A History of Indian Philosophy Part 61
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and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute truth, but the [emailprotected], which were intended for the wise who had controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly joys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahman as the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas were intended for two cla.s.ses of persons. [emailprotected] thus did not begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and psychological a.n.a.lysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to show by textual comparison of the different [emailprotected], and by reference to the content of pa.s.sages in the [emailprotected], that they were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that the uncontradicted testimony of all the [emailprotected] was in favour of the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and apparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of the texts referred to the doctrines of mahat, [emailprotected], etc. of the [emailprotected] He had also to interpret the few scattered ideas about physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the [emailprotected] consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In order to show that the philosophy of the [emailprotected] as he expounded it was a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections that his opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to criticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to be self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of the [emailprotected], other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and wrong. This he did not only in his bhasya on the _Brahma-sutras_ but also in his commentaries on the [emailprotected] Logic with him had a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aid which it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the [emailprotected] texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted testimony of the [emailprotected] as the absolute truth.
His disciples followed him in all, and moreover showed in great detail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradicted either in perceptual experience or in rational thought, and that all the realistic categories which Nyaya and other systems had put forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They also supplemented his philosophy by constructing a Vedanta epistemology, and by rethinking elaborately the relation of the maya, the Brahman, and the world of appearance and other relevant topics. Many problems of great philosophical interest which
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had been left out or slightly touched by [emailprotected] were discussed fully by his followers. But it should always be remembered that philosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be taken as but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening our faith in the truth revealed in the [emailprotected] The true work of logic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsetting the instructions of the [emailprotected] is logic gone astray. Many lives of [emailprotected] were written in Sanskrit such as the [emailprotected]_, [emailprotected]_, [emailprotected]_, etc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700 and 800 A.D. in the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father S'ivaguru was a Yajurvedi Brahmin of the Taittiriya branch. Many miracles are related of [emailprotected], and he is believed to have been the incarnation of S'iva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year and became the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing in a mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came over to Benares and thence went to Badarikas'rama. It is said that he wrote his ill.u.s.trious [emailprotected] on the _Brahma-sutra_ in his twelfth year. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten [emailprotected]
He returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided to travel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of other schools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went to meet k.u.marila, but k.u.marila was then at the point of death, and he advised him to meet k.u.marila's disciple. He defeated [emailprotected]@dana and converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He then travelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywhere he established his Vedanta philosophy, which from that time forth acquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life of India.
[emailprotected] carried on the work of his teacher Gaudapada and by writing commentaries on the ten [emailprotected] and the _Brahma-sutras_ tried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one which was intended to be preached in the [emailprotected] and the _Brahma-sutras_ [Footnote: 1]. Throughout his commentary on the _Brahma-sutras_, there is ample evidence that he was contending against some other rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held that the [emailprotected] partly favoured the [emailprotected] cosmology
[Footnote 1: The main works of [emailprotected] are his commentaries ([emailprotected]) on the ten [emailprotected] (is'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, [emailprotected], [emailprotected]@dukya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, [emailprotected]@nyaka, and Chandogya), and on the _Brahma-sutra_.]
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of the existence of [emailprotected] That these were actual textual interpretations of the _Brahma-sutras_ is proved by the fact that [emailprotected] in some places tries to show that these textual constructions were faulty [Footnote ref 1]. In one place he says that others (referring according to Vacaspati to the [emailprotected]) and some of us (referring probably to those who interpreted the sutras and the [emailprotected] from the Vedanta point of view) think that the soul is permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposed to the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unity of the self (_atmaikatva_) that this S'ariraka commentary of mine is being attempted [Footnote ref 2]. Ramanuja, in the introductory portion of his [emailprotected] on the _Brahma-sutra,_ says that the views of Bodhayana who wrote an elaborate commentary on the _Brahma-sutra_ were summarized by previous teachers, and that he was following this Bodhayana [emailprotected] in writing his commentary. In the [emailprotected]_ of Ramanuja mention is made of Bodhayana, Tanka, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharuci as Vedantic authorities, and [emailprotected] is referred to as the "[emailprotected]" commentator.
