The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 45

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 45

The (1^{st}) clause of the Report was agreed to, nem. con.

The (2) clause was also agreed to nem: con:

The (3) clause was postponed in order to decide previously on the mode of electing the President.

The (4) clause was accordingly taken up.

M^r Gorham disapproved of making the next highest after the President, the vice-President, without referring the decision to the Senate in case the next highest should have less than a majority of votes. As the regulation stands a very obscure man with very few votes may arrive at that appointment.

M^r Sherman said the object of this clause of the report of the Committee was to get rid of the ineligibility, which was attached to the mode of election by the Legislature, & to render the Executive independent of the Legislature. As the choice of the President was to be made out of the five highest, obscure characters were sufficiently guarded against in that case; and he had no objection to requiring the vice-President to be chosen in like manner, where the choice was not decided by a majority in the first instance.

M^r Madison was apprehensive that by requiring both the President & vice President to be chosen out of the five highest candidates, the attention of the electors would be turned too much to making candidates instead of giving their votes in order to a definitive choice. Should this turn be given to the business, The election would, in fact be consigned to the Senate altogether. It would have the effect at the same time, he observed, of giving the nomination of the candidates to the largest States.

M^r Gov^r Morris concurred in, & enforced the remarks of M^r Madison.

M^r Randolph & M^r Pinkney wished for a particular explanation & discussion of the reasons for changing the mode of electing the Executive.

M^r Gov^r Morris said he would give the reasons of the Committee and his own. The 1^{st} was the danger of intrigue & faction if the appointm^t should be made by the Legislature. 2. The inconveniency of an ineligibility required by that mode in order to lessen its evils. 3. The difficulty of establishing a Court of Impeachments, other than the Senate which would not be so proper for the trial nor the other branch for the impeachment of the President, if appointed by the Legislature.

4. n.o.body had appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature. 5. Many were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people. 6. The indispensable necessity of making the Executive independent of the Legislature.--As the Electors would vote at the same time throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible also to corrupt them. A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after the trial of the impeachment.

Col: Mason confessed that the plan of the Committee had removed some capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal and corruption. It was liable however to this strong objection, that nineteen times in twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the purpose.

M^r Butler thought the mode not free from objections, but much more so than an election by the Legislature, where as in elective monarchies, cabal faction & violence would be sure to prevail.

M^r Pinkney stated as objections to the mode 1. that it threw the whole appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate. 2. The Electors will be strangers to the several candidates and of course unable to decide on their comparative merits. 3. It makes the Executive reeligible which will endanger the public liberty. 4. It makes the same body of men which will in fact elect the President his Judges in case of an impeachment.

M^r Williamson had great doubts whether the advantage of reeligibility would balance the objection to such a dependence of the President on the Senate for his reappointment. He thought at least the Senate ought to be restrained to the _two_ highest on the list.

M^r Gov^r Morris said the princ.i.p.al advantage aimed at was that of taking away the opportunity for cabal. The President may be made if thought necessary ineligible on this as well as on any other mode of election. Other inconveniences may be no less redressed on this plan than any other.

M^r Baldwin thought the plan not so objectionable when well considered, as at first view: The increasing intercourse among the people of the States, would render important characters less & less unknown; and the Senate would consequently be less & less likely to have the eventual appointment thrown into their hands.

M^r Wilson. This subject has greatly divided the House, and will also divide the people out of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to decide. He had never made up an opinion on it entirely to his own satisfaction. He thought the plan on the whole a valuable improvement on the former. It gets rid of one great evil, that of cabal & corruption; & Continental Characters will multiply as we more & more coalesce, so as to enable the electors in every part of the Union to know & judge of them. It clears the way also for a discussion of the question of re-eligibility on its own merits which the former mode of election seemed to forbid. He thought it might be better however to refer the eventual appointment to the Legislature than to the Senate, and to confine it to a smaller number than five of the Candidates. The eventual election by the Legislature w^d not open cabal anew, as it would be restrained to certain designated objects of choice, and as these must have had the previous sanction of a number of the States; and if the election be made as it ought as soon as the votes of the Electors are opened & it is known that no one has a majority of the whole there can be little danger of corruption. Another reason for preferring the Legislature to the Senate in this business was that the House of Rep^s will be so often changed as to be free from the influence & faction to which the permanence of the Senate may subject that branch.

