After the Rain : how the West lost the East Part 23
Foreigners do not like Russia. Russia should stop relying on them so heavily. Not because of nationalistic reasons. Because of realistic ones. It is not realistic to expect foreign inst.i.tutions and lenders (such as the IMF) to provide Russia with another 45 billion roubles. It was the IMF that de-monetised the Russian economy. Its outlandish demands to limit the money supply reduced the amount of roubles in circulation to a dangerous, life-threatening, level (15% of GDP). The result was an unprecedented barter economy (more than 75% of all transactions) and a collapse of the popular trust in the rouble.
There has never been a post-communist "Russian Economy". There was a "Moscow Economy" and a "Rest of Russia Economy". The first was a bubble of consumption, novelty seeking, vanity and financial a.s.sets. The "crisis" in August was merely the bursting of the MUSCOVITE bubble. How come I consider this to be good for Russia?
First, it will weed out the weak economic players. Shady companies, the manufacturers of shoddy goods, financial leeches and parasites - all will vanish together with easy, corrupt and criminal money. Foreign firms, which came over to ride the wave of unbridled consumerism and to make a quick buck, will go home. The export revenues of oligarchs and robber barons will revert back to the nation. In time, their inefficient and corrupt fiefdoms and monopolies will crumble. They may even begin to pay taxes.
Multinationals committed to the still promising Russian market will not go away. They will invest more and provide even more credits to local suppliers and partners. They will hire good staff, reduce costs and finally acknowledge the existence of life (and markets) outside Moscow.
The crisis in Moscow is blessing for the rest of Russia, as has often been the case in history.
This is also the chance of domestic industry and services. With unemployment up, wage costs are down by half. So are rent and security costs and other overhead. Many good people are available today at a reasonable price. Companies have rationalized, cut the fat, sacked unneeded people, become lean and mean. They are fast becoming compet.i.tive in their own markets and, later on, perhaps, in export markets.
Additionally, imports are down by 45%. Domestic firms face much less compet.i.tion, on the one hand, and less choosy clients, on the other hand. This is their chance to capture market share. Russian businesses are used to operating without a banking system, or in hyperinflation.
Foreigners are not. Shops will prefer to stock cheaper domestically produced goods. Both product quality and the attention to the consumer's needs and demands need to improve. But the prize is enormous: control of the Russian market.
But is there a Russian market? This is the only cloud in the silver lining. Russia is being regionalized, broken down. The movement of both people and goods is gradually restricted. The fragmentation of a hitherto unified market is detrimental. This is the real risk facing Russia. Whatever the POLITICAL arrangements - the economy must remain united. The various oblasts, mini-states and fiefdoms are simply not economically viable on their own.
(Article published November 23, 1998 in "The New Presence")
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IMF - Kill or Cure
This was the t.i.tle of the cover page of the prestigious magazine, "The Economist" in its issue of 10/1/98. The more involved the IMF gets in the world economy - the more controversy surrounds it. Economies in transition, emerging economies, developing countries and, lately, even Asian Tigers all feel the brunt of the IMF recipes. All are not too happy with it, all are loudly complaining. Some economists regard this as a sign of the proper functioning of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) - others spot some justice in some of the complaints.
The IMF was established in 1944 as part of the Bretton Woods agreement.
Originally, it was conceived as the monetary arm of the UN, an agency.
It encompa.s.sed 29 countries but excluded the losers in World War II, Germany and j.a.pan. The exclusion of the losers in the Cold war from the WTO is reminiscent of what happened then: in both cases, the USA called the shots and dictated the composition of the membership of international organization in accordance with its predilections.
Today, the IMF numbers 182 member-countries and boasts "equity" (own financial means) of 200 billion USD (measured by Special Drawing Rights, SDR, pegged at 1.35 USD each). It employs 2600 workers from 110 countries. It is truly international.
The IMF has a few statutory purposes. They are splashed across its Statute and its official publications. The criticism relates to the implementation - not to the n.o.ble goals. It also relates to turf occupied by the IMF without any mandate to do so.