In Chandogya III. x. 4, where the [emailprotected] cosmology appeared to be different from the [emailprotected]@nupurana_ cosmology, [emailprotected] refers to an explanation offered on the point by one whom he calls "acaryya" ([emailprotected] pariharah acaryyaih_) and anandagiri says that "acaryya" there refers to [emailprotected] This [emailprotected] is known to us from Ramanuja's statement as being a commentator of the dualistic school, and we have evidence here that he had written a commentary on the Chandogya [emailprotected]
A study of the extant commentaries on the _Brahma-sutras_ of [emailprotected] by the adherents of different schools of thought leaves us convinced that these sutras were regarded by all as condensations of the teachings of the [emailprotected] The differences of opinion were with regard to the meaning of these sutras and the [emailprotected] texts to which references were made by them in each particular case. The _Brahma-sutra_ is divided into four adhyayas or books, and each of these is divided into four chapters or padas. Each of these contains a number of topics of discussion ([emailprotected]_) which are composed of a number of sutras, which raise the point at issue, the points that lead to doubt and uncertainty, and the considerations that should lead one to favour
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[Footnote 1: See note on p. 432.]
[Footnote 2: [emailprotected]'s [emailprotected] on the _Brahma-sutras_, I. iii. 19.]
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a particular conclusion. As explained by [emailprotected], most of these sutras except the first four and the first two chapters of the second book are devoted to the textual interpretations of the [emailprotected] pa.s.sages. [emailprotected]'s method of explaining the absolutist Vedanta creed does not consist in proving the Vedanta to be a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, but in so interpreting the [emailprotected] texts as to show that they all agree in holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be the only truth. In Chapter I of Book II [emailprotected] tries to answer some of the objections that may be made from the [emailprotected] point of view against his absolutist creed and to show that some apparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not present any real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refute the [emailprotected], Yoga, [emailprotected], the Buddhist, Jaina, Bhagavata and S'aiva systems of thought. These two chapters and his commentaries on the first four sutras contain the main points of his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showing that the conclusion of the sutras was always in strict agreement with the [emailprotected] doctrines. Reason with [emailprotected] never occupied the premier position; its value was considered only secondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding of the revealed scriptures, the [emailprotected] The ultimate truth cannot be known by reason alone. What one debater shows to be reasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what he shows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater.
So there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logic and argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be found in the [emailprotected]; reason, discrimination and judgment are all to be used only with a view to the discovery of the real purport of the [emailprotected] From his own position [emailprotected] was not thus bound to vindicate the position of the Vedanta as a thoroughly rational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend on its rationality but on the authority of the [emailprotected] But what was true could not contradict experience. If therefore [emailprotected]'s interpretation of the [emailprotected] was true, then it would not contradict experience. [emailprotected] was therefore bound to show that his interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience.
If he could show that his interpretation was the only interpretation that was faithful to the [emailprotected], and that its apparent contradictions with experience could in some way be explained,
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he considered that he had nothing more to do. He was not writing a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the whole truth as taught and revealed in the [emailprotected] and not simply a system spun by a clever thinker, which may erroneously appear to be quite reasonable, Ultimate validity does not belong to reason but to the scriptures.
He started with the premise that whatever may be the reason it is a fact that all experience starts and moves in an error which identifies the self with the body, the senses, or the objects of the senses. All cognitive acts presuppose this illusory identification, for without it the pure self can never behave as a phenomenal knower or perceiver, and without such a perceiver there would be no cognitive act. [emailprotected] does not try to prove philosophically the existence of the pure self as distinct from all other things, for he is satisfied in showing that the [emailprotected] describe the pure self unattached to any kind of impurity as the ultimate truth. This with him is a matter to which no exception can be taken, for it is so revealed in the [emailprotected] This point being granted, the next point is that our experience is always based upon an identification of the self with the body, the senses, etc. and the imposition of all phenomenal qualities of pleasure, pain, etc.
upon the self; and this with [emailprotected] is a beginningless illusion.
All this had been said by [emailprotected] [emailprotected] accepted [emailprotected]'s conclusions, but did not develop his dialectic for a positive proof of his thesis. He made use of the dialectic only for the refutation of other systems of thought. This being done he thought that he had nothing more to do than to show that his idea was in agreement with the teachings of the [emailprotected] He showed that the [emailprotected] held that the pure self as pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss was the ultimate truth. This being accepted the world as it appears could not be real. It must be a mere magic show of illusion or maya. [emailprotected] never tries to prove that the world is maya, but accepts it as indisputable.
For, if the self is what is ultimately real, the necessary conclusion is that all else is mere illusion or maya. He had thus to quarrel on one side with the [emailprotected] realists and on the other with the [emailprotected] realists, both of whom accepted the validity of the scriptures, but interpreted them in their own way. The [emailprotected] held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be interpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action,
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or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that the [emailprotected] being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of actions. The description of Brahman in the [emailprotected] does not therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman, but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman should be meditated upon as being an ent.i.ty which possesses a nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates.
[emailprotected]