The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 31

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 31

M^r Butler agreed to the Commitment if the Committee were to be left at liberty. He was persuaded that the more the subject was examined, the less it would appear that the number of inhabitants would be a proper rule of proportion. If there were no other objection the changeableness of the standard would be sufficient. He concurred with those who thought some balance was necessary between the old & the new States. He contended strenuously that property was the only just measure of representation. This was the great object of Govern^t; the great cause of war; the great means of carrying it on.

M^r Pinkney saw no good reason for committing. The value of land had been found on full investigation to be an impracticable rule. The contributions of revenue including imports & exports must be too changeable in their amount; too difficult to be adjusted; and too injurious to the non-commercial States. The number of inhabitants appeared to him the only just & practicable rule. He thought the blacks ought to stand on an equality with the whites: But w^d agree to the ratio settled by Cong^s. He contended that Cong^s had no right under the articles of Confederation to authorize the admission of new States; no such case having been provided for.

M^r Davy was for committing the clause in order to get at the merits of the question arising on the Report. He seemed to think that wealth or property ought to be represented in the 2^d branch; and numbers in the 1^{st} branch.

On the Motion for committing as made by M^r Gov^r Morris,

Ma.s.s^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.

M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The members app^d by Ballot were M^r Gov^r Morris, M^r Gorham, M^r Randolph, M^r Rutlidge, M^r King.

M^r Wilson signified that his view in agreeing to the co[~m]itm^t was that the Com^e might consider the propriety of adopting a scale similar to that established by the Const.i.tution of Ma.s.s^{ts} which w^d give an advantage to y^e small States without substantially departing from the rule of proportion.

M^r Wilson & M^r Mason moved to postpone the clause relating to money bills in order to take up the clause relating to an equality of votes in the Second branch.

On the question Ma.s.s^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.

P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The clause relating to equality of votes being under consideration,

Doc^r Franklin observed that this question could not be properly put by itself, the Co[~m]ittee having reported several propositions as mutual conditions of each other. He could not vote for it if separately taken, but should vote for the whole together.

Col. Mason perceived the difficulty & suggested a reference of the rest of the Report to y^e Committee just appointed, that the whole might be brought into one view.

M^r Randolph disliked y^e reference to that Committee, as it consisted of members from States opposed to the wishes of the smaller States, and could not therefore be acceptable to the latter.

M^r Martin & M^r Jenifer moved to postpone the clause till the Com^e last appointed sh^d report.

M^r Madison observed that if the uncommitted part of the Report was connected with the part just committed, it ought also to be committed; if not connected, it need not be postponed till report should be made.

On the question for postponing, moved by M^r Martin & M^r Jenifer,--Con^t N. J. Del. M^d V^a Geo. ay. P^a N. C. S. C. no.

Ma.s.s. N. Y. divided.

The 1^{st} clause relating to the originating of money bills was then resumed.

M^r Govern^r Morris was opposed to a restriction of this right in either branch, considered merely in itself and as unconnected with the point of representation in the 2^d branch. It will disable the 2^d branch from proposing its own money plans, and giving the people an opportunity of judging by comparison of the merits of those proposed by the 1^{st} branch.

M^r Wilson could see nothing like a concession here on the part of the smaller States. If both branches were to say yes or no, it was of little consequence which should say yes or no first, which last. If either was indiscriminately to have the right of originating, the reverse of the Report, would he thought be most proper; since it was a maxim that the least numerous body was the fittest for deliberation; the most numerous for decision. He observed that this discrimination had been transcribed from the British into several American const.i.tutions. But he was persuaded that on examination of the American experiments it would be found to be a trifle light as air. Nor could he ever discover the advantage of it in the Parliamentary history of G. Britain. He hoped if there was any advantage in the privilege, that it would be pointed out.

M^r Williamson thought that if the privilege were not common to both branches it ought rather to be confined to the 2^d as the bills in that case would be more narrowly watched, than if they originated with the branch having most of the popular confidence.

M^r Mason. The consideration which weighed with the Committee was that the 1^{st} branch would be the immediate representatives of the people, the 2^d would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the people's money, they might soon forget the source from whence they received it. We might soon have an aristocracy. He had been much concerned at the principles which had been advanced by some gentlemen, but had the satisfaction to find they did not generally prevail. He was a friend to proportional representation in both branches; but supposed that some points must be yielded for the sake of accomodation.

M^r Wilson. If he had proposed that the 2^d branch should have an independent disposal of public money, the observations of (Col. Mason) would have been a satisfactory answer. But nothing could be farther from what he had said. His question was how is the power of the 1^{st} branch increased or that of the 2^d diminished by giving the proposed privilege to the former? Where is the difference, in which branch it begins, if both must concur, in the end?

M^r Gerry would not say that the concession was a sufficient one on the part of the small States. But he could not but regard it in the light of a concession. It w^d make it a const.i.tutional principle that the 2^d branch were not possessed of the Confidence of the people in money matters, which w^d lessen their weight & influence. In the next place if the 2^d branch were dispossessed of the privilege, they w^d be deprived of the opportunity which their continuance in office 3 times as long as the 1^{st} branch would give them of making three successive essays in favor of a particular point.

