mr. Powys, and pa.s.sed through Parliament concurrently with the other two. In the House of Lords the same arguments were, with little change, renewed. Lord Shelburne took occasion to declare his full concurrence in the sentiments of Lord Chatham, expressing 'the strongest disapprobation of every idea tending to admit the independence of America,' although acknowledging that future circ.u.mstances might create a necessity for such a submission.
Lord Chatham himself was ill with gout at Hayes, and did not appear.
There was no division; and on the 11th of March (1778), the King, seated on his throne, gave to all three measures the royal a.s.sent."[6]
Lord North and other members of his Administration were convinced that the American problem could not be solved by their own party; that such a work could be accomplished by the Earl of Chatham alone, as he had a few years before, by his skill and energy, when the affairs of America were in a desperate state after five years' unsuccessful war with France, dispossessed France, in the short s.p.a.ce of two years, of every inch of American territory. The Duke of Richmond advocated immediate surrender of independence to the Americans, and peace with them, in order to avoid a war with France; he doubted the possibility of even Lord Chatham being able to effect a reconciliation between the American colonies and Great Britain. Three-fourths of a century afterwards, Lord Macaulay expressed the same opinion; but Lord Mahon, in his History, has expressed a contrary opinion, and given his reasons in the following words, well worthy of being carefully read and pondered:
"In the first place, let it be remembered with what great and what singular advantages Lord Chatham would have set his hand to the work. He had from the outset most ably and most warmly supported the claims of the colonists. Some of his eloquent sentences had become watchwords in their mouths. His statue had been erected in their streets; his portrait was hanging in their Council Chambers. For his great name they felt a love and reverence higher as yet than for any one of their own chiefs and leaders, not even at that early period excepting Washington himself. Thus, if even it could be said that overtures of reconciliation had failed in every other British hand, it would afford no proof that in Chatham's they might not have thriven and borne fruit.
"But what at the same period was the position of Congress? Had that a.s.sembly shown of late an enlightened zeal for the public interests, and did it then stand high in the confidence and affection of its countrymen? Far otherwise. The factions and divisions prevailing at their town of York (in Virginia, where they removed from Baltimore), the vindictive rigour to political opponents, the neglect of Washington's army, and the cabals against Washington's powers, combined to create disgust, with other less avoidable causes, as the growing depreciation of the paper-money, the ruinous loss of trade, and the augmented burdens of the war. Is the truth of this picture denied? Hear then, as witnesses, the members of Congress themselves. We find in this very month of March (1778), one of them write to another on the necessity of joint exertions to "revive the expiring reputation of Congress." (Letter from William Duer, of New York, to Robert Morris, dated March 6th, 1778, and printed in the Life of Reed, Vol. I., p. 365.) We find another lamenting that 'even good Whigs begin to think peace, at some expense, desirable.' (General Reed to President Wharton, February 1, 1778.)
"When such was the feeling in America, both as regarded Lord Chatham and as regarded the Congress, it would not certainly follow that any overture from the former would be rejected on account of the disapprobation of the latter. The provinces might, perhaps, have not been inclined to the deliberations, or even cast off the sway of the central body, and make terms of peace for themselves. At any rate, all such hope was not precluded; at least some such trial might be made.
"Nor does it appear to me, as to Mr. Macaulay, that there was any, even the slightest, inconsistency in Lord Chatham having first p.r.o.nounced against the conquest of America, and yet refusing to allow her independence. After the declaration in her behalf of France, Lord Chatham had said, no doubt, that America could not be conquered. Had he ever said she could not be reconciled? It was on conciliation, and not on conquest, that he built his later hopes. He thought the declaration of France no obstacle to his views, but rather an instrument for their support. He conceived that the treaty of alliance concluded by the envoys of the Congress with the Court of Versailles might tend beyond any other cause to rekindle British feelings in the hearts of the Americans. Were the glories of Wolfe and Amherst, in which they had partaken, altogether blotted from their minds? Would the soldier-yeomen of the colonies be willing to fight side by side with those French whom, till within fifteen years, they had found in Canada their bitter hereditary foes? That consequences like to these--that some such revulsion of popular feeling in America might, perhaps, ensue from an open French alliance, is an apprehension which, during the first years of the contest, we find several times expressed in the secret letters of the Revolution chiefs; it was a possibility which we see called forth their fears; why then might it not be allowed to animate the hopes of Chatham?"[7]
But Lord Chatham was not destined even to try the experiment of giving America a second time to England; in a few days he fell in the House of Lords, to rise no more, with the protest on his lips against the separation of the American colonies from England. The Americans had no confidence in the professions of a Parliament and Ministry which had oppressed and sought to deceive them for twelve years. As low as the Congress had fallen in the estimation of a large part of the colonists, the English Ministry was regarded with universal distrust and aversion.
