The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 56

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 56

The senators and representatives beforementioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this const.i.tution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.

VII.

The ratification of the conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this const.i.tution between the States so ratifying the same.

LETTER.[92]

[92] The draft of the letter accompanied the draft of the Const.i.tution, but was not printed with it. The Journal says (Sept. 12): "The draft of a letter to Congress being at the same time reported, was read once throughout; and afterwards agreed to by paragraphs."

(_Const. MSS. and Journal_, p. 367.) The draft is in the handwriting of Gouverneur Morris and was undoubtedly prepared by him. It was turned over to Washington by Jackson with the other papers of the convention. The draft of the Const.i.tution must have been among those papers he destroyed. Probably it too was written by Morris. The letter having been accepted September 12, was printed with the final Const.i.tution September 17. It does not appear to have caused debate.

We have now the Honor to submit to the Consideration of the United States in Congress a.s.sembled that Const.i.tution which has appeared to us the most advisable.

The Friends of our Country have long seen and desired that the Power of making War Peace and Treaties, that of levying Money & regulating Commerce and the correspondent executive and judicial Authorities should be fully and effectually vested in the general Government of the Union. But the Impropriety of delegating such extensive Trust to one Body of Men is evident.

Hence results the Necessity of a different organization.

It is obviously impracticable in the foederal Government of these States to secure all Rights of independent Sovereignty to each and yet provide for the Interest and Safety of all.

Individuals entering into Society must give up a Share of Liberty to preserve the Rest. The Magnitude of the Sacrifice must depend as well on Situation and Circ.u.mstances as on the Object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with Precision the Line between those Rights which must be surrendered and those which may be reserved. And on the present Occasion this Difficulty was increased by a Difference among the several States as to their Situation Extent Habits and particular Interests.

In all our Deliberations on this Subject we kept steadily in our View that which appears to us the greatest Interest of every true American The Consolidation of our Union in which is involved our Prosperity Felicity Safety perhaps our national Existence. This important Consideration seriously and deeply impressed on our Minds led each State in the Convention to be less rigid in Points of inferior Magnitude than might have been otherwise expected. And thus the Const.i.tution which we now present is the Result of a Spirit of Amity and of that mutual Deference & Concession which the Peculiarity of our political Situation rendered indispensable.

That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not perhaps to be expected. But each will doubtless consider that had her Interests been alone consulted the Consequences might have been particularly disagreable or injurious to others.

That it is liable to as few Exceptions as could reasonably have been expected we hope and believe. That it may promote the lasting Welfare of that Country so dear to us all and secure her Freedom and Happiness is our most ardent Wish--

M^r Williamson moved to reconsider the clause requiring three fourths of each House to overrule the negative of the President, in order to strike out 3/4 and insert 2/3. He had he remarked himself proposed 3/4 instead of 2/3, but he had since been convinced that the latter proportion was the best. The former puts too much in the power of the President.

M^r Sherman was of the same opinion; adding that the States would not like to see so small a minority and the President, prevailing over the general voice. In making laws regard should be had to the sense of the people, who are to be bound by them, and it was more probable that a single man should mistake or betray this sense than the Legislature.

M^r Gov^r Morris. Considering the difference between the two proportions numerically, it amounts in one House to two members only; and in the others to not more than five; according to the numbers of which the Legislature is at first to be composed. It is the interest moreover of the distant States to prefer 3/4 as they will be oftenest absent and need the interposing check of the President. The excess rather than the deficiency, of laws was to be dreaded. The example of N. York shews that 2/3 is not sufficient to answer the purpose.

M^r Hamilton added his testimony to the fact that 2/3 in N. York had been ineffectual either where a popular object, or a legislative faction operated; of which he mentioned some instances.

M^r Gerry. It is necessary to consider the danger on the other side also. 2/3 will be a considerable, perhaps a proper security. 3/4 puts too much in the power of a few men. The primary object of the revisionary check in the President is not to protect the general interest, but to defend his own department. If 3/4 be required, a few Senators having hopes from the nomination of the President to offices, will combine with him and impede proper laws. Making the vice-President Speaker increases the danger.

M^r Williamson was less afraid of too few than of too many laws. He was most of all afraid that the repeal of bad laws might be rendered too difficult by requiring 3/4 to overcome the dissent of the President.

Col: Mason had always considered this as one of the most exceptionable parts of the System. As to the numerical argument of M^r Gov^r Morris, little arithmetic was necessary to understand that 3/4 was more than 2/3, whatever the numbers of the Legislature might be. The example of New York depended on the real merits of the laws. The Gentlemen citing it, had no doubt given their own opinions. But perhaps there were others of opposite opinions who could equally paint the abuses on the other side. His leading view was to guard against too great an impediment to the repeal of laws.

M^r Gov^r Morris dwelt on the danger to the public interest from the instability of laws, as the most to be guarded against. On the other side there could be little danger. If one man in office will not consent where he ought, every fourth year another can be subst.i.tuted. This term was not too long for fair experiments. Many good laws are not tried long enough to prove their merit. This is often the case with new laws opposed to old habits. The Inspection laws of Virginia & Maryland to which all are now so much attached were unpopular at first.

M^r Pinkney was warmly in opposition to 3/4 as putting a dangerous power in the hands of a few Senators headed by the President.

