The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 47

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 47

M^r d.i.c.kinson moved, in order to remove ambiguity from the intention of the clause as explained by the vote, to add, after the words "if such number be a majority of the whole number of the Electors" the word "appointed."

On this motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Con. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Delaware [and]

M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Col: Mason. As the mode of appointment is now regulated, he could not forbear expressing his opinion that it is utterly inadmissible. He would prefer the Government of Prussia to one which will put all power into the hands of seven or eight men, and fix an Aristocracy worse than absolute monarchy.

The words "and of their giving their votes" being inserted on motion for that purpose, after the words "The Legislature may determine the time of chusing and a.s.sembling the Electors."

The House adjourned.

THURSDAY SEP^R 6. 1787. IN CONVENTION

M^r King and M^r Gerry moved to insert in the (5)[54] clause of the Report (see Sep^r 4) after the words "may be ent.i.tled in the Legislature" the words following--"But no person shall be appointed an elector who is a member of the Legislature of the U. S. or who holds any office of profit or trust under the U. S." which pa.s.sed nem: con:

[54] This is a mistake and should be fourth clause. See p. 298.

M^r Gerry proposed as the President was to be elected by the Senate out of the five highest candidates, that if he should not at the end of his term be re-elected by a majority of the Electors, and no other candidate should have a majority, the eventual election should be made by the Legislature. This he said would relieve the President from his particular dependence on the Senate for his continuance in office.

M^r King liked the idea, as calculated to satisfy particular members and promote unanimity & as likely to operate but seldom.

M^r Read opposed it, remarking that if individual members were to be indulged, alterations would be necessary to satisfy most of them.

M^r Williamson espoused it as a reasonable precaution against the undue influence of the Senate.

M^r Sherman liked the arrangement as it stood, though he should not be averse to some amendments. He thought he said that if the Legislature were to have the eventual appointment instead of the Senate, it ought to vote in the case by States, in favor of the small States, as the large States would have so great an advantage in nominating the candidates.

M^r Gov^r Morris thought favorably of M^r Gerry's proposition. It would free the President from being tempted in naming to offices, to Conform to the will of the Senate, & thereby virtually give the appointments to office, to the Senate.

M^r Wilson said that he had weighed carefully the report of the Committee for remodelling the const.i.tution of the Executive; and on combining it with other parts of the plan, he was obliged to consider the whole as having a dangerous tendency to aristocracy; as throwing a dangerous power into the hands of the Senate. They will have in fact, the appointment of the President, and through his dependence on them, the virtual appointment to offices; among others the Officers of the Judiciary Department. They are to make Treaties; and they are to try all impeachments. In allowing them thus to make the Executive & Judiciary appointments, to be the Court of impeachments, and to make Treaties which are to be laws of the land, the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers are all blended in one branch of the Government. The power of making Treaties involves the case of subsidies, and here as an additional evil, foreign influence is to be dreaded. According to the plan as it now stands, the President will not be the man of the people as he ought to be, but the minion of the Senate. He cannot even appoint a tide-waiter without the Senate. He had always thought the Senate too numerous a body for making appointments to office. The Senate will moreover in all probability be in constant Session. They will have high salaries. And with all those powers, and the President in their interest, they will depress the other branch of the Legislature, and aggrandize themselves in proportion. Add to all this, that the Senate sitting in conclave, can by holding up to their respective States various and improbable candidates, contrive so to scatter their votes, as to bring the appointment of the President ultimately before themselves. Upon the whole, he thought the new mode of appointing the President, with some amendments, a valuable improvement; but he could never agree to purchase it at the price of the ensuing parts of the Report, nor befriend a system of which they make a part.

M^r Gov^r Morris expressed his wonder at the observations of M^r Wilson so far as they preferred the plan in the printed Report to the new modification of it before the House, and entered into a comparative view of the two, with an eye to the nature of M^r Wilsons objections to the last. By the first the Senate he observed had a voice in appointing the President out of all the Citizens of the U. S: by this they were limited to five candidates previously nominated to them, with a probability of being barred altogether by the successful ballot of the Electors. Here surely was no increase of power. They are now to appoint Judges nominated to them by the President. Before they had the appointment without any agency whatever of the President. Here again was surely no additional power. If they are to make Treaties as the plan now stands, the power was the same in the printed plan. If they are to try impeachments, the Judges must have been triable by them before. Wherein then lay the dangerous tendency of the innovations to establish an aristocracy in the Senate? As to the appointment of officers, the weight of sentiment in the House, was opposed to the exercise of it by the President alone; though it was not the case with himself. If the Senate would act as was suspected, in misleading the States into a fallacious disposition of their votes for a President, they would, if the appointment were withdrawn wholly from them, make such representations in their several States where they have influence, as would favor the object of their partiality.

