A History of Indian Philosophy Part 49
Udayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all the stores of heat required for chemical change. But there are differences in the modes of the action of heat; and the kind of contact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemical action which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from what transforms flavour or taste.
Heat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitely small particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions rectilineally with inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate through the interatomic s.p.a.ce as in the case of the conduction of heat, as when water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparency light rays penetrate through the inter-atomic s.p.a.ces with _parispanda_ of the nature of deflection or refraction (_tiryag-gamana_).
In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound back--which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike the atoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform the physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recombine them, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable velocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemical combination [Footnote ref l]. Govardhana a later Nyaya writer says that paka means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that
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[Footnote 1: See Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Hindus_.]
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changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates or changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the same a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When gra.s.s eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of heat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into such forms as those that belong to milk [Footnote ref 1].
In the [emailprotected] system all action of matter on matter is thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (_prayatna_) is distinguished from all forms of motion as against the [emailprotected] doctrine which considered everything other than [emailprotected] (intelligence) to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore to be subject to vibratory motion.
The Origin of Knowledge ([emailprotected]).
The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We have already seen that [emailprotected] explained it by supposing that the buddhi (place of consciousness) a.s.sumed the form of the object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or [emailprotected]
The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence of the self.
[emailprotected] regarded all effects as being due to the a.s.semblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably, and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (_samagri_) which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus called [emailprotected] or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge [Footnote ref 2]. None of the separate elements composing
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[Footnote 1: Govardhana's _Nyayabodhini_ on [emailprotected]_, pp. 9, 10.]
[Footnote 2: "[emailprotected] vidadhati bodhabodhasvabhava samagri [emailprotected]_" _Nyayamanjari_, p. 12.
Udyotakara however defined "[emailprotected]" as upalabdhihetu (cause of knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyapara or movement of the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vacaspati says: "_siddhamindriyadi, asiddhanca [emailprotected] vyaparayannutpadayan [emailprotected] eva [emailprotected] [emailprotected]@m tvindriyadi [emailprotected] va nanyatra caritarthamiti [emailprotected] phale vyapriyate._" [emailprotected]_, p. 15. Thus it is the action of the senses as [emailprotected] which is the direct cause of the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as causes in some sense. _"[emailprotected]@h. pramane caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva [emailprotected]
[emailprotected] tu phaloddes'ena [emailprotected] iti taddhetu kathancit."
Ibid._ p. 16.]
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the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of course the collocation or combination is not an ent.i.ty separated from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly.
These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate cognition as qualification ([emailprotected]@na) in determinate perceptions, the knowledge of [emailprotected] in inference, the seeing of similar things in upamana, the hearing of sound in s'abda) but also the a.s.semblage of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception, capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations that is called [emailprotected]
Nyaya argues that in the [emailprotected] view knowledge originates by the transcendent influence of [emailprotected] on a particular state of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does not belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept (knowledge). The [emailprotected] to whom the knowledge belongs, however, neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as it always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendental contact of the [emailprotected] with buddhi is but a mere semblance or appearance or illusion, then the [emailprotected] has to admit that there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge is false. And since all knowledge is false, the [emailprotected] have precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.
There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine that simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the knowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the rise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither is the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the knowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is evident that this view does not explain why knowledge should
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express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the object. The doctrine of the Vijnana vadins, that it is knowledge alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and object in such a manner that knowledge as object should require the knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case we might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on _ad infinitum_. Again if [emailprotected] be defined as [emailprotected]_ (capacity of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called [emailprotected] These views moreover do not explain the origin of knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes intellectual and physical [Footnote ref 1]. There is no transcendent element involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production on the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena are produced [Footnote ref 2].
The four [emailprotected] of Nyaya.
We know that the Carvakas admitted perception ([emailprotected]_) alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the [emailprotected] admitted two sources, [emailprotected] and inference (_anumana_); [emailprotected] added _s'abda_ (testimony) as the third source;
[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 12-26.]