The Congress refused even to confer with the Royal Commissioners, and had sufficient influence to prevent any province from entering into negotiations with them. All the former grounds of complaint had been removed by the three Acts of Parliament above referred to, and all the concessions demanded had been granted. The Royal Commissioners requested General Washington, on the 9th of June (1778), to furnish a pa.s.sport for their Secretary, Dr. Ferguson with a letter from them to Congress; but this was refused, and the refusal was approved by Congress. They then forwarded, in the usual channel of communication, a letter addressed "To his Excellency Henry Laurens, the President, and other Members of Congress," in which they enclosed a copy of their commission and the Acts of Parliament on which it was founded; and they offered to concur in every satisfactory and just arrangement towards the following among other purposes:
"To consent to a cessation of hostilities both by sea and land;
"To restore free intercourse, to revive mutual affection, and renew the common benefits of naturalization through the several parts of this empire;
"To extend every freedom to trade that our respective interests can require;
"To agree that no military forces shall be kept up in the different States of North America without the consent of the General Congress, or particular a.s.semblies;
"To concur in measures calculated to discharge the debts of America, and to raise the credit and value of the paper circulation;
"To perpetuate our union by a reciprocal deputation of an agent or agents from the different States, who shall have the privilege of a seat and voice in the Parliament of Great Britain; or if sent from Great Britain, in that case to have a seat or voice in the a.s.semblies of the different States to which they may be deputed respectively, in order to attend to the several interests of those by whom they are deputed;
"In short, to establish the power of the respective Legislatures in each particular State; to settle its revenue, its civil and military establishment, and to exercise a perfect freedom of legislation and internal government; so that the British States throughout North America, acting with us in peace and war under one common sovereign, may have the irrevocable enjoyment of every privilege that is short of total separation of interests, or consistent with that union of force on which the safety of our common religion and liberty depends."[8]
The three Acts of Parliament and the proposals of the five English Commissioners were far in advance of any wishes which the colonists had expressed before the Declaration of Independence, and placed the colonists on the footing of Englishmen--all that the Earl of Chatham and Mr. Burke had ever advocated--all that the free, loyal, and happy Dominion of Canada enjoys at this day--all and nothing more than was required for the unity of the empire and of the Anglo-Saxon race; but the leaders of Congress had determined upon the dismemberment of the empire--had determined to sever all connection with the elder European branch of the Anglo-Saxon family--had determined, and that without even consulting the const.i.tuents whom they professed to represent, to transfer their allegiance from England to France, to bind themselves hand and foot to France--that they would make no peace with England, upon any terms, without the consent of the French Court.
It may be easily conceived what an effect would be produced upon the truly national mind of both England and America by such a transition on the part of the leaders of Congress and their representatives abroad--a transition which might be called a revolution, involving new issues and new relations of parties; for the question was no longer one of mere separation from England, much less the question of Stamp Acts, or taxation without representation, or suspension of charters--all acts and pretensions of this kind having been repealed and renounced; but the question was now one of union with the hereditary foe of England and her colonies; and the unnatural alliance contemplated the invasion of England by the French, the destruction of British commerce, the wresting from England of the West Indies as well as Canada,[9] and the possession by France of whatever islands or territory her navy and army should conquer.
