The Life of Yakoob Beg Part 6
The following day there was an interview of ceremony with the Dadkhwah of Yarkand, Mahomed Yunus Jan, for whose history the reader is referred to Chapter IX., and then the visitors were permitted to go wherever they liked. On Mr. Forsyth's former visit a similar freedom had not been accorded him. Their first appearance in the streets was the occasion for a great deal of bustling on the part of the curious, but of friendly goodwill also. All the princ.i.p.al streets and bazaars were visited in turn, such as the butchers' street, or market, where the varieties of meat were clearly to be seen, and their quality tested by their tails or heads being left untouched. It appears to be the fashion in Yarkand to purchase the necessaries of life during the morning, and the luxuries in the evening. There is a special evening bazaar, called Sham, where hats and other clothes, in addition to various other articles, are put up for sale in the afternoon. This, when lit up with Chinese lamps, must have presented a stirring sight, very similar to a country fair in our country. Sir Douglas Forsyth does not tell us whether under Yakoob Beg it was customary to illuminate this bazaar with the gaudy lamps of the Chinese, or whether our imagination of such a scene must be referred back to the days of the old domination.
Nor were these harmonious relations confined to the lower people and ourselves alone. Their rulers set an example that all strove to imitate.
Between the officers of the mission and the Dadkhwah something more cordial than a chivalrous sentiment of guest towards host sprang up, and was heartily reciprocated; while Hadji Torah smoothed down all difficulties by his ready tact and never-failing resource. The latter did not remain the whole time of the three weeks that the mission remained at Yarkand, but set out for the capital, in order to put the Ameer _au courant_ with English affairs, and the exact objects our authorities had before them with regard to his country.
Mahomed Yunus had placed at the disposal of the mission a considerable number of the carts of the country, which proved very serviceable. These carts are strongly built, with two wheels, six feet in diameter, and are drawn by four or six ponies, as the case may be. They are not permitted to carry a greater weight than ten hundredweight, but with that load it is quite customary for them to perform journeys of twenty and twenty-five miles a day. In carts of this kind the heavier baggage was carried from Yarkand to Kashgar, while the members of the mission with a lighter camp followed on some days afterwards. While mentioning these carts, so superior to the Indian modes of conveyance, we will remark that they also are used as omnibuses and stage coaches. They ply frequently between the fort and city of Kashgar, a distance of five miles, and they are also used as a stage coach doing the whole distance from Yarkand to Kashgar in five stages. But no company, with its regulations and bye-laws has a monopoly of this branch of locomotion, and there is a tariff fixed by law which cannot be departed from.
On the 28th of November the mission set out from Yarkand, and for a certain distance high officials, by order of the Dadkwah, bore it company to speed it on its journey. From Yarkand to Yangy Hissar the country was equally prosperous-looking, but there was much desert land as well. The villages of Kok Robat and Ak Robat (names meaning Blue and White Post-house respectively) wore a flourishing look, and the appearance of Yakoob Beg's soldiery, still _jigits_, who looked prim on parade, and yet could play the part of waiter, carpenter, or what not, with equal facility, added a sense of order and cohesion to the whole display. The appearance of Yangy Hissar was made more imposing to the view by the proximity of the formidable fort Yakoob Beg had erected there; but in itself, owing to the houses being surrounded by mud walls, with crenellated tops, it closely resembled a fortification. There was only a brief stay here, and the mission then commenced its last stage of all. The 4th of December, 1873, was the eventful day which first saw an English envoy enter that capital, which Mr. Shaw had visited four years before in a non-official capacity. Special quarters had been prepared, at a short distance from the fort, where is also the royal palace, for the envoy, and these Elchi Khana had been fitted up in a very comfortable, if not luxurious style. Ihrar Khan Torah, who had visited India as envoy twice before, was the first to pay a visit to the new arrivals, and to request that they would come at once to see the Athalik Ghazi. The following description is Sir Douglas Forsyth's own account of his first interview with the Ameer:--
"According to etiquette we dismounted at about forty paces from the gateway, and walked slowly along with Ihrar Khan, the Yasawal-Bashi, or head chamberlain, with white wand in hand going ahead. In the outer gateway soldiers were seated on a dais with their firearms laid on the ground before them, their arms folded, and their eyes on the ground. We then crossed obliquely an empty court-yard, and pa.s.sing through a second gateway filled with soldiers, crossed another court, on all sides of which soldiers in gay costumes were ranged seated. From this court we pa.s.sed into the penetralia, a small court, in which not a soul was visible, and everywhere a deathlike stillness prevailed. At the further end of this court was a long hall, with several window doors. Ihrar Khan then led us in single file, with measured tread, to some steps at the side of the hall, and, entering almost on tiptoe, looked in, and, returning, beckoned with his hand to me to advance alone. As I approached the door he made a sign for me to enter, and immediately withdrew. I found myself standing at the threshold of a very common-looking room, perfectly bare of all ornament, and with a not very good carpet on the floor: looking about I saw enter at a doorway on the opposite side a tall stout man, plainly dressed. He beckoned with his hand, and I advanced, thinking that it must be a chamberlain who was to conduct me to 'the presence.' Instinctively, however, I made a bow as I advanced, and soon found myself taken by both hands, and saluted with the usual form of politeness, and I knew that I was standing before the far-famed ruler of Eastern Turkestan. After a few words of welcome the Athalik led me across the room and seated me near him, by the side of a window. At this moment a salute of fifteen guns was fired. His Highness asked in an eager tone after the health of Her Majesty, and of the Viceroy, and soon afterwards called, in a low voice, to Ihrar Khan to bring in the other officers. They came in one by one, and each was shaken by the hand, and made to sit down by my side. Then there was a long and somewhat trying pause, during which the Athalik eyed each one of us with intent scrutiny. I had been told that etiquette forbade the guest to speak much on the first interview, and that it was a point of good manners to sit perfectly still with downcast eyes.... After this silent ordeal had been undergone for some time, at a sign from the Athalik, sixteen soldiers came in with the dastarkhwan, and the Athalik breaking a loaf of bread shared it with us. After the cloth was removed, we, remembering our lesson in manners, rose up, and stroking our beards, said, 'Allah o Akbar;' soon after which the Athalik said, 'Khush, amadeed' ('You are welcome')."
