The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 20

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume II Part 20

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert, after "office," except offices in the army or navy: but in that case their offices shall be vacated.

M^r Broom 2^{ds} him.

M^r Randolph had been & should continue uniformly opposed to the striking out of the clause; as opening a door for influence & corruption. No arguments had made any impression on him, but those which related to the case of war, and a co-existing incapacity of the fittest commanders to be employed. He admitted great weight in these, and would agree to the exception proposed by M^r Gov^r Morris.

M^r Butler & M^r Pinkney urged a general postponem^t of 9. Sect. Art.

VI. till it should be seen what powers would be vested in the Senate, when it would be more easy to judge of the expediency of allowing the officers of State to be chosen out of that body.--A general postponement was agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. Sect. 10. taken up--"that members be paid by their respective States."

M^r Elseworth said that in reflecting on this subject he had been satisfied that too much dependence on the States would be produced by this mode of payment. He moved to strike it out and insert that they should "be paid out of the Treasury of the U. S. an allowance not exceeding ([blank]) dollars per day or the present value thereof."

M^r Gov^r Morris, remarked that if the members were to be paid by the States it would throw an unequal burden on the distant States, which would be unjust as the Legislature, was to be a national a.s.sembly. He moved that the payment be out of the Nat^l Treasury; leaving the quantum to the discretion of the Nat^l Legislature. There could be no reason to fear that they would overpay themselves.

M^r Butler contended for payment by the States; particularly in the case of the Senate, who will be so long out of their respective States, that they will lose sight of their Const.i.tuents unless dependent on them for their support.

M^r Langdon was ag^{st} payment by the States. There would be some difficulty in fixing the sum; but it would be unjust to oblige the distant States to bear the expence of their members in travelling to and from the Seat of Gov^t.

M^r Madison. If the H. of Rep^s is to be chosen _biennially_--and the Senate to be _constantly_ dependent on the Legislatures which are chosen _annually_, he could not see any chance for that stability in the Gen^l Gov^t the want of which was a princ.i.p.al evil in the State Gov^{ts}. His fear was that the organization of the Gov^t supposing the Senate to be really independ^t for six years, would not effect our purpose. It was nothing more than a combination of the peculiarities of two of the State Gov^{ts} which separately had been found insufficient. The Senate was formed on the model of that of Maryl^d. The Revisionary check, on that of N. York. What the effect of a union of these provisions might be, could not be foreseen. The enlargement of the sphere of the Government was indeed a circ.u.mstance which he thought would be favorable as he had on several occasions undertaken to show. He was however for fixing at least two extremes not to be exceeded by the Nat^l Legisl^{re} in the payment of themselves.

M^r Gerry. There are difficulties on both sides. The observation of M^r Butler has weight in it. On the other side, the State Legislatures may turn out the Senators by reducing their salaries. Such things have been practised.

Col. Mason. It has not yet been noticed that the clause as it now stands makes the House of Represent^s also dependent on the State Legislatures: so that both houses will be made the instruments of the politics of the States whatever they may be.

M^r Broom could see no danger in trusting the Gen^l Legislature with the payment of themselves. The State Legislatures had this power, and no complaint had been made of it.

M^r Sherman was not afraid that the Legislature would make their own wages too high; but too low, so that men ever so fit could not serve unless they were at the same time rich. He thought the best plan would be to fix a moderate allowance to be paid out of the Nat^l Treas^y and let the States make such additions as they might judge fit. He moved that 5 dollars per day be the sum, any further emoluments to be added by the States.

M^r Carrol had been much surprised at seeing this clause in the Report.

The dependence of both Houses on the State Legislatures is compleat; especially as the members of the former are eligible to State offices.

The States can now say: if you do not comply with our wishes, we will starve you; if you do we will reward you. The new Gov^t in this form was nothing more than a second edition of Congress in two volumes, instead of one, and perhaps with very few amendments--

M^r d.i.c.kenson took it for granted that all were convinced of the necessity of making the Gen^l Gov^t independent of the prejudices, pa.s.sions, and improper views of the State Legislatures. The contrary of This was effected by the section as it stands. On the other hand there were objections ag^{st} taking a permanent standard as wheat which had been suggested on a former occasion, as well as against leaving the matter to the pleasure of the Nat^l Legislature. He proposed that an Act should be pa.s.sed every 12 years by the Nat^l Legisl^{re} settling the quantum of their wages. If the Gen^l Gov^t should be left dependent on the State Legislatures, it would be happy for us if we had never met in this Room.