M^r Williamson, replying to M^r Morris, observed that the aristocratic complexion proceeds from the change in the mode of appointing the President which makes him dependent on the Senate.

M^r Clymer said that the aristocratic part to which he could never accede was that in the printed plan, which gave the Senate the power of appointing to offices.

M^r Hamilton said that he had been restrained from entering into the discussions by his dislike of the Scheme of Gov^t in General; but as he meant to support the plan to be recommended, as better than nothing, he wished in this place to offer a few remarks. He liked the new modification, on the whole, better than that in the printed Report. In this the President was a Monster elected for seven years, and ineligible afterwards; having great powers, in appointments to office, & continually tempted by this const.i.tutional disqualification to abuse them in order to subvert the Government. Although he should be made re-eligible, still if appointed by the Legislature, he would be tempted to make use of corrupt influence to be continued in office. It seemed peculiarly desirable therefore that some other mode of election should be devised. Considering the different views of different States, & the different districts Northern Middle & Southern, he concurred with those who thought that the votes would not be concentered, and that the appointment would consequently in the present mode devolve on the Senate. The nomination to offices will give great weight to the President. Here then is a mutual connexion & influence, that will perpetuate the President, and aggrandize both him & the Senate. What is to be the remedy? He saw none better than to let the highest number of ballots, whether a majority or not, appoint the President. What was the objection to this? Merely that too small a number might appoint. But as the plan stands, the Senate may take the candidate having the smallest number of votes, and make him President.

M^r Spaight & M^r Williamson moved to insert "seven" instead of "four"

years for the term of the President[55]--

[55] An ineligibility w^d have followed (tho' it would seem from the vote not in the opinion of all) this prolongation of the term.--Madison's Note.

On this motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.

V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Spaight & M^r Williamson, then moved to insert "six," instead of "four". On which motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.

V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

On the term "four" all the States were ay, except N. Carolina, no.

On the question (Clause 4. in the Report) for appointing President by electors---down to the words,--"ent.i.tled in the Legislature" inclusive

N. H. ay. Mas: ay. Con^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay.

V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.--ay.

It was moved that the Electors meet at the seat of the Gen^l Gov^t which pa.s.sed in the Negative N. C. only being ay.

It was moved to insert the words "under the seal of the State" after the word "transmit" in the 4^{th}. clause of the Report which was disagreed to; as was another motion to insert the words "and who shall have given their votes" after the word "appointed" in the 4^{th} Clause of the Report as added yesterday on motion of M^r d.i.c.kinson.

On several motions, the words "in presence of the Senate and House of Representatives" were inserted after the word "counted" and the word "immediately" before the word "choose;" and the words "of the Electors"

after the word "votes."

M^r Spaight said if the election by Electors is to be crammed down, he would prefer their meeting altogether and deciding finally without any reference to the Senate and moved "that the Electors meet at the seat of the General Government."

M^r Williamson 2^{ded} the motion, on which all the States were in the negative except N: Carolina.

On motion the words "But the election shall be on the same day throughout the U. S." were added after the words "transmitting their votes"

N. H. ay. Mas. no. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay.

V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.--ay.

On a question on the sentence in clause (4) "if such number be a majority of that of the Electors appointed"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d ay.

V^a no. N.C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On a question on the clause referring the eventual appointment of the President to the Senate

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. V^a ay.

N. C. no. Here the call ceased.

M^r Madison made a motion requiring 2/3 at least of the Senate to be present at the choice of a President. M^r Pinkney 2^{ded} the motion.

M^r Gorham thought it a wrong principle to require more than a majority in any case. In the present case it might prevent for a long time any choice of a President. On the question moved by M^r M. and M^r P.

N. H. ay. Mas. abs^t. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d ay.

V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Williamson suggested as better than an eventual choice by the Senate, that this choice should be made by the Legislature, voting by _States_ and not _per capita_.