Thus ended this imposing interview, imposing not for any magnificence or barbaric splendour that appertained either to the court or person of the ruler, but by reason of the mysterious character of the Ameer himself, of his vague power and influence, and of the hold he had acquired over such of his subjects as comprised his court and his body guard. All his Khokandian friends and relations, whose fortunes, indeed, depended on his power, were stanchly attached to his person. It could not be given to envoys to possess such complete prescience as to foresee that the jarring elements, that still existed beneath the surface would suffice to overthrow his rule still more irretrievably when it received its first shock from external foes. To the observer, the appearance of Yakoob Beg and his military following was the highest evidence of latent power. Order was supreme, and discipline was as apparent in the palace of the Ameer as in the barrack yards of his fortresses.
The formal interview took place on the 11th of December, when the presents from our government to the Ameer, carried by over 100 men, were delivered to His Highness. There were guns of all kinds, including two small cannon, vases, &c., &c.; but the token of friendship at which the ruler showed most symptoms of pleasure was the autograph letter of Her Majesty. This letter was enclosed in a "magnificent casket of pale yellow quartz, clamped with gilt bands and handles, and bossed with onyx stones." The Ameer received this with unconcealed satisfaction, several times repeating, "G.o.d be praised." And then he made those declarations of friendship which, taken in conjunction with our admiration for the man, were the means of riveting England and Kashgar into a closer alliance than any that has as yet subsisted between ourselves and any other Central Asian ruler. "Your Queen is a great sovereign. Her government is a powerful and a beneficent one. Her friendship is to be desired, as it always proves a source of advantage to those who possess it. The Queen is as the sun, in whose genial rays such poor people as I flourish. I particularly desire the friendship of the English. It is essential to me. Your rule is just. The road is open to every one, and from here to London any one can come and go with perfect freedom."
On the 13th of December our representatives paid their first visit to the city of Kashgar. The country round Kashgar is very fertile, highly cultivated, and thickly populated, and the mission was not less struck by the air of prosperity prevalent here than it had been at Yarkand. In addition, the people had a healthier appearance, mainly through the absence of goitre. The Dadkhwah of Kashgar, Alish Beg, who was a Kashgari and not a Khokandian, was not less friendly than the Governor of Yarkand had been, and a very pleasant day was pa.s.sed in his company.
On the 18th a grand review was held, but for some reason, far from clear, only of the old Chinese troops who had taken service under the new ruler when Kashgar citadel fell. The description of the manoeuvres which this force performed reads more like the display of an itinerant circus than of a disciplined army, but, nevertheless, these Khitay troops were excellent material for an army. Their practice with the _tyfu_, an awkward weapon, being a sort of gun-cannon, carried by two men and served by three, was p.r.o.nounced very good up to 250 yards.
It is proper to state here, very clearly, that while the English mission was on Kashgarian soil it lived and travelled free of all expense, and as the Ameer paid his subjects in hard cash for whatever service they rendered, it is obvious that for a small state such as his was this was no trivial expense. It is only fair that this fact should be as widely known as possible, for some discontent was aroused by a similar hospitality being extended to the Seyyid Yakoob Khan last year. That discontent arose from ignorance; for it is hardly to be imagined that any Englishman would grumble at reciprocating the courteousness of a Central Asian potentate. The mission remained at the capital almost four months, and altogether the time pa.s.sed very pleasantly. The weather was certainly rigorous; but then there was much to be done in the way of business, sight-seeing and amus.e.m.e.nt.
