The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 8

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 8

M^r Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them, which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer the public affairs best.

M^r Sherman said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an inst.i.tution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depository of the supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the business which ought to be done by the Executive department, and consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he wished the number might not be fixed, but that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate.

M^r Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he considered strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.[52]

[52] According to King, Madison followed Wilson: "Madison agreed with Wilson in the Definition of Executive power. _Ex vi termini._ Executive power does not include the Power of War and Peace. Executive Power shd. be limited and defined. If large, we shall have the Evils of Elective Monarchies.

Perhaps the best plan will be a single Executive of long duration, with a Council and with Liberty to dissent on his personal Responsibility."--King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 588.

According to Pierce:

"M^r Madison was of opinion that an Executive formed of one Man would answer the purpose when aided by a Council, who should have the right to advise and record their proceedings, but not to control his authority."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 320.

M^r Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in order to give weight & inspire confidence.[53]

[53] King gives Gerry's remarks: "_Gerry._ I am in favor of a Council to advise the Executive: they will be organs of information respecting Persons qualified for various offices. Their opinions may be recorded, so as to be liable to be called to account & impeached--in this way, their Responsibility will be certain, and for misconduct their Punishment sure."

d.i.c.kinson followed Gerry: "_d.i.c.kinson._ A limited yet vigorous Executive is not republican, but peculiar to monarchy--the royal Executive has vigour, not only by power, but by popular Attachment & Report--an Equivalent to popular Attachment may be derived from the Veto on the Legislative acts. We cannot have a limited monarchy--our condition does not permit it. Republics are in the beginning and for a time industrious, but they finally destroy themselves because they are badly const.i.tuted. I dread the consolidation of the States, & hope for a good national Govt. from the present Division of the States with a feeble Executive.

"We are to have a Legislature of two branches, or two Legislatures, as the sovereign of the nation--this will work a change unless you provide that the judiciary shall aid and correct the Executive. The first Branch of the Legislature, the H. of Representatives, must be on another plan. The second Branch or Senate may be on the present scheme of representing _the States_--the Representatives to be apportioned according to the Quotas of the States paid into the general Treasury. The Executive to be removed from office by the national Legislature, on the Pet.i.tion of seven States."--King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 588 _et seq._

M^r Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed by the British Govenm^t as our prototype. He did not mean however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it he did not know that he should be opposed to it; but the fixt genius of the people of America required a different form of Government. He could not see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, dispatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in order to support its independence to consist of more than one.

M^r Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it.

M^r Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz--"that a National Executive be inst.i.tuted."[54]

[54] Williamson followed Wilson, according to King: "_Williamson_--There is no true difference between an Executive composed of a single person, with a Council, and an Executive composed of three or more persons."--King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 590.

M^r Madison thought it would be proper, before a choice sh^d be made between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and must be given to that departm^t whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would a.s.sist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive sh^d be struck out & that after the words "that a national Executive ought to be inst.i.tuted" there be inserted the words following viz. "with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers "not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," as may from time to time be delegated by the national Legislature." The words "not legislative nor judiciary in their nature" were added to the proposed amendment, in consequence of a suggestion by Gen^l Pinkney that improper powers might otherwise be delegated.

M^r Wilson seconded this motion.

M^r Pinkney moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member of it; viz: "and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated." He said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the "power to carry into effect the national laws."

M^r Randolph seconded the motion.

M^r Madison did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words, "to appoint to offices &c. the whole being perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not however see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.

In consequence of the motion of M^r Pinkney, the question on M^r Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by M^r Pinkney struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y., N. J., Pen^a, Del., N. C., & Geo. ag^{st} Ma.s.s., Virg^a & S. Carolina the preceding part of the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided all the other States in the affirmative.

The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,

M^r Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Ma.s.s^{ts}, shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.

M^r Sherman was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which was to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.

M^r Wilson moves that the blank for the term of duration should be filled with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred this short period, on the supposition that a re-eligibility would be provided for.

M^r Pinkney moves for seven years.

M^r Sherman was for three years, and ag^{st} the doctrine of rotation as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties.

M^r Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment.

M^r Bedford[55] was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years.

He begged the Committee to consider what the situation of the Country would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.

[55] "Mr. Bedford was educated for the Bar, and in his profession I am told, has merit. He is a bold and nervous Speaker, and has a very commanding and striking manner;--but he is warm and impetuous in his temper, and precipitate in his judgment. Mr. Bedford is about 32 years old, and very corpulent."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 330.

On the question for seven years,

Ma.s.s^{ts} divid^{d.} Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pen^a ay.

Del. ay. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no.

There being 5 ays, 4 noes, & 1 div^d, a question was asked whether a majority had voted in the Affirmative? The President decided that it was an affirmative vote.

The _mode of appointing_ the Executive was the next question.

M^r Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States;

Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes however that M^r Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form.--the clause, "to be chosen by the National Legislature"--was accordingly postponed.--

M^r Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch only of the national Legislature.

The Committee then rose and the House

Adjourned.

SAt.u.r.dAY JUNE 2^D IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE

William Sam^l Johnson from Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, from Mary^d, & John Lansing J^r from N. York, took their seats.

It was mov^d & 2^{ded} to postpone ye Resol: of M^r Randolph respecting the Executive, in order to take up the 2^d branch of the Legislature; which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: ag^{st} N. Y. Pen^a Mary^d. The mode of appointing the Executive was resumed.

M^r Wilson made the following motion, to be subst.i.tuted for the mode proposed by Mr. Randolph's resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided into ---- districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect ---- members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive Magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at ---- and they or any ---- of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body ---- person-- in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested."

M^r Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election by the national Legislature.

M^r Gerry, opposed the election by the National legislature. There would be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature & the candidates w^d bargain & play into one another's hands, votes would be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to their friends. He liked the principle of M^r Wilson's motion, but fears it would alarm & give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such as might not be requisite for local purposes. He was for waiting till the people should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States, instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions.

M^r Williamson[56] could see no advantage in the introduction of Electors chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to them as the State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended with great trouble and expence.

[56] "Mr. Williamson is a Gentleman of education and talents. He enters freely into public debate from his close attention to most subjects, but he is no Orator. There is a great degree of good humour and pleasantry in his character; and in his manners there is a strong trait of the Gentleman. He is about 48 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._, iii., 332.

On the question for agreeing to M^r Wilson's subst.i.tute, it was negatived: Ma.s.s^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y.[57] no. P^a ay. Del. no.

Mar^d ay. Virg^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo^a no.