A History of Indian Philosophy Part 42
The fact that the [emailprotected] begins with a promise to describe dharma and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions and also the [emailprotected]@[emailprotected]_ (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows that [emailprotected]'s method of explaining dharma has been by showing that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a good number cannot be explained at all except on the a.s.sumption of [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The
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[Footnote 1: S'vetas'vatara I.i.2]
[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the _Kalapa [emailprotected]_, in which it is said that the description of the six categories by [emailprotected] in his [emailprotected] sutras_, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himalaya).
"[emailprotected] vyakhyatukamasya @[emailprotected]@[emailprotected] Himavadgantukamasya sagaragamanopamam_."]
[Footnote 3: The sutra "_Tadvacanad amnayasya [emailprotected]_ (I.i.3 and X.ii.9) has been explained by _Upaskara_ as meaning "The Veda being the word of is'vara (G.o.d) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of is'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyaya ideas into the [emailprotected] Sutra X.ii.8 is only a repet.i.tion of VI.ii.1.]
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description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] In V. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the a.s.similation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in _Upaskara_) are said to be due to [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] Salvation (moksa) is said to be produced by the annihilation of [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths Vais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced) and the [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] All the categories that he describes are founded on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] These are the acts on which depend all life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy.
[emailprotected]'s philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] But what leads to [emailprotected]@[emailprotected]? In answer to this, [emailprotected] does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (_snana_), fasting, holy student life (_brahmacarya_), remaining at the house of the teacher (_gurukulavasa_), retired forest life (_vanaprastha_), sacrifice (_yajna_), gifts (_dana_), certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras) (VI. ii. 2).
He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] He also described how
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feelings of attachment to things are also generated by [emailprotected]@[emailprotected]
Throughout almost the whole of VI. i [emailprotected] is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on [emailprotected] will show that the later [emailprotected] writers agreed with the [emailprotected] doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which [emailprotected] differs from [emailprotected] are (1) self-validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or G.o.d, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (according to k.u.marila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego.
Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the [emailprotected] But as no is'vara is mentioned, and as all [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may a.s.sume that [emailprotected] had no dispute with [emailprotected] The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the [emailprotected] sutras._ It is probable that [emailprotected] believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i.
1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with [emailprotected] suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the [emailprotected] sutras,_ the view was probably what is represented in the [emailprotected] sutras._ As there is no reference to is'vara and as [emailprotected]@[emailprotected] proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well a.s.sume that [emailprotected] was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later [emailprotected] philosophers.
As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the [emailprotected] and the [emailprotected], we find that in II. ii. 25-32, [emailprotected] gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive [emailprotected] view as we know from the later [emailprotected] writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyaya view is
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[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sutras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by [emailprotected] Mis'ra in his _Upaskara_ (II. ii.
36 by adding an "_api_" to the sutra and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyabhava" as [emailprotected] and bhava instead of [emailprotected] and abhava, which in my opinion is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later Nyaya [emailprotected] view.]
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that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally this is regarded as the [emailprotected] view as well. But in [emailprotected] III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted on the authority of the scriptures (_agama_). To this the final [emailprotected] conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self in our feeling as "I" (_aham_), and we have therefore not to depend on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional proof of what we already find in perception as "I" (_aham_) (III. ii.
10-18, also IX. i. 11).
These considerations lead me to think that the [emailprotected] represented a school of [emailprotected] thought which supplemented a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.
Philosophy in the [emailprotected] sutras.
The [emailprotected] sutras_ begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (_dharma_) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity (_abhyudaya_) and salvation ([emailprotected]'reyasa_) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sutra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (_dravya_), quality ([emailprotected]_), cla.s.s concept (_samdanya_), particularity ([emailprotected]_), and inherence (_samavayay_) [Footnote ref 1].
The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, s.p.a.ce, soul, and mind. The [emailprotected] are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure, separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to species [Footnote ref 2]. Action (_karma_) means upward movement
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[Footnote 1: _Upaskara_ notes that [emailprotected] here refers to the ultimate differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same element has specific features of difference.]
[Footnote 2: Here the well known qualities of heaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness (_sneha_), elasticity ([emailprotected]_), merit (_dharma_), and demerit (_adharma_) have been altogether omitted.
These are all counted in later [emailprotected] commentaries and compendiums.
It must be noted that "[emailprotected]_" in [emailprotected] means qualities and not subtle reals or substances as in [emailprotected] Yoga. [emailprotected] in [emailprotected] would be akin to what Yoga would call _dharma_.]
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downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal movement. The three common qualities of dravya, [emailprotected] and karma are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause, and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other dravyas and the [emailprotected] other [emailprotected] But karma is not necessarily produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or its effect but the [emailprotected] are destroyed both by the cause and by the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses karma and [emailprotected] and is regarded as the material (_samavayi_) cause.
[emailprotected] inhere in dravya, cannot possess further [emailprotected], and are not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is devoid of [emailprotected], cannot remain at one time in more than one object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi) of (derivative) dravyas, [emailprotected], and karma, [emailprotected] is also the non-material cause (_asamavayi_) of dravya, [emailprotected] and karma. Karma is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion (_vega_). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be produced even without karma [Footnote ref 1]. Dravya is the general effect of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to [emailprotected]