On the 2nd of February Yakoob Beg placed his seal to the treaty of commerce, and this act concluded the business portion of the English mission. On the 16th of March formal leave was taken of the Athalik Ghazi, and the mission returned to India. It had accomplished its task with pre-eminent success, and the Forsyth Emba.s.sy deserves long to be remembered as the most ably conducted and practically useful emba.s.sy that ever set out from India.
Since the signature of that treaty the Turkestan Trading Company has been very actively engaged in despatching several caravans annually into Kashgaria; but now, whether temporarily or permanently remains to be seen, its operations have come to a standstill. In these later years, Mr. Shaw, in his old post as Commissioner in Ladakh, had been as quietly performing his useful work as ever before; and there were rumours that he was to receive his reward in being sent as another envoy, or rather as a resident agent, into Kashgaria, last year. If the appointment were made, it has at this date (October 1st) been for the time suspended; and such entirely new considerations have come into play that it may be postponed for an indefinite period. Hadji Torah's visit to this country, in June and July, 1877, when the Turko-Russian war had rendered the Eastern Question once more acute, revived our interest, which had been flagging, in Eastern Turkestan. But he came at an unfortunate moment, for June brought us tidings of reverses round Turfan, and July did not pa.s.s away without the intelligence of the death of the Athalik Ghazi himself.
There had, before the receipt of this definite intelligence, been absurd rumours of the part Yakoob Beg was resolved to play in Central Asia as the ally of the Porte, while he, poor man, was opposing with despair, and at the cost of his life, a relentless and irresistible foe. Such is the irony of circ.u.mstance! The vanquished in Asia was by some freak of imagination converted in Europe into the arbiter of a great question, and the guide of all those peoples of either Turkestan who chafe at the bit because of Russian rule. But in reality, with the return of Sir Douglas Forsyth, our relations with Kashgar, which at one time promised to have been most cordial, languished for want of a motive. No amount of admiration would suffice to make us permanently guarantee Kashgar against Russia, for the bare facts concerning the intervening country at once chilled the sympathy at our hearts. The Grim Pa.s.s, and the road lined with desiccated travellers and animals, effaced the bright picture of the orchards of Kashgar and the busy streets of Yarkand. There was a sigh of profound relief, that would not be suppressed, when Sir Douglas Forsyth's report made the fact clear, that wherever else India might be menaced she was safe, at least, from attack north of Cashmere. It is true that there is a feasible route from Khoten to Ruduk, and thence to India; but Yakoob Beg did not hold it, and its consideration was considered to be beside the question. In fact, after 1874, we entertained much the same opinion towards Kashgar and Yakoob Beg that we did towards Poland and Kosciusko; and we were beginning to reconcile ourselves to a Russian installation in that state, when the returning Chinese made us reflect more deeply on Central Asian matters, and discover that after all has been said against the a.s.sertion there exists a third, and hitherto neglected, great Power in Central Asia. There was never anything save a kindly feeling between the two countries, and all who could admire bravery and justice and hospitality and frank courtesy were attached to the individual who had proved that he possessed all these attributes in no mean degree. But there was no deeper sympathy than this, or rather there was no stronger connecting link. The Indian government felt that it would be championing an unrecognized cause in supporting Yakoob Beg against all comers, and in the press of more urgent matters our relations with the Athalik Ghazi became lost sight of.
The effect of this treatment upon the Ameer was not unapparent, and during the last twelve months of his rule he had become more Russian and less English in his policy. But we preserved "the even-tenor of our way." Yakoob Beg had no hold over us such as must always be possessed by the ruler of Afghanistan. Practically speaking, his state was more inaccessible to us than Tibet, and the Russians at Yarkand would be a source of far less danger to us than warlike and hostile Chinese might become at Lhasa. To sum up, England and Kashgar were friends because they had no reason to be foes; but they were indifferent friends. The tear might be shed for mutual misfortunes, and condolences might be uttered when cause for grief arose; but that was all. There was no alliance in the true sense, nor was there firm and unswerving friendship. There was a brief s.p.a.ce occupied by sympathy and goodwill; then ensued an unbroken period of unvarying indifference. Before 1877, the spark that had been kindled by Mr. Shaw, and fanned to the dimensions of a flame by Sir Douglas Forsyth, had gone out, and with its extinction pa.s.sed away the solid fabric that many had hoped to rear upon the base which the enterprise of a few intrepid men had diligently prepared. Whether we were prudent or imprudent, true or false, kind or unkind, Yakoob Beg leaned on a broken reed when he bade defiance to Russia, trusting on our support. This chapter of our policy in Central Asia may be closed as speedily as possible; if we do not come out of it with much glory, it is to be hoped that a lenient posterity may judge our demerits with a merciful consideration for the preservation of a strict and irresponsible neutrality.
CHAPTER XII.
YAKOOB BEG'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA, AND DEATH.