The IMF is supposed to:
A.Promote international monetary cooperation;
B.Expand international trade (a role which reverted now to the WTO);
C.Establish a multilateral system of payments;
D.a.s.sist countries with Balance of Payments (BOP) difficulties under adequate safeguards;
E.Lessen the duration and the degree of disequilibrium in the international BOPS of member countries;
F.Promote exchange rate stability, the signing of orderly exchange agreements and the avoidance of compet.i.tive exchange depreciation.
The IMF tries to juggle all these goals in the thinning air of the global capital markets. It does so through three types of activities:
Surveillance
The IMF regularly monitors exchange rate policies, the general economic situation and other economic policies. It does so through the (to some countries, ominous) mechanism of "consultation" (with the countries'
monetary and fiscal authorities). The famed (and dreaded) World Economic Outlook (WEO) report amalgamates the individual country results into a coherent picture of multilateral surveillance.
Sometimes, countries, which have no on-going interaction with the IMF and do not use its a.s.sistance do ask it to intervene, at least by way of grading and evaluating their economies. The last decade saw the transformation of the IMF into an unofficial (and, incidentally, non-mandated) country credit rating agency. Its stamp of approval can mean the difference between the availability of credits to a given country - or its absence. At best, a bad review by the IMF imposes financial penalties on the delinquent country in the form of higher interest rates and charges payable on its international borrowings.
The Precautionary Agreement is one such rating device. It serves to boost international confidence in an economy. Another contraption is the Monitoring Agreement, which sets economic benchmarks (some say, hurdles) under a shadow economic program designed by the IMF. Attaining these benchmarks confers reliability upon the economic policies of the country monitored.
Financial a.s.sistance
Where surveillance ends, financial a.s.sistance begins. It is extended to members with BOP difficulties to support adjustment and reform policies and economic agendas. Through 31/7/97, for instance, the IMF extended 23 billion USD of such help to more than 50 countries and the outstanding credit portfolio stood at 60 billion USD. The surprising thing is that 90% of these amounts were borrowed by relatively well-off countries in the West, contrary to the image of the IMF as a lender of last resort to shabby countries in despair.
Hidden behind a jungle of acronyms, an unprecedented system of international finance evolves relentlessly. They will be reviewed in detail later.
Technical a.s.sistance
The last type of activity of the IMF is Technical a.s.sistance, mainly in the design and implementation of fiscal and monetary policy and in building the inst.i.tutions to see them through successfully (e.g., Central Banks). The IMF also teaches the uninitiated how to handle and account for transactions that they are doing with the IMF. Another branch of this activity is the collection of statistical data - where the IMF is forced to rely on mostly inadequate and antiquated systems of data collection and a.n.a.lysis. Lately, the IMF stepped up its activities in the training of government and non-government (NGO) officials. This is in line with the new credo of the World Bank: without the right, functioning, less corrupt inst.i.tutions - no policy will succeed, no matter how right.
From the narrow point of view of its financial mechanisms (as distinct from its policies) - the IMF is an intriguing and hitherto successful example of international collaboration and crisis prevention or amelioration (=crisis management). The principle is deceptively simple: member countries purchase the currencies of other member countries (USA, Germany, the UK, etc.). Alternatively, the draw SDRs and convert them to the aforementioned "hard" currencies. They pay for all this with their own, local and humble currencies. The catch is that they have to buy their own currencies back from the IMF after a prescribed period of time. As with every bank, they also have to pay charges and commissions related to the withdrawal.
A country can draw up to its "Reserve Tranche Position". This is the unused part of its quota (every country has a quota which is based on its partic.i.p.ation in the equity of the IMF and on its needs). The quota is supposed to be used only in extreme BOP distress. Credits that the country received from the IMF are not deducted from its quota (because, ostensibly, they will be paid back by it to the IMF). But the IMF holds the local currency of the country (given to it in exchange for hard currency or SDRs). These holdings are deducted from the quota because they are not credit to be repaid but the result of an exchange transaction.