[Footnote 2: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Ganges'a, a later naiyayika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be successful, I call it valid knowledge. [emailprotected]_, K.
Tarkavagis'a's edition, [emailprotected]_.
"The [emailprotected] sutras_ tacitly admit the Vedas as a [emailprotected] The view that [emailprotected] only admitted two [emailprotected], perception and inference, is traditionally accepted, _"[emailprotected]@[emailprotected] [emailprotected] [emailprotected] anumananca taccapi,_ etc." Pras'astapada divides all cognition (_buddhi_) as _vidya_ (right knowledge) and _avidya_ (ignorance). Under _avidya_ he counts [emailprotected]'aya_ (doubt or uncertainty), _viparyaya_ (illusion or error), _anadhyavasaya_ (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and _svapna_ (dream). Right knowledge (_vidya_) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages ([emailprotected]_). Interpreting the [emailprotected] sutras_ I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI.
i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the trustworthy character of their author. _Arthapatti_ (implication) and _anupalabdhi_ (non-perception) are also cla.s.sed as inference and _upamana_ (a.n.a.logy) and _aitihya_ (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]
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Nyaya adds a fourth, _upamana_ (a.n.a.logy). The principle on which the four-fold division of [emailprotected] depends is that the causal collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of our perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda (testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be admitted that inference and s'abda are different [emailprotected], though they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyaya thus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upamana within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different [emailprotected] [Footnote ref 1].
Perception ([emailprotected]).
The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements.
These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of akas'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things.
Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them.
The cognitive senses (_vak, pani, pada, payu_, and _upastha_) recognized in [emailprotected] as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body.
Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error not a.s.sociated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such
[Footnote 1:
_Samagribhedai phalabhedacca [emailprotected]@h Anye eva hi samagriphale [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] Anye eva ca samagriphale [emailprotected] Nyayamanjari_, p. 33.]
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as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just at the time when the object is seen) or name a.s.sociation, and determinate [Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow, the knowledge of the sound as a.s.sociated with the percept cannot be counted as perception but as sound-knowledge ([emailprotected]_).
That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact of the senses with the object is said to be the product of the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate (_nirvikalpa_) and (_savikalpa_) determinate. Indeterminate perception is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of perception in which it appears without any a.s.sociation with name.
Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage is just pa.s.sed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no a.s.sociation of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate perception of a thing called [emailprotected] If at the time of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that product is said to const.i.tute nirvikalpa perception which results from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is held by the later naiyayikas that we are not conscious of it directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first stage without which the determinate consciousness could not arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception.
The contact of the sense with the object is regarded as being of six kinds: (1) contact with the dravya (thing) called [emailprotected], (2) contact with the [emailprotected] (qualities) through the thing ([emailprotected]_) in which they inhere in samavaya (inseparable) relation, (3) contact with the [emailprotected] (such as colour etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness (rupatva), which inhere in the [emailprotected] in the samavaya relation.
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[Footnote 1: Ganges'a, a later naiyayika of great reputation, describes perception as immediate awareness ([emailprotected] [emailprotected] [emailprotected]@nam_).]
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This species of contact is called [emailprotected], for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour is in samavaya relation, and in the specific colour there is the colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavaya relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavaya by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory sense is akas'a and the sound exists in akas'a in the samavaya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavaya. (5) The generic character of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavaya. (6) There is another kind of contact by which negation (_abhava_) is perceived, namely [emailprotected] [emailprotected]@na (as qualifying contact). This is so called because the eye perceives only the empty s.p.a.ce which is qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation.
Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug is only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen that Nyaya admits not only the substances and qualities but all kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).
The most important thing about the [emailprotected] theory of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge is indeed _arthaprakas'a,_ revelation of objects, and it is called perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well.
The senses according to [emailprotected] are material and we have seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental (_atindriya_) power (_s'akti_) than that of actual vibratory
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