Until the close of the autumn of 1876 Yakoob Beg had not devoted much personal attention to his eastern frontier. After the first Tungan war and the capture of Kucha he had confided to his son and his lieutenants, the charge of maintaining order in the annexed districts, and of protecting his dominions against any hostile attempt on the part of the Chinese. About the month of September in that year couriers arrived with strange tidings in Kashgar. The message, we can well imagine, was terrible in its brevity. The Chinese had appeared north of the Tian Shan. They had sacked Urumtsi, and were laving close siege to Manas.
Their numbers rumour had magnified to almost a hundred thousand combatants, and they came armed with all the auxiliaries Western science could supply.
Before following the movements of the ruler of Kashgar upon the receipt of this intelligence, it will be necessary to consider what had been the history of this Chinese army which had so suddenly appeared in Jungaria.
When in the natural course of events the Chinese government, having solved the Taeping and Panthay difficulties, having restored order where disorder had been supreme, and having created an army where there had been only a disorganized rabble, turned its attention to the question, which it had never lost sight of, of chastising the Tungan rebels beyond Kansuh, the victorious soldiers of Yunnan, instead of being disbanded, were invited to partic.i.p.ate in a fresh campaign in the regions beyond Gobi. It requires no great stretch of imagination to realize the scene when the imperial edict came before these veterans, calling on all true soldiers to vindicate their country's honour and their outraged religion against the Tungan outcasts; how the generals, such as Chang Yao, set an example of enthusiasm which the main body of their soldiers speedily followed. In the presence of such military enthusiasm we are transported back to the days of imperial Rome, when the subjection of one province was only the prelude to some fresh triumph, and when every campaign found in the ranks of the army the veterans of the last. So it was that the victors of Talifoo, by long marches through Szchuen and Shensi, reached Lanchefoo, the capital of Kansuh, where the viceroy of that province was gathering together the munitions of war, and the recruits who were to swell the nucleus of trained soldiers to the proportions suitable to an invading army. Some have considered, and we are far from denying that there is much to support such a view, that there was a political motive at the root of this enterprise, the motive being a desire on the part of the ruling family to give employment to a large disciplined body of men, who if retained in China proper would be at the service of any powerful conspirator or presumptuous aspirant to imperial honours. Whether there is any foundation or not for this supposition, it is certain that those troops who were not required for garrison work in Yunnan were taken by a round-about route at a great distance from the capital to the north-west frontier town of Lanchefoo, there to prepare for the most arduous military enterprise China had undertaken since her conquest of Eastern Turkestan in the last century.
It is not certain when these movements began to be carried out, but there appears to be no reason to doubt that the advanced portion of the Chinese army had commenced its march westward before the end of the year 1874. In the barren region between Lanchefoo and Hamil, a tract of country some 900 miles as the crow flies, but probably nearer 1,200 by the road followed by the Chinese, such difficulties were encountered that one if not two winters were occupied in overcoming these preliminary obstacles to the advance of the main force. The interval was not pa.s.sed in complete idleness at headquarters, where magazines of arms and stores were being collected, recruits enlisted and drilled, and the plan of campaign that was to astonish Asia, if not Europe also, was being drawn up by the Viceroy of Kansuh in person and his able lieutenants. At last, with the break of spring upon the desert plains of Gobi, the Chinese army, which numbered in its entirety some 50,000 men, set out on the long road across the desert to the more fertile regions lying north and south of the Celestial Mountains. Of the details of this portion of the enterprise the _Pekin Gazette_ is strangely reticent. The most profound secrecy was observed, and, although it was known that military events were in progress in the north-west, their object and their extent were mysteries. After the delay experienced by the advanced guard, which had to form fixed encampments, or rather settlements, in the desert, and plant the corn that was to enable it to advance in the following spring, no serious check was experienced by the Chinese until they appeared before the walls of Urumtsi, which the Tungan leaders had resolved to defend.
Although several officers in the service of Yakoob Beg happened to be in the city, and several of the leading Tungani resided there, the defence was not prolonged, and after a few days Urumtsi surrendered to the Chinese. Many of the inhabitants had fled to the neighbouring city of Manas, but the garrison was ma.s.sacred by order of the Chinese generals.
There is no mention in this case of what fate befell those of the inhabitants who remained.
Urumtsi surrendered towards the close of August, 1876, and on the 2nd of September the Chinese sat down before the fortifications of Manas, a much more strongly situated city, and defended with the whole force of the Tungan people. The first panic at the appearance of the Chinese had pa.s.sed off, and the defenders of Manas recognized that they were not only fighting for their cause and independence, but also for their lives and the honour of their families. The terrible lesson of Urumtsi was not without its effect upon the resolute but despairing garrison of Manas.
The capture of Urumtsi was a creditable performance in a military sense, but the campaign had to be decided before the ramparts of Manas. On the 2nd of September the Chinese batteries commenced to play on the north-east portion of the wall, and for two months the bombardment was carried on on all sides with more or less vigour. Several a.s.saults were repulsed, and the Tungani, in face of superior odds and weapons, had behaved like brave men. But the Chinese were as persistent in their attack after an eight weeks' siege as they had been on the first day of their arrival, and the provisions of the Tungani were almost exhausted.