A country can draw no more than 25% of its quota in the first tranche of a loan that it receives from the IMF. The first tranche is available to any country, which demonstrates efforts to overcome its BOP problems. The language of this requirement is so vague that it renders virtually all the members eligible to receive the first instalment.
Other tranches are more difficult to obtain (as Russia and Zimbabwe can testify): the country must show successful compliance with agreed economic plans and meet performance criteria regarding its budget deficit and monetary gauges (for instance credit ceilings in the economy as a whole). The tranches that follow the first one are also phased. All this (welcome and indispensable) disciplining is waived in case of Emergency a.s.sistance - BOP needs which arise due to natural disasters or as the result of an armed conflict. In such cases, the country can immediately draw up to 25% of its quota subject only to "cooperation" with the IMF - but not subject to meeting performance criteria. The IMF also does not shy away from helping countries meet their debt service obligations. Countries can draw money to retire and reduce burdening old debts or merely to service it.
It is not easy to find a path in the jungle of acronyms, which sprouted in the wake of the formation of the IMF. It imposes tough guidelines on those unfortunate enough to require its help: a drastic reduction in inflation, cutting back imports and enhancing exports. The IMF is funded by the rich industrialized countries: the USA alone contributes close to 18% to its resources annually. Following the 1994-5 crisis in Mexico (in which the IMF a crucial healing role) - the USA led a round of increases in the contributions of the well-to-do members (G7) to its coffers. This became known as the Halifax-I round. Halifax-II looks all but inevitable, following the costly turmoil in Southeast Asia. The latter dilapidated the IMF's resources more than all the previous crises combined.
At first, the Stand By Arrangement (SBA) was set up. It still operates as a short-term BOP a.s.sistance financing facility designed to offset temporary or cyclical BOP deficits. It is typically available for periods of between 12 to 18 months and released gradually, on a quarterly basis to the recipient member. Its availability depends heavily on the fulfilment of performance conditions and on periodic program reviews. The country must pay back (=repurchase its own currency and pay for it with hard currencies) in 3.25 to 5 years after each original purchase.
This was followed by the General Agreement to Borrow (GAB) - a framework reference for all future facilities and by the CFF (Compensatory Financing Facility). The latter was augmented by loans available to countries to defray the rising costs of basic edibles and foodstuffs (cereals). The two merged to become CCFF (Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility) - intended to compensate members with shortfalls in export earnings attributable to circ.u.mstances beyond their control and to help them to maintain adjustment programs in the face of external shocks. It also helps them to meet the rising costs of cereal imports and other external contingencies (some of them arising from previous IMF lending!). This credit is also available for a period of 3.25 to 5 years.
1971 was an important year in the history of the world's financial markets. The Bretton Woods Agreements were cancelled but instead of pulling the carpet under the proverbial legs of the IMF - it served to strengthen its position. Under the Smithsonian Agreement, it was put in charge of maintaining the central exchange rates (though inside much wider bands). A committee of 20 members was set up to agree on a new world monetary system (known by its unfortunate acronym, CRIMS). Its recommendations led to the creation of the EFF (extended Financing Facility), which provided, for the first time, MEDIUM term a.s.sistance to members with BOP difficulties, which resulted from structural or macro-economic (rather than conjectural) economic changes. It served to support medium term (3 years) programs. In other respects, it is a replica of the SBA, except that that the repayment (=the repurchase, in IMF jargon) is in 4.5-10 years.
The 70s witnessed a proliferation of multilateral a.s.sistance programs.
The IMF set up the SA (Subsidy Account), which a.s.sisted members to overcome the two destructive oil price shocks. An oil facility was formed to ameliorate the reverberating economic shock waves. A Trust Fund (TF) extended BOP a.s.sistance to developing member countries, utilizing the profits from gold sales. To top all these, an SFF (Supplementary Financing Facility) was established.
During the 1980s, the IMF had a growing role in various adjustment processes and in the financing of payments imbalances. It began to use a basket of 5 major currencies. It began to borrow funds for its purposes - the contributions did not meet its expanding roles.