M^r Elseworth was not unwilling himself to trust the Legislature with authority to regulate their own wages, but well knew that an unlimited discretion for that purpose would produce strong, tho' perhaps not insuperable objections. He thought changes in the value of money, provided for by his motion in the words, "or the present value thereof."

M^r L. Martin. As the Senate is to represent the States, the members of it ought to be paid by the States.

M^r Carrol. The Senate was to represent & manage the affairs of the whole, and not to be the advocates of State interests. They ought then not to be dependent on nor paid by the States.

On the question for paying the Members of the Legislature out of the Nat^l Treasury,

N. H. ay. Ma.s.s. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.

M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

M^r Elseworth moved that the pay be fixed at 5 doll^{rs} or the present value thereof per day during their attendance & for every thirty miles in travelling to & from Congress.

M^r Strong preferred 4 dollars, leaving the Sts. at liberty to make additions.

On question for fixing the pay at 5 dollars.

N. H. no. Ma.s.s. no. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no.

M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r d.i.c.kenson proposed that the wages of the members of both houses s^d be required to be the same.

M^r Broome seconded him.

M^r Ghorum. this would be unreasonable. The Senate will be detained longer from home, will be obliged to remove their families, and in time of war perhaps to sit constantly. Their allowance should certainly be higher. The members of the Senates in the States are allowed more, than those of the other house.

M^r d.i.c.kenson withdrew his motion.

It was moved & agreed to amend the section by adding--"to be ascertained by law."

The section (Art. VI. Sect. 10) as amended, agreed to nem. con.

Adj^d.

WEDNESDAY AUGUST 15. IN CONVENTION.

Art: VI. Sect. 11. Agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. Sect 12. taken up.

M^r Strong moved to amend the article so as to read--"Each House shall possess the right of originating all bills, except bills for raising money for the purposes of revenue, or for appropriating the same and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the Gov^t which shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other cases".

Col. Mason, 2^{ds} the motion. He was extremely earnest to take this power from the Senate, who he said could already sell the whole Country by means of Treaties.

M^r Ghorum urged the amendment as of great importance. The Senate will first acquire the habit of preparing money bills, and then the practice will grow into an exclusive right of preparing them.

M^r Govern^r Morris opposed it as unnecessary and inconvenient.

M^r Williamson, some think this restriction on the Senate essential to liberty, others think it of no importance. Why should not the former be indulged. He was for an efficient and stable Gov^t: but many would not strengthen the Senate if not restricted in the case of money bills. The friends of the Senate would therefore lose more than they would gain by refusing to gratify the other side. He moved to postpone the subject till the powers of the Senate should be gone over.

M^r Rutlidge 2^{ds} the motion.

M^r Mercer should hereafter be ag^{st} returning to a reconsideration of this section. He contended (alluding to M^r Mason's observations) that the Senate ought not to have the power of treaties. This power belonged to the Executive department; adding that Treaties would not be final so as to alter the laws of the land, till ratified by legislative authority. This was the case of Treaties in Great Britain; particularly the late Treaty of Co[~m]erce with France.

Col. Mason, did not say that a Treaty would repeal a law; but that the Senate by means of treaty might alienate territory &c., without legislative sanction. The cessions of the British Islands in W. Indies by Treaty alone were an example. If Spain should possess herself of Georgia therefore the Senate might by treaty dismember the Union. He wished the motion to be decided now, that the friends of it might know how to conduct themselves.

On the question for postponing Sect: 12. it pa.s.sed in the affirmative.

N. H. ay. Ma.s.s. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. Pen^a no. Del: no.

Mary^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Madison moved that all acts before they become laws should be submitted both to the Executive and supreme Judiciary Departments, that if either of these should object 2/3 of each House, if both should object, 3/4 of each House, should be necessary to overrule the objections and give to the acts the force of law.[29]