M^r Madison. When 3/4 was agreed to, the President was to be elected by the legislature and for seven years. He is now to be elected by the people and for four years. The object of the revisionary power is two fold. 1. to defend the Executive rights 2. to prevent popular or factious injustice. It was an important principle in this & in the State Const.i.tutions to check legislative injustice and encroachments. The Experience of the States had demonstrated that their checks are insufficient. We must compare the danger from the weakness of 2/3 with the danger from the strength of 3/4. He thought on the whole the former was the greater. As to the difficulty of repeals it was probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon take place of limiting the duration of laws so as to require renewal instead of repeal.

The reconsideration being agreed to. On the question to insert 2/3 in place of 3/4.

N. H. div^d. Mas. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d ay.

M^r McHenry no. V^a no. Gen^l Washington M^r Blair, M^r Madison no. Col. Mason, M^r Randolph ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Williamson, observed to the House that no provision was yet made for juries in Civil cases and suggested the necessity of it.

M^r Gorham. It is not possible to discriminate equity cases from those in which juries are proper. The Representatives of the people may be safely trusted in this matter.

M^r Gerry urged the necessity of Juries to guard ag^{st} corrupt Judges.

He proposed that the Committee last appointed should be directed to provide a clause for securing the trial by Juries.

Col: Mason perceived the difficulty mentioned by M^r Gorham. The jury cases cannot be specified. A general principle laid down on this and some other points would be sufficient. He wished the plan had been prefaced with a Bill of Rights, & would second a Motion if made for the purpose. It would give great quiet to the people; and with the aid of the State declarations, a bill might be prepared in a few hours.

M^r Gerry concurred in the idea & moved for a Committee to prepare a Bill of Rights. Col: Mason 2^{ded} the motion.

M^r Sherman, was for securing the rights of the people where requisite.

The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Const.i.tution; and being in force are sufficient. There are many cases where juries are proper which cannot be discriminated. The Legislature may be safely trusted.

Col: Mason. The laws of the U. S. are to be paramount to State Bills of Rights. On the question for a Com^e to prepare a Bill of Rights

N. H. no. Mas. abs^t. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.

V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The Clause relating to exports being reconsidered, at the instance of Col: Mason, who urged that the restriction on the States would prevent the incidental duties necessary for the inspection & safekeeping of their produce, and be ruinous to the Staple States, as he called the five Southern States, he moved as follows--"provided nothing herein contained shall be construed to restrain any State from laying duties upon exports for the sole purpose of defraying the charges of inspecting, packing, storing and indemnifying the losses in keeping the commodities in the care of public officers, before exportation." In answer to a remark which he antic.i.p.ated, to wit, that the States could provide for these expences, by a tax in some other way, he stated the inconveniency of requiring the Planters to pay a tax before the actual delivery for exportation.

M^r Madison 2^{ded} the motion. It would at least be harmless; and might have the good effect of restraining the States to bona fide duties for the purpose, as well as of authorizing explicitly such duties; tho'

perhaps the best guard against an abuse of the power of the States on this subject, was the right in the Gen^l Government to regulate trade between State & State.

M^r Gov^r Morris saw no objection to the motion. He did not consider the dollar per Hhd laid on Tob^o in Virg^a as a duty on exportation, as no drawback would be allowed on Tob^o taken out of the Warehouse for internal consumption.

M^r Dayton was afraid the proviso w^d enable Pennsylv^a to tax N. Jersey under the idea of Inspection duties of which Pen^a would Judge.

M^r Gorham & M^r Langdon, thought there would be no security if the proviso sh^d be agreed to, for the States exporting thro' other States, ag^{st} these oppressions of the latter. How was redress to be obtained in case duties should be laid beyond the purpose expressed?

M^r Madison. There will be the same security as in other cases. The jurisdiction of the supreme Court must be the source of redress. So far only had provision been made by the plan ag^{st} injurious acts of the States. His own opinion was, that this was sufficient. A negative on the State laws alone could meet all the shapes which these could a.s.sume. But this had been overruled.

M^r Fitzimmons. Incidental duties on Tob^o & flour never have been & never can be considered as duties on exports.

M^r d.i.c.kinson. Nothing will save the States in the situation of N.

Hampshire N. Jersey Delaware &c. from being oppressed by their neighbors, but requiring the a.s.sent of Cong^s to inspection duties. He moved that this a.s.sent sh^d accordingly be required.

M^r Butler 2^{ded} the motion.

Adjourned.

THURSDAY SEP^R 13. 1787. IN CONVENTION

Col. Mason.[93] He had moved without success for a power to make sumptuary regulations. He had not yet lost sight of his object. After descanting on the extravagance of our manners, the excessive consumption of foreign superfluities, and the necessity of restricting it, as well with oeconomical as republican views, he moved that a Committee be appointed to report articles of a.s.sociation for encouraging by the advice the influence and the example of the members of the Convention, oeconomy frugality and american manufactures.

[93] The dissensions among the Virginia delegates had leaked out, for Joseph Jones, Fredericksburg, September 13, 1787, wrote to Madison that a rumor of their disagreement was current in Virginia.--Chicago Historical Society MSS.

Doc^r Johnson 2^{ded} the motion which was without debate agreed to, nem: con: and a Committee appointed, consisting of Col: Mason, Doc^r Franklin, M^r d.i.c.kenson, Doc^r Johnson and M^r Livingston.[94]