M^r Pinkney thought it evident that the Concession was wholly on one side, that of the large States, the privilege of originating money bills being of no account.

M^r Gov^r Morris had waited to hear the good effects of the restriction.

As to the alarm sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there never was, nor ever will be a civilized Society without an aristocracy.

His endeavor was to keep it as much as possible from doing mischief. The restriction if it has any real operation, will deprive us of the services of the 2^d branch in digesting & proposing money bills of which it will be more capable than the 1^{st} branch. It will take away the responsibility of the 2^d branch, the great security for good behavior.

It will always leave a plea, as to an obnoxious money bill that it was disliked, but could not be const.i.tutionally amended; nor safely rejected. It will be a dangerous source of disputes between the two Houses. We should either take the British Const.i.tution altogether or make one for ourselves. The Executive there has dissolved two Houses as the only cure for such disputes. Will our Executive be able to apply such a remedy? Every law directly or indirectly takes money out of the pockets of the people. Again What use may be made of such a privilege in case of great emergency? Suppose an Enemy at the door, and money instantly & absolutely necessary for repelling him, may not the popular branch avail itself of this duress, to extort concessions from the Senate destructive of the Const.i.tution itself. He ill.u.s.trated this danger by the example of the Long Parliament's exped^{ts} for subverting the H. of Lords; concluding on the whole that the restriction would be either useless or pernicious.

Doc^r Franklin did not mean to go into a justification of the Report, but as it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the 2^d branch from medling with money bills, he could not but remark that it was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of their money, & how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim that those who feel, can best judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained, if money affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of the people. This was his inducement to concur in the report. As to the danger or difficulty that might arise from a Negative in the 2^d where the people w^d not be proportionately represented, it might easily be got over by declaring that there should be no such negative; or if that will not do, by declaring that there shall be no such branch at all.

M^r Martin said that it was understood in the Committee that the difficulties and disputes which had been apprehended, should be guarded ag^{st} in the detailing of the plan.

M^r Wilson. The difficulties & disputes will increase with the attempts to define & obviate them. Queen Anne was obliged to dissolve her Parliam^t in order to terminate one of these obstinate disputes between the two Houses. Had it not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one can say what the result would have been. The point is still sub judice in England. He approved of the principles laid down by the Honble President (Doct^r Franklin) his Colleague, as to the expediency of keeping the people informed of their money affairs. But thought they would know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one way as in the other.

Gen^l Pinkney was astonished that this point should have been considered as a concession. He remarked that the restriction to money bills had been rejected on the merits singly considered, by 8 States ag^{st} 3.

and that the very States which now called it a concession, were then ag^{st} it as nugatory or improper in itself.

On the Question whether the clause relating to money bills in the Report of the Com^e consisting of a member from each State, sh^d stand as part of the Report

Ma.s.s^{ts} divid^d Con^t ay. N. Y. div^d. N. J. ay. P^a no.

Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. div^d

A Question was then raised whether the question was carried in the affirmative; there being but 5 ays out of 11. States present. The words of the rule are (see May 28).

On this question: Mas. Con^t N. J. P^a Del. M^d N. C. S. C. Geo.

ay. N. Y. V^a no

(In several preceding instances like votes had sub silentio been entered as decided in the affirmative.)

Adjourned

SAt.u.r.dAY, JULY 7. IN CONVENTION.

"Shall the clause allowing each State one vote in the 2^d branch, stand as part of the Report,"? being taken up--

M^r Gerry. This is the critical question. He had rather agree to it than have no accommodation. A Govern^t short of a proper national plan, if generally acceptable, would be preferable to a proper one which if it could be carried at all, would operate on discontented States. He thought it would be best to suspend the question till the Comm^e yesterday appointed, should make report.

M^r Sherman Supposed that it was the wish of every one that some Gen^l Gov^t should be established. An equal vote in the 2^d branch would, he thought, be most likely to give it the necessary vigor. The small States have more vigor in their Gov^{ts} than the large ones, the more influence therefore the large ones have, the weaker will be the Gov^t.

In the large States it will be most difficult to collect the real & fair sense of the people. Fallacy & undue influence will be practised with most success; and improper men will most easily get into office. If they vote by States in the 2^d branch, and each State has an equal vote, there must be always a majority of States as well as a majority of the people on the side of public measures, & the Gov^t will have decision and efficacy. If this be not the case in the 2^d branch there may be a majority of States ag^{st} public measures, and the difficulty of compelling them to abide by the public determination, will render the Government feebler than it has ever yet been.

M^r Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating temper, but firmness was sometimes a duty of higher obligation. Conciliation was also misapplied in this instance. It was pursued here rather among the Representatives, than among the Const.i.tuents; and it w^d be of little consequence if not established among the latter; and there could be little hope of its being established among them if the foundation should not be laid in justice and right.

On Question shall the words stand as part of the Report?

Ma.s.s^{ts} div^d. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J, ay. P^a no. Del. ay.

M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. div^d

(Note. several votes were given here in the affirmative or were div^d because another final question was to be taken on the whole report.)