With their supplies ebbed also their courage, and, after an unsuccessful sortie, the Tungan general, Hai-Yen, presented himself to the Chinese outposts begging to be accorded an honourable capitulation. Ostensibly, terms were granted--or, rather, to put the matter as it is expressed in the official Chinese report, everything was left vague--and on the 6th of November Hai-Yen and the main body of his fighting men came forth from the city towards the Chinese camp. The subsequent events are not clear, but it seems that the att.i.tude of this body was suspicious. The men were armed, they were in a well-ordered phalanx, and to the Chinese on the hills around it looked as if they were about to attempt to cut their way through. Once the Chinese generals entertained the suspicion, they proceeded to act promptly upon it, as if it were an incontestable fact, and the Tungani, attacked from all sides, by artillery, horse, and foot, were in a short time annihilated. Such of their chiefs as were not slain were brought before the Chinese generals, and forthwith executed "with the extreme of torture." Every able-bodied man found in the city or its vicinity was ma.s.sacred; but the report distinctly states that the women, children, and old men were spared, and there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the Chinese. There would, in their eyes, be no need to palliate such strictly just acts of retribution as these.
Not content with having chastised the living Tungani, by annihilating them, as a race capable of self-defence for a generation to come, the bodies of some of the prime movers in the Tungan movement in its infancy, such as To-teh-lin, Heh-tsun, and Han-Hing-Nung, were exhumed and quartered, as an example to all traitors to the Chinese Empire. The fall of Manas struck a blow that resounded throughout Central Asia, and at the intelligence a panic spread among all the peoples of Chinese Turkestan and Jungaria. The enterprise had been conducted with such astonishing secrecy, and the blow had been struck with such rapidity and skill, that the effect was enhanced by these causes, new alike in the annals of China and Central Asia. Not only had the Khitay returned for revenge, but they had brought with them all the auxiliaries that make England and Russia the dominant powers in that continent. The Khitay no longer advanced in the clumsy formation of a long-forgotten age, but in obedience to orders based on the models of France and Germany. Their artillery was not a source of danger to the artillerists alone, but as effective as the workshops of Herr Krupp can supply. But, above all, their generals had made still more astonishing progress. In the sieges of Urumtsi and Manas they had proved themselves to be no mean tacticians; in their next and more extended enterprise they were to show that they must be ranked still higher as strategists.
Before the end of 1870 the Tungani had ceased to be an independent people. The great majority of them had fallen either in the field or by the hand of the executioner; and with their disappearance the first portion of the task of the Chinese army was completed. The blood of the Khitay ma.s.sacred in 1862 and 1863 was atoned for, and Chinese prestige restored to as great a height as at any time it had been in the present century. More remained to be accomplished, in its danger as in its result more important, which we have now to consider, before their full task should be consummated; but the Chinese army and its generals had done, even up to this point, a feat of which any country might be proud.
These events appear sudden and strange to us who are far removed from their influence, and who only entertain a languid kind of supercilious interest in matters in which the Chinese are the guiding spirit. But what must they have appeared to Yakoob Beg in his palace at Kashgar, although that palace was 1,000 miles removed from the spot where his victorious enemies lay encamped? It is impossible for us to gauge the feeling of apprehension with which these first triumphs of the Chinese were viewed throughout Eastern Turkestan; and if the bold heart of the Athalik Ghazi did not misgive him, it was not through any light spirit as to the gravity of the danger.
Intelligence of the fall of Manas reached Yakoob Beg, probably, before the end of November, and in consequence of the lateness of the season he had the whole of the winter before him to make his preparations for defence. The surrender of these cities was not generally known in this country until April, 1877, when we also heard of Yakoob Beg's march eastward to protect his menaced frontier. There is very little to be learnt of the internal affairs of Kashgar between March, 1876, and March, 1877; that is to say, between the close of the revolt in Khokand, with the surrender of Abderrahman Aftobatcha, and the mustering of Yakoob Beg's army round the city of Turfan, or Tarfur. There can be no doubt that in that period some important changes had taken place in the sentiment of the Kashgarian people; these changes may not have been very perceptible to a casual observer, yet in their consequences they were as important as manifest sedition. It is not difficult to suggest what some of these modifications may have been; of what they resulted in there can be no doubt--the weakening of the power of the Athalik Ghazi.
