A History of Indian Philosophy Part 45
Caraka, Nyaya sutras and [emailprotected] sutras.
When we compare the _Nyaya sutras_ with the [emailprotected] sutras_ we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more h.o.m.ogeneous. The large amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their opponents [Footnote ref 2]. This a.s.sumption is justified when
[Footnote 1: Vatsyayana notes that this is the salvation of him who has known Brahman, IV. i. 63.]
[Footnote 2: A reference to the [emailprotected] sutra_ shows that the Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to the worship of Sarasvati (G.o.ddess of learning), who they supposed would help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.]
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we compare the futilities (jati) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to disputations as found in the _Nyaya sutra_ with those that are found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the _Nyaya sutra_ and [emailprotected]_ which have treated of these matters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g.
[emailprotected]@[emailprotected], prayojana, pratijna and [emailprotected]@da) follows very closely the definitions given of those in the _Nyaya sutras_. There are others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthana, etc., where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. [emailprotected]@thapana, jijnasa, vyavasaya, [emailprotected], [emailprotected], upalambha, parihara, abhyanujna_, etc.) which are not found in the _Nyaya sutra_ [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the various types of futilities (jati) and points of opponent's refutation (nigrahasthana) mentioned in the _Nyaya sutra_ are not found in _Caraka_. There are some terms which are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. _aupamya_ in _Caraka, upamana_ in _Nyaya sutra, arthapatti_ in _Nyaya sutra_ and _arthaprapti_ in _Caraka_. Caraka does not seem to know anything about the Nyaya work on this subject, and it is plain that the treatment of these terms of disputations in the _Caraka_ is much simpler and less technical than what we find in the _Nyaya sutras_.
If we leave out the varieties of jati and nigrahasthana of the fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the treatment of Caraka and that of the _Nyaya sutras_. It seems therefore in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the _Nyaya sutras_ were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation was earlier, whereas the compilation of the _Nyaya sutras_ represents a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work.
It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing through the _Nyaya sutras_ is that of a polemic against the doctrines which could be attributed to the Sautrantika Buddhists, the Vijnanavada Buddhists, the nihilists, the [emailprotected], the Carvaka, and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no
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[Footnote 1: Like [emailprotected], Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (_anumana_) as _purvavat, [emailprotected] and [emailprotected]@[emailprotected]_.]
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further allusion elsewhere. The [emailprotected] sutras_ as we have already seen had argued only against the [emailprotected], and ultimately agreed with them on most points. The dispute with [emailprotected] in the _Nyaya sutras_ is the same as in the [emailprotected] over the question of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the self-validity of knowledge ([emailprotected] [emailprotected]_)and the akhyati doctrine of illusion of the [emailprotected], which form the two chief points of discussion between later [emailprotected] and later Nyaya, are never alluded to in the _Nyaya sutras_. The advocacy of Yoga methods (_Nyaya sutras_, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in [emailprotected] and are not in keeping with the general tendency of the _Nyaya sutras_, and the j.a.panese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.
The [emailprotected] sutras_, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (atman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of [emailprotected] (conglomeration etc.).
The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity (_ayaugapadya_) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with [emailprotected] as with Nyaya. The _Nyaya sutras_ give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of [emailprotected] or udbhutarupavattva which [emailprotected] does. On the question of inference Nyaya gives three cla.s.sifications as purvavat, [emailprotected] and [emailprotected]@[emailprotected], but no definition. The [emailprotected] sutras_ do not know of these cla.s.sifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyapti (concomitance of _hetu_ (reason) and _sadhya_ (probandum)) which became so important in later Nyaya has never been properly formulated either in the _Nyaya sutras_ or in the [emailprotected] [emailprotected] sutra_, III. i. 24, no doubt a.s.sumes the knowledge of concomitance between hetu and sadhya (_prasiddhipurvakatvat apades'asya_),
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[Footnote 1: _J.A.S.B._ 1905.]
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but the technical vyapti is not known, and the connotation of the term _prasiddhipurvakatva_ of [emailprotected] seems to be more loose than the term _vyapti_ as we know it in the later Nyaya. The [emailprotected] sutras_ do not count scriptures (_s'abda_) as a separate [emailprotected], but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas.