All this was a different thing from mere independence of the mother country. The United Empire Loyalists and advocates of colonial rights were now subject to a new allegiance, and punished as rebels and their property confiscated if they would not unite with the French against their English forefathers and brethren. So enamoured were the leaders of Congress with their new allies, that they interrupted the reading of the official letter from the British Commissioners on account of a pa.s.sage which reflected upon France, and debated three days whether they should allow the remaining part of the letter to be read.[10]
But the feelings of all cla.s.ses in England, and of a large part, if not the great majority, of the colonists, were different from those of the leaders of Congress, now depleted of many distinguished men who attended its previous year's sittings.[11]
By this alliance with France the allied colonies became, as it were, a part of France, bound up in oneness with it--refusing all overtures or negotiations with the representatives of England without the approval of the French Court. The coasts, cities, towns, etc., of the American allies of France therefore became liable to the same treatment on the part of the British army and navy as the coasts, cities, and towns of France. Of this the British Commissioners informed the Congress, after the latter had declared its ident.i.ty with France, and refused any further intercourse with them.[12]
The war for a short time after this period became more acrimonious and destructive on both sides than before, as between the French and English. But this policy of devastation and retaliation was disapproved of by the British Government--was confined mostly to some certain coast towns in New England, while in the South the conduct of Col. Campbell, on the subjugation of Georgia, was marked by lenity and generosity.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: "While the American Commissioners were urging the Ministers of the King of France to accept the treaty proposed by Congress, they received a.s.surances of the good wishes of the Court of France; but were from time to time informed that the important transactions required further consideration, and were enjoined to observe the most profound secrecy. Matters remained in this fluctuating state from December, 1776, till December, 1777. Private encouragement and public discountenance were alternated; but both varied according to the complexion of news from America. The defeat on Long Island, the reduction of New York, and the train of disastrous events in 1776, which have already been mentioned, sunk the credit of the Americans very low, and abated much of the national ardour for their support. Their subsequent successes at Trenton and Princeton effaced these impressions, and rekindled active zeal in their behalf. The capture of Burgoyne (October, 1777) fixed these wavering polities. The successes of the American campaign of 1777 placed them on high ground. Their enmity proved itself formidable to Britain, and their friendship became desirable to France. It was therefore determined to take them by the hand and publicly espouse their cause. The Commissioners of Congress, on the 16th of December, 1777, were informed by M. Gerard, one of the Secretaries of the King's Council of State, 'that it was decided to acknowledge the independence of the United States, and to make a treaty with them; that in the treaty no advantage would be taken of their situation to obtain terms which otherwise it would not be convenient for them to agree to; that his Most Christian Majesty desired the treaty, once made, should be durable, and their amity to subsist for ever, which could not be expected if each nation did not find an interest in its continuance as well as in its commencement.'" (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap, xv., pp. 246, 247.)]
[Footnote 2: "MS. Instructions, May, 6th, 1776, State Paper Office.--It is therein required as a preliminary condition, before any province shall be declared in the King's peace, that its Convention, or Committee, or a.s.sociation 'which have usurped powers,' shall be dissolved."]
[Footnote 3: Lord Mahon's History of England, Vol. VI., Chap. liii., pp.
137, 138.
Lord Mahon adds: "At the beginning of the troubles, as I have already shown, and for a long time afterwards, the vast majority of the Americans had no wish nor thought of separation from the mother country.
Their object was substantially, and with some new safeguards for their rights, to revert to the same state in which they had been before the Administration of George Grenville. But the further the conflict proceeded, the less and less easy of attainment did that object seem.
How hard, after what had pa.s.sed, to restore harmonious action between the powers now at strife, for the people to trust the Governors appointed by the King, and for the King to trust the a.s.sembly elected by the people. Even where the actual wrong might have departed, it would still leave its fatal legacy, rancour and suspicion, behind. Under the influence of these feelings a great number of persons in all the colonies were gradually turning their minds to the idea of final separation from the parent State. Still, in all these colonies, except only in New England, there were many lingering regrets, many deep-rooted doubts and misgivings. John Adams writes as follows: 'My dear friend Gates, all our misfortunes arise from a single source--the reluctance of the Southern colonies to republican government' (March, 1776, American Archives, Vol. V., p. 472). Here are the words of another popular leader: 'Notwithstanding the Act of Parliament for seizing our property, there is a strange reluctance in the minds of many to cut the knot which ties us to Great Britain'" (Letter of Reed to Washington, March 3rd, 1776).--_Ib._, pp. 139, 140.]
[Footnote 4: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap.