The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 17

The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of USA Volume I Part 17

6. Res^d that the Nat^l Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the Legislative rights vested in Cong^s by the Confederation, and moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent; or in which the harmony of the U. S. may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all laws pa.s.sed by the several States contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union.

7. Res^d that the rights of suffrage in the 1^{st} branch of the National Legislature, ought not to be according to the rule established in the articles of confederation but according to some equitable ratio of representation, namely, in proportion to the whole number of white & other free citizens & inhabitants, of every age s.e.x and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, & three fifths of all other persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes in each State.

8. Resolved that the right of suffrage in the 2^d branch of the National Legislature ought to be according to the rule established for the first.

9. Resolved that a National Executive be inst.i.tuted to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the Nat^l Legislature for the term of seven years, with power to carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for--to be ineligible a second time, & to be removeable on impeachment and conviction of malpractices or neglect of duty--to receive a fixed stipend by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to public service to be paid out of the national Treasury.

10. Resol^d that the Nat^l Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative Act, which shall not be afterwards pa.s.sed unless by two thirds of each branch of the National Legislature.

11. Resol^d that a Nat^l Judiciary be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the Judges of which to be appointed by the 2^d branch of the Nat^l Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour, & to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.

12. Resol^d that the Nat^l Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals.

13. Res^d that the jurisdiction of the Nat^l Judiciary shall extend to all cases which respect the collection of the Nat^l revenue, impeachments of any Nat^l Officers, and questions which involve the national peace & harmony.

14. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the U. States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government & territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the Nat^l Legislature less than the whole.

15. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress and their authorities and privileges untill a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted and for the completion of all their engagements.

16. Res^d that a Republican Const.i.tution & its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each State by the U. States.

17. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary.

18. Res^d that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union.

19. Res^d that the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation by the Convention ought at a proper time or times after the approbation of Cong^s to be submitted to an a.s.sembly or a.s.semblies recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.

THURSDAY JUNE 14. IN CONVENTION.

M^r Patterson, observed to the Convention that it was the wish of several deputations, particularly that of N. Jersey, that further time might be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the Committee of the Whole, and to digest one purely federal, and contradistinguished from the reported plan. He said they hoped to have such an one ready by tomorrow to be laid before the Convention: And the Convention adjourned that leisure might be given for the purpose.

FRIDAY JUNE 15^{TH} 1787

M^r Patterson, laid before the Convention the plan which he said several of the deputations wished to be subst.i.tuted in place of that proposed by M^r Randolph. After some little discussion of the most proper mode of giving it a fair deliberation it was agreed that it should be referred to a Committee of the Whole, and that in order to place the two plans in due comparison, the other should be recommitted. At the earnest request of M^r Lansing[84] & some other gentlemen, it was also agreed that the Convention should not go into Co[~m]ittee of the whole on the subject till tomorrow, by which delay the friends of the plan proposed by M^r Patterson w^d be better prepared to explain & support it, and all would have an opportu^y of taking copies.[85]

[84] "Mr. Lansing is a practising Attorney at Albany, and Mayor of that Corporation. He has a hisitation in his speech, that will prevent his being an Orator of any eminence;--his legal knowledge I am told is not extensive, nor his education a good one. He is however a Man of good sense, plain in his manners, and sincere in his friendships. He is about 32 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 327.

[85] (This plan had been concerted among the deputations or members thereof, from Con^t N. Y. N. J. Del. and perhaps M^r Martin from Mary^d who made with them a common cause though on different principles. Con^t & N. Y. were ag^{st} a departure from the principle of the Confederation, wishing rather to add a few new powers to Cong^s than to subst.i.tute, a National Gov^t. The States of N. J. & Del. were opposed to a National Gov^t because its patrons considered a proportional representation of the States as the basis of it. The eagerness displayed by the members opposed to a Nat^l Gov^t from these different motives began now to produce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention.

M^r d.i.c.kenson said to M^r Madison You see the consequence of pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small States wish for two branches in the General Legislature, and are friends to a good National Government; but we would sooner submit to foreign power, than submit to be deprived of an equality of suffrage in both branches of the legislature, and thereby be thrown under the domination of the large States.)--Madison Note.

"Mr. Madison moved for the report of the committee, and the question may then come on whether the convention will postpone it in order to take into consideration the system now offered.

"Mr. Lansing is of opinion that the two systems are fairly contrasted. The one now offered is on the basis of amending the federal government, and the other to be reported as a national government, on propositions which exclude the propriety of amendment. Considering therefore its importance, and that justice may be done to its weighty consideration, he is for postponing it a day.

"Col. Hamilton cannot say he is in sentiment with either plan--supposes both might again be considered as federal plans, and by this means they will be fairly in committee, and be contrasted so as to make a comparative estimate of the two."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 121, 122.

The propositions from N. Jersey moved by M^r Patterson were in the words following.

1. Res^d that the articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, corrected, & enlarged, as to render the federal Const.i.tution adequate to the exigencies of Government, & the preservation of the Union.

2. Res^d that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States in Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation, they be authorized to pa.s.s acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the U. States, by Stamps on paper, vellum or parchment, and by a postage on all letters or packages pa.s.sing through the general post-office, to be applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper & expedient; to make rules & regulations for the collection thereof; and the same from time to time, to alter & amend in such manner as they shall think proper, to pa.s.s Acts for the regulation of trade & commerce as well with foreign Nations as with each other: provided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures & penalties to be incurred for contravening such acts rules and regulations shall be adjudged by the Common law Judiciaries of the State in which any Offence contrary to the true intent & meaning of such Acts rules & regulations shall have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing in the first instance all suits & prosecutions for that purpose in the Superior Common law Judiciary in such State, subject nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law & fact in rendering Judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of the U. States.

3. Res^d that whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead of the rule for making requisitions mentioned in the articles of Confederation, the United States in Cong^s be authorized to make such requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white & other free citizens & inhabitants of every age s.e.x and condition including those bound to servitude for a term of years & three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes; that if such requisitions be not complied with, in the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non complying States & for that purpose to devise and pa.s.s acts directing & authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers hereby vested in the U. States in Cong^s shall be exercised without the consent of at least ---- States, and in that proportion if the number of Confederated States should hereafter be increased or diminished.

4. Res^d that the U. States in Cong^s be authorized to elect a federal Executive to consist of ---- persons, to continue in office for the term of ---- years, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase nor diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons composing the Executive at the time of such increase or diminution, to be paid out of the federal treasury; to be incapable of holding any other office or appointment during their time of service and for ---- years thereafter: to be ineligible a second time, & removeable by Cong^s on application by a majority of the Executives of the several States; that the Executives besides their general authority to execute the federal acts ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for, & to direct all military operations; provided that none of the persons composing the federal Executive shall on any occasion take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct any enterprise as General or in any other capacity.

5. Res^d that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the Executive, & to hold their offices during good behaviour, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services in which no increase nor diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution: that the Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear & determine in the first instance on all impeachments of federal Officers, & by way of appeal in the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights of Amba.s.sadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all cases of piracies & felonies on the high Seas, in all cases in which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for the regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall during the time they remain in office be capable of receiving or holding any other office or appointment during their term of service, or for ---- thereafter.

6. Res^d that all Acts of the U. States in Cong^s made by virtue & in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the Articles of Confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions any thing in the respective laws of the Individual States to the Contrary notwithstanding: and that if any State, or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent y^e carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth y^e power of the Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an Obedience to such Acts, or an observance of such Treaties.

7. Res^d that provision be made for the admission of new States into the Union.

8. Res^d that the rule for naturalization ought to be same in every State.

9. Res^d that a Citizen of one State committing an offence in another State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same offence as if it had been committed by a Citizen of the State in which the offence was committed.[86]

[86] This copy of M^r Patterson's propositions varies in a few clauses from that in the printed Journal furnished from the papers of M^r Brearley a colleague of M^r Patterson. A confidence is felt, notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That the copy in the Journal is not entirely correct is shewn by the ensuing speech of M^r Wilson (June 16) in which he refers to the mode of removing the Executive by impeachment & conviction as a feature in the Virg^a plan forming one of its contrasts to that of M^r Patterson, which proposed a removal on the application of a majority of the Executives of the States. In the copy printed in the Journal, the two modes are combined in the same clause; whether through inadvertence, or as a contemplated amendment, does not appear.--Madison's Note.

The Journal contains: "6. Resolved, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers within the several states, ought to be bound, by oath, to support the articles of union," and "9. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for hearing and deciding upon all disputes arising between the United States and an individual state, respecting territory."--_Journal of the Federal Convention_, 126.

Adjourned.

SAt.u.r.dAY JUNE 16. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE on Resolutions propos^d by M^r P. & M^r R.

M^r Lansing called for the reading of the 1^{st} resolution of each plan, which he considered as involving principles directly in contrast; that of M^r Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective States, that of M^r Randolph destroys it: the latter requires a negative on all the laws of the particular States; the former, only certain general powers for the general good. The plan of M^r R. in short absorbs all power except what may be exercised in the little local matters of the States which are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He grounded his preference of M^r P's plan, chiefly on two objections ag^{st} that of M^r R. 1. want of power in the Convention to discuss & propose it. 2. the improbability of its being adopted, 1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being. The Act of Congress The tenor of the Acts of the States, the Co[~m]issions produced by the several deputations all proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the Confederacy, marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary & improper to go farther. He was sure that this was the case with his State. N. York would never have concurred in sending deputies to the Convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to turn on a consolidation of the States, and a National Government.

2. was it probable that the States would adopt & ratify a scheme, which they had never authorized us to propose? and which so far exceeded what they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several Acts particularly in relation to the plan of revenue proposed by Cong. in 1783, not authorized by the Articles of Confederation, what were the ideas they then entertained. Can so great a change be supposed to have already taken place. To rely on any change which is hereafter to take place in the sentiments of the people would be trusting to too great an uncertainty. We know only what their present sentiments are. And it is in vain to propose what will not accord with these. The States will never feel a sufficient confidence in a general Government to give it a negative on their laws. The Scheme is itself totally novel. There is no parallel to it to be found. The Authority of Congress is familiar to the people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress will be readily approved by them.

M^r Patterson, said as he had on a former occasion given his sentiments on the plan proposed by M^r R. he would now avoiding repet.i.tion as much as possible give his reasons in favor of that proposed by himself. He preferred it because it accorded 1. with the powers of the Convention, 2 with the sentiments of the people. If the confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain larger powers, not a.s.sume them ourselves. I came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. Our object is not such a Governm^t as may be best in itself, but such a one as our Const.i.tuents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve. If we argue the matter on the supposition that no Confederacy at present exists, it can not be denied that all the States stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. All therefore must concur before any can be bound. If a proportional representation be right, why do we not vote so here? If we argue on the fact that a federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles of it we still find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of it. He reads the 5^{th} art: of Confederation giving each State a vote--& the 13^{th} declaring that no alteration shall be made without unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done, must be unanimously undone. It was observed (by M^r Wilson) that the larger State gave up the point, not because it was right, but because the circ.u.mstances of the moment urged the concession.

Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to take it back. Can the donor resume his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser States. The larger States acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the small ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. N. Jersey & Maryland were the two last, the former objecting to the want of power in Congress over trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate the vacant territory to the benefit of the whole.--If the sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the Representatives must be drawn immediately from the States, not from the people: and we have no power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. The only expedient that will cure the difficulty, is that of throwing the States into Hotchpot. To say that this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be tried, and we shall see whether the Citizens of Ma.s.s^{ts} Pen^a & V^a accede to it. It will be objected that Coercion will be impracticable. But will it be more so in one plan than the other? Its efficacy will depend on the quantum of power collected, not on its being drawn from the States, or from the individuals; and according to his plan it may be exerted on individuals as well as according that of M^r R. A distinct executive & Judiciary also were equally provided by his plan. It is urged that two branches in the Legislature are necessary. Why? for the purpose of a check. But the reason of the precaution is not applicable to this case. Within a particular State, where party heats prevail, such a check may be necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less necessary, and besides, the delegations of the different States are checks on each other. Do the people at large complain of Cong^s? No, what they wish is that Cong^s may have more power. If the power now proposed be not eno', the people hereafter will make additions to it. With proper powers Cong^s will act with more energy & wisdom than the proposed Nat^l Legislature; being fewer in number, and more secreted & refined by the mode of election.

The plan of M^r R. will also be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia & Del. two representatives each in the popular branch the aggregate number of that branch will be 180. Add to it half as many for the other branch and you have 270, coming once at least a year from the most distant as well as the most central parts of the republic. In the present deranged State of our finances can so expensive a System be seriously thought of?

By enlarging the powers of Cong^s the greatest part of this expence will be saved, and all purposes will be answered. At least a trial ought to be made.

M^r Wilson entered into a contrast of the princ.i.p.al points of the two plans so far he said as there had been time to examine the one last proposed. These points were 1. in the Virg^a plan there are 2 & in some degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan from N. J. there is to be a _single_ legislature only--2. Representation of the people at large is the basis of one: the State Legislatures, the pillars of the other--3. proportional representation prevails in one;--equality of suffrage in the other--4. A single Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one:--a plurality is held out in the other.--5. in the one the majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail:--in the other a minority may prevail. 6. the Nat^l Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent &:--in place of this Cong^s are to have additional power in a few cases only--7. A negative on the laws of the States:--in place of this coertion to be subst.i.tuted--8. The Executive to be removable on impeachment & conviction;--in one plan: in the other to be removable at the instance of a majority of the Executives of the States--9. Revision of the laws provided for in one:--no such check in the other--10. inferior national tribunals in one:--none such in the other. 11. In one y^e jurisdiction of Nat^l tribunals to extend &c.--; an appellate jurisdiction only allowed in the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to extend to all cases affecting the Nation^l peace & harmony; _there_ a few cases only are marked out. 13. finally y^e ratification is in this to be by the people themselves:--in that by the legislative authorities according to the 13 art: of the Confederation.

With regard to the _power of the Convention_, he conceived himself authorized to _conclude nothing_, but to be at liberty to _propose any thing_. In this particular he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the two plans.

With _regard to the sentiments of the people_, he conceived it difficult to know precisely what they are. Those of the particular circle in which one moved, were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He could not persuade himself that the State Gov^{ts} & Sovereignties were so much the idols of the people, nor a Nat^l Gov^t so obnoxious to them, as some supposed. Why s^d a Nat^l Gov^t be unpopular? Has it less dignity? will each Citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen of _Deleware_ be degraded by becoming a Citizen of the _United States_?

Where do the people look at present for relief from the evils of which they complain? Is it from an internal reform of their Gov^{ts}? no, Sir.

It is from the Nat^l Councils that relief is expected. For these reasons he did not fear, that the people would not follow us into a National Gov^t and it will be a further recommendation of M^r R'^s plan that it is to be submitted to _them_, and not to the _Legislatures_, for ratification.