Yakoob Beg's over-caution in November, 1875, when the last rising broke out in Khokand, damaged his prestige more than a lost battle. It damped the ardour of the Khokandian element among his followers, and when we remember that these were his ablest and most devoted partisans, this alone was a serious blow. But there are many tokens that the disaffection was not confined to any special party among his people, but was spread amongst them all. The Tungan wars had never been popular, and had been costly and sanguinary operations. The old trade with Russian territory, that once had been so lucrative, languished for want of a fostering hand, and the difficulties of that northern range of mountains, which the patience and care of the Chinese had for a time pierced through, were made the most of to prevent intercourse with Kuldja and Vernoe. More than all, too, all Yakoob Beg's skill as a "manipulator of phrases" could not conceal the fact that his treaty with England was a failure. It did not give him that British protection which alone he cared for, and it did not provide, through the greater obstacles of nature, his people with that new trade outlet which was the sole object worth securing in their eyes. The Forsyth treaty seemed to bring the relations of England and Kashgar to a sudden termination; and the Kashgari were quite shrewd enough to perceive that the Athalik Ghazi would not be b.u.t.tressed by English bayonets against Russian aggression, if that instrument was to be held, as in their eyes it could not be otherwise than held, the only connecting link between the countries. The consequence of this belief was a resignation to a Russian subjection at no distant date.
Yakoob Beg's tenure of power would be morally weakened by the existence of these causes for discontent among his people, and it was at such a moment, when they had perhaps only slightly become clear to his eyes, that the return of the Chinese was heralded. In the face of a great and common danger a well-affected people would have rallied round their head, and in the crisis have found a joint necessity to produce a better understanding than existed before among their component parts. The country east of Kucha, where it was inhabited at all, was inhabited by the few survivors of the ma.s.sacres ordered by Yakoob Beg's representatives. Amongst these there could be no great amount of affection towards his cause. The garrison of the city of Kashgar consisted in the main of the pardoned Khitay soldiers--Yangy Mussulmans, as they were called--and from them no stanch support could be expected against their Buddhist countrymen (see Appendix). The Tungani of Kucha and Aksu and the neighbourhood were the most numerous recruits in the army, and from them at least it might have been supposed that the Athalik Ghazi would obtain faithful service. Even among them, however, there was discontent. They had everything to dread at the hands of the Chinese. It was they who had ma.s.sacred the helpless Khitay, a deed from the stain of which Yakoob Beg at least was free; and it was they against whom the wrath of China would in the first place be directed. But they had also their grudges against the ruler. He had beaten them in the field of battle, and had compelled more than he had induced them to join his army. They hated the Mahomedan Andijani only one degree less than the Buddhist Chinaman, and their ambitious game had been foiled by the military talents of their present ruler. They had run, in the years 1862-65, all the risk attaching to a revolt against China, and when they had accomplished their task they found themselves defrauded of their reward. Therefore, in the face of a Chinese invasion there was disunion in the ranks of the very Mahomedan rebels who had originated all these troubles. The nucleus of Yakoob Beg's army, when these have been struck out as non-efficient, was small indeed; but it was only on that nucleus he could depend in fighting for his crown and his religion.
During the winter of 1876, when he was busy in collecting arms, ammunition, and stores at Yarkand and Kashgar, he must have discovered many of these discordant elements; yet he pushed his preparations resolutely on. He conceived that under the circ.u.mstances the boldest policy would be the most prudent, and that if he could but beat the Chinese in the field by superior tactics he might ride triumphant over all his difficulties and dangers. With these views uppermost in his mind he concentrated all his forces, Tungan included, along the southern slopes of the Tian Shan, with his headquarters at Turfan. The Russian officer, Captain Kuropatkine, who had been sent to Kashgar on a mission, and who had journeyed through the whole extent of Kashgaria to meet the Ameer at Turfan, computed Yakoob Beg's army at the following strength, and supplied the accompanying information concerning its disposition along the frontier.
The fort of Devanchi, guarding the princ.i.p.al defile through the mountain range, was garrisoned by 900 _jigits_, armed with muskets and two guns--one a breech-loader. At Turfan there were with the Ameer 3,500 _jigits_ and 5,000 _sarbazes_, with 20 guns, mostly of ancient make.
Toksoun, a fortified place, some miles nearer Korla, on the main road, was occupied by 4,000 _jigits_ and 2,000 _sarbazes_ with five guns.
Hacc Kuli Beg had command here. At Korla there were also about 1,500 men, who were brought up to the front shortly after Captain Kuropatkine's departure. With these 17,000 men, scattered over a widely extended area, Yakoob Beg had to defend himself against an enemy superior in numbers, and, as the result showed, in generalship as well.
The Russian officer gave, on his return, a very gloomy account of Yakoob Beg's affairs, predicting the speedy disintegration of his state. He also a.s.serted that the Tungani were deserting in great numbers, and that everywhere east of Kucha there was discontent and distrust of the Kashgarian rulers. This disparaging account was confirmed by Colonel Prjevalsky, some months afterwards, upon his return from his adventurous journey to Lob Nor. In a letter, dated from Little Yuldus, May 28, 1877, he said he had been very kindly received, but also suspiciously watched by Yakoob Beg. "All the way from Hoidu Got to Lob Nor he was escorted by a guard of honour, who officiously endeavoured to satisfy his smallest wishes, but would not allow him, or any of his people, to come in contact with the inhabitants. Yakoob Beg somewhat peremptorily asked Colonel Prjevalsky to explain why the Russians had provisioned the Chinese forces arrayed against him; but, in an interview at Korla, he again and again a.s.sured the Russian traveller that he was a friend and well-wisher to Russia. Notwithstanding these precautions, Colonel Prjevalsky and the other members of the expedition succeeded in making the natives tell them that they were disgusted with the military despotism of Yakoob Beg, and that they hoped the Russians would soon be coming."