With _Nyaya sutras_ s'abda as a [emailprotected] applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vatsyayana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds [emailprotected]@si, arya_ and _mleccha_ (foreigners). Upamana which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyaya is not even referred to in the [emailprotected] sutras_. The _Nyaya sutras_ know of other [emailprotected], such as _arthapatti, sambhava_ and _aitihya_, but include them within the [emailprotected] admitted by them, but the [emailprotected] sutras_ do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The [emailprotected] sutras_ believe in the perception of negation (abhava) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i.
1-10). The _Nyaya sutras_ (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhava as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyaya and the [emailprotected] sutras_ about the acceptance of abhava as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The _Nyaya sutras_ say nothing about the categories of _dravya, [emailprotected], karma, [emailprotected]_ and _samavaya_ which form the main subjects of [emailprotected] discussions [Footnote ref 3]. The _Nyaya sutras_ take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with [emailprotected] The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient.
The [emailprotected] sutras_ do not mention the name of "is'vara," whereas the _Nyaya sutras_ try to prove his existence on eschatological grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the _Nyaya sutras_ are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the
[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these [emailprotected] is Caraka.
But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from Nyaya and calls _arthapatti arthaprapti_ (_Caraka_ III. viii.).]
[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from Vatsyayana's commentary.]
[Footnote 3: The _Nyaya sutra_ no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jati as "_samanaprasavatmika [emailprotected]_" (II. ii. 71).]
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Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact of knowledge. Both the Nyaya and the [emailprotected] sutras_ admit the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of atomic structure in later [emailprotected] are absent there. The [emailprotected] calls salvation [emailprotected]'reyasa_ or [emailprotected]_ and the Nyaya _apavarga_. [emailprotected] with [emailprotected] is the permanent cessation of connection with body; the apavarga with Nyaya is cessation of pain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference between the [emailprotected] and Nyaya are said to lie with regard to theory of the notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc.
Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness, then from a sense of [emailprotected] of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two things); again, the doctrine of pilupaka (changes of qualities by heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyaya held) was held by [emailprotected], which the Naiyayikas did not admit [Footnote ref 2]. But as the _Nyaya sutras_ are silent on these points, it is not possible to say that such were really the differences between early Nyaya and early [emailprotected] These differences may be said to hold between the later interpreters of [emailprotected] and the later interpreters of Nyaya. The [emailprotected] as we find it in the commentary of Pras'astapada (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyaya from the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the [emailprotected] philosophy in this chapter is that which is found from the sixth century onwards.
The [emailprotected] and Nyaya Literature.
It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the [emailprotected] sutras_ by [emailprotected], also called Aulukya the son of Uluka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It
[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamali Vedantatirtha quotes a pa.s.sage from [emailprotected]@[emailprotected]_, XVI. 68-69 in _J.A.S.B._, 1905, and another pa.s.sage from a Nyaya writer Bhasarvajna, pp. 39-41, in _J.A.S.B._, 1914, to show that the old Naiyayikas considered that there was an element of happiness (_sukha_) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the [emailprotected] denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyaya or the [emailprotected] sutras_, unless the cessation of pain with Nyaya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss or happiness.]
[Footnote 2: See Madhava's [emailprotected]'ana_.]
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appears from the _Vayu purana_ that he was born in Prabhasa near Dvaraka, and was the disciple of Somas'arma. The time of Pras'astapada who wrote a [emailprotected] (commentary) of the [emailprotected] sutras_ cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity of Pras'astapada's [emailprotected] is this that unlike other [emailprotected] (which first give brief explanations of the text of the sutras and then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining the first brief comments), it does not follow the sutras but is an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnote ref 1]. There were two other [emailprotected] on the [emailprotected] sutras_, namely [emailprotected]@sya_ and [emailprotected]_, but these are now probably lost. References to the former are found in [emailprotected]_ of Padmanabha Mis'ra and also in _Ratnaprabha_ 2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this [emailprotected], namely _Vyomavati_ by Vyomas'ekharacarya, _Nyayakandali_ by S'ridhara, [emailprotected]_ by Udayana (984 A.D.) and _Lilavati_ S'rivatsacarya.
In addition to these Jagadis'a [emailprotected]@tacarya of Navadvipa and [emailprotected] Mis'ra wrote two other commentaries on the _Pras'astapada-bhasya_, namely _Bhasyasukti_ and [emailprotected]_. [emailprotected] Mis'ra (1425 A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the [emailprotected] sutras_ called the _Upaskara_. Of these _Nyaya-kandali_ of S'ridhara on account of its simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably the best for a modern student of [emailprotected] Its author was a native of the village of [emailprotected]