M^r Randolph preferred the former mode of const.i.tuting the Executive, but if the change was to be made, he wished to know why the eventual election was referred to the _Senate_ and not to the _Legislature_? He saw no necessity for this and many objections to it. He was apprehensive also that the advantage of the eventual appointment would fall into the hands of the States near the seat of Government.

M^r Gov^r Morris said the _Senate_ was preferred because fewer could then say to the President, you owe your appointment to us. He thought the President would not depend so much on the Senate for his reappointment as on his general good conduct.

The further consideration of the Report was postponed that each member might take a copy of the remainder of it.

The following motion was referred to the Committee of Eleven--to wit,--"To prepare & report a plan for defraying the expences of the Convention."

[51]M^r Pinkney moved a clause declaring "that each House should be judge of the privilege of its own members." M^r Gov^r Morris 2^{ded} the motion.

[51] This motion not contained in the printed Journal--Madison's Note.

M^r Randolph & M^r Madison expressed doubts as to the propriety of giving such a power, & wished for a postponement.

M^r Gov^r Morris thought it so plain a case that no postponement could be necessary.

M^r Wilson thought the power involved, and the express insertion of it needless. It might beget doubts as to the power of other public bodies, as Courts &c. Every Court is the judge of its own privileges.

M^r Madison distinguished between the power of Judging of privileges previously & duly established, and the effect of the motion which would give a discretion to each House as to the extent of its own privileges.

He suggested that it would be better to make provision for ascertaining by _law_, the privileges of each House, than to allow each House to decide for itself. He suggested also the necessity of considering what privileges ought to be allowed to the Executive.

Adjourned.

WEDNESDAY SEP^R 5. 1787. IN CONVENTION.

M^r Brearley from the Committee of Eleven made a farther report as follows,

(1) To add to the clause "to declare war" the words "and grant letters of marque and reprisal."

(2) To add to the clause "to raise and support armies" the words "but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years."

(3) Instead of sect: 12. art 6. say--"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the Senate: no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law."

(4) Immediately before the last clause of sect. 1. art. 7.

insert "To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States and the acceptance of the Legislature become the Seat of the Government of the U. S.

and to exercise like authority over all places purchased for the erection of Forts, Magazines, a.r.s.enals, Dock Yards, and other needful buildings."

(5) "To promote the progress of Science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors & inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."

This report being taken up,--The (1) clause was agreed to nem: con:

To the (2) clause M^r Gerry objected that it admitted of appropriations to an army, for two years instead of one, for which he could not conceive a reason, that it implied that there was to be a standing army which he inveighed against as dangerous to liberty, as unnecessary even for so great an extent of Country as this, and if necessary, some restriction on the number & duration ought to be provided: Nor was this a proper time for such an innovation. The people would not bear it.

M^r Sherman remarked that the appropriations were permitted only, not required to be for two years. As the Legislature is to be biennially elected, it would be inconvenient to require appropriations to be for one year, as there might be no Session within the time necessary to renew them. He should himself he said like a reasonable restriction on the number and continuance of an army in time of peace.

The (2) clause was then agreed to nem: con:

The (3) clause, M^r Gov^r Morris moved to postpone. It had been agreed to in the Committee on the ground of compromise, and he should feel himself at liberty to dissent to it, if on the whole he should not be satisfied with certain other parts to be settled.--M^r Pinkney 2^{ded} the motion.

M^r Sherman was for giving immediate ease to those who looked on this clause as of great moment, and for trusting to their concurrence in other proper measures.

On the question for postponing

N. H. ay. Mas. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay.

V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

So much of the (4) clause as related to the seat of Government was agreed to nem: con:

On the residue to wit, "to exercise like authority over all places purchased for forts" &c.

M^r Gerry contended that this power might be made use of to enslave any particular State by buying up its territory, and that the strongholds proposed would be a means of awing the State into an undue obedience to the Gen^l Government.