The information contained in this letter refers to the end of April, 1877, or to a time after the first defeat of Yakoob Beg by the Chinese, and his withdrawal to Korla; but it is _a propos_ in this place as confirming Captain Kuropatkine's remarks.
In addition to the 17,000, more or less, disciplined soldiers whom Yakoob Beg had mustered at the frontier, Captain Kuropatkine mentioned 10,000 Doungans--that is, the Tungani inhabitants of this eastern region. Not only were these notoriously untrustworthy, but they were also badly armed, and were, on the whole, a source of weakness rather than of strength. Before the close of the month of February the Athalik Ghazi was at Turfan, constructing forts at Toksoun and towards the Tian Shan, and endeavouring to inspire his followers with his own indomitable spirit.
In the meanwhile the Chinese had not been idle. They had, after their triumph over the Tungani, established their headquarters at Guchen, near Urumtsi, and had so far secured their communications with Kansuh that a regular service of couriers was organized, and a continual supply of arms, military stores, and men flowed across Gobi to the invading army.
For instance, a large a.r.s.enal for the storage of arms was erected at Lanchefoo, and on one occasion as many as 10,000 rifles of the Berdan pattern were sent in a single convoy. While Tso Tsung Tang, the Viceroy of Kansuh and Commander-in-Chief, was making these preparations north of the Tian Shan, for forcing the range with the melting of the snow, another Chinese general, Chang Yao, was stationed at Hamil for the purpose of seconding the main attack by a diversion south of the range.
In estimating the total number of the Chinese army at 60,000 men--that is, 50,000 round Guchen and 10,000 at Hamil--we would express only what is probable. The total number may have been more or less, but in estimating it at 60,000 men we believe we are as close to exact.i.tude as is possible under the circ.u.mstances. In the month of March the Chinese generals had made all their preparations for attacking Yakoob Beg. So far as our geographical information goes there is no direct road from Guchen to Turfan, and consequently the chief Chinese attack was made from Urumtsi against Devanchi, where Yakoob Beg had constructed a fort.
But, although the larger army was manoeuvring north of the Tian Shan, the decisive blow was in reality struck by the smaller force advancing from Hamil. If we are to judge from the disposition of the Kashgarian army, the movements of this brigade had not obtained that attention from the Athalik Ghazi which they merited.
General Chang Yao captured the small towns of Chightam and Pidjam in the middle of April without encountering any serious opposition. And from the latter of these places, some fifty miles east of Turfan, commenced that concerted movement with his superior, Tso Tsung Tang, which was to overcome all Kashgarian resistance. A glance at the map will show that Yakoob Beg at Turfan was caught fairly between two fires by armies advancing from Urumtsi and Pidjam, and if defeated his line of retreat was greatly exposed to an enterprising enemy. Upon the Chinese becoming aware of the success of their preliminary movements a general advance was ordered in all directions. It is evident that the Chinese were met at first with a strenuous resistance at Devanchi, and that the forcing of the Tian Shan defiles had not been accomplished when news reached the garrison that their ruler had been expelled from Turfan by a fresh Chinese army. It was then that confusion spread fast through all ranks of the followers of Yakoob Beg; in that hour of doubt and unreasoning panic the majority of his soldiers either went over to the enemy or fled in headlong flight to Karashar. In this moment of desperation the Athalik Ghazi still bore himself like a good soldier. Outside Turfan he gave battle to the invader, and though driven from the field by overwhelming odds he yet once more made a stand at Toksoun, forty miles west of Turfan, and when a second time defeated withdrew to Karashar to make fresh efforts to withstand the invading army. Yakoob Beg probably lost in these engagements not less than 20,000 men, including Tungani, by desertion and at the hands of the enemy. He consequently conceived that it would be prudent to withdraw still farther into his territory, and accordingly left Karashar, after a few days' residence, for Korla.
Some weeks before the occurrence of these striking events Yakoob Beg had sent an envoy to Tashkent to solicit the aid of the Russians against the advancing Chinese. But the Russians only gave his messenger fair words, and did not interfere with Mr. Kamensky's commercial transactions with the Chinese army. At the moment, too, Russia was so busily occupied in Europe that she had no leisure to devote to the Kashgarian question.
The Chinese had for many years been good friends with Russia, and Yakoob Beg had all his life been a scarcely concealed enemy. Between two such combatants the sympathies of the Russian government must at first have certainly gone with the former; nor had Yakoob Beg's att.i.tude towards Russia of late been as discreet as it might have been. His nephew, the Seyyid Yakoob Khan, was notoriously an agent for some indefinite purpose at Constantinople. His protection of the Bokharan prince, Abdul Melik, or Katti Torah, the most bitter enemy of Russia in Central Asia, was also ill calculated to attract Russian sympathy to his side.
Moreover there was little or nothing to arouse Russian susceptibilities in Chinese victories so far distant as Urumtsi or Turfan. In many respects, too, this Chinese invasion was a relief for Russia. It freed her hands in Central Asia in a manner that perhaps will never be sufficiently appreciated. Buddhist victories in Eastern Turkestan struck a severe blow at Mahomedan vigour throughout the Khanates, and the waning prestige of the Badaulet, or the "fortunate one," acted as a warning of strange significance to all the neighbouring princes.
It is not difficult, therefore, to discover valid reasons why the Russians declined to negotiate between the combatants, and although Yakoob Beg endeavoured to come to terms with the Chinese, on the understanding that his personal safety should be guaranteed, all his diplomatic overtures were met by categorical refusals.
The Chinese after entering Toksoun came to a sudden halt, for which the causes are not evident. But the terror of their name had gone before them, and the country east of Karashar was hurriedly abandoned by its inhabitants. The Chinese delay may have been caused by the necessity for collecting provisions to enable them to advance further, or perhaps it may have arisen from the outbreak of some epidemic, as a.s.serted by one of the Indian journals. On this point the _Pekin Gazette_ is profoundly silent. The number for the 23rd of June contained a narrative of the operations round Turfan, and also a list of the honours and rewards given to the successful generals; but it and its subsequent issues are silent as to the causes for the Chinese inactivity that then for many months ensued. The most striking sentence in this report is that which says that "the Mahomedans who submitted themselves were permitted to revert to their peaceful avocations;" and if this be true, this is one instance, at all events, of the Chinese exercising moderation. Strange as it may seem, with this preliminary success the vigour of the Chinese invasion appeared to die away, and for five months nothing more was heard of the whereabouts of the Chinese army. In that interval the most important events occurred in Kashgaria, but with these, the Chinese, although the originators of them, had nothing to do. In the closing scene of all of the eventful life we have been in these pages considering the invading Khitay had no part. They were probably not aware of what was taking place some 300 miles from their camp until many weeks after it had happened; and then conceived that their best policy would be to give time for the disintegrating causes at work within the state to have their full effect before they advanced westward. When Colonel Prjevalsky saw Yakoob Beg it must have been within a very short period of his death. The shadow of approaching events may have been upon the defeated conqueror, who from recent disaster could only presage worse yet to come.
Of the exact manner of Yakoob Beg's death there are various accounts.
The most probable is that he was murdered by a party of conspirators, who were led by Hakim Khan Torah. The date given is the 1st of May. That Yakoob Beg should meet with a violent death, considering that he was surrounded by such doubtful followers as the Tungan chiefs, is not to be marvelled at, and that the first reverse in his career should be the signal for fresh disturbances is only what we should expect from a consideration of his country and its peoples in the light of past history. So far, then, as the a.s.sertion goes, that Yakoob Beg was murdered, there is nothing improbable about it. But there are many discrepancies in the accompanying narrative. The first intelligence of the death of the Ameer of Kashgar was contained in a telegram published in the _Times_ of July 16 last year. It stated that his death occurred at Korla, after a short illness, and that he had nominated as his successor Hakim Khan Torah, to the express disregard of his own sons.
The telegram went on to say that Hakim Khan had declined to accept the gift, and that the Ameer's eldest son, Beg Kuli Beg, had succeeded to the throne. A few days after this telegram Hakim Khan Torah was identified with the ancient dynasty of Kashgar, which Yakoob Beg had first seated on the throne, and then displaced in the person of Buzurg Khan. All this intelligence came from Tashkent. On the 23rd of July we learnt in this country, from the same source, that Beg Kuli Beg had notified his father's death and his own accession to the throne to General Kaufmann. There no longer remained any doubt that Yakoob Beg was really dead.
For some reason or other Beg Kuli Beg does not appear to have been a favourite with the Russians; but this aversion to him was based on some mistake, for Beg Kuli Beg was certainly unfriendly to England, and was scarcely civil to our envoy, Sir Douglas Forsyth. Moreover, he at once placed himself in communication with the Russian government, asking for advice as to the course he should pursue with regard to the Chinese invasion, and renewing his father's request that Russia should stop the supplies sent to Urumtsi and Turfan from Kuldja. It was reported, but not confirmed, that his latter demand was complied with.
Nothing more was heard of the history of these events until the end of August, when news reached India through Ladakh and Cashmere that Yakoob Beg "had been a.s.sa.s.sinated by Hakim Khan Torah, the son of Buzurg Khan."