Pascal's Pensees Part 18
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For we must not misunderstand ourselves; we are as much automatic as intellectual; and hence it comes that the instrument by which conviction is attained is not demonstrated alone. How few things are demonstrated?
Proofs only convince the mind. Custom is the source of our strongest and most believed proofs. It bends the automaton, which persuades the mind without its thinking about the matter. Who has demonstrated that there will be a to-morrow, and that we shall die? And what is more believed?
It is, then, custom which persuades us of it; it is custom that makes so many men Christians; custom that makes them Turks, heathens, artisans, soldiers, etc. (Faith in baptism is more received among Christians than among Turks.) Finally, we must have recourse to it when once the mind has seen where the truth is, in order to quench our thirst, and steep ourselves in that belief, which escapes us at every hour; for always to have proofs ready is too much trouble. We must get an easier belief, which is that of custom, which, without violence, without art, without argument, makes us believe things, and inclines all our powers to this belief, so that out soul falls naturally into it. It is not enough to believe only by force of conviction, when the automaton is inclined to believe the contrary. Both our parts must be made to believe, the mind by reasons which it is sufficient to have seen once in a lifetime, and the automaton by custom, and by not allowing it to incline to the contrary. _Inclina cor meum, Deus._[100]
The reason acts slowly, with so many examinations, and on so many principles, which must be always present, that at every hour it falls asleep, or wanders, through want of having all its principles present.
Feeling does not act thus; it acts in a moment, and is always ready to act. We must then put our faith in feeling; otherwise it will be always vacillating.
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Two extremes: to exclude reason, to admit reason only.
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It is not a rare thing to have to reprove the world for too much docility. It is a natural vice like credulity, and as pernicious.
Superst.i.tion.
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Piety is different from superst.i.tion.
To carry piety as far as superst.i.tion is to destroy it.
The heretics reproach us for this superst.i.tious submission. This is to do what they reproach us for ...
Infidelity, not to believe in the Eucharist, because it is not seen.
Superst.i.tion to believe propositions. Faith, etc.
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I say there are few true Christians, even as regards faith. There are many who believe but from superst.i.tion. There are many who do not believe solely from wickedness. Few are between the two.
In this I do not include those who are of truly pious character, nor all those who believe from a feeling in their heart.
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There are only three kinds of persons; those who serve G.o.d, having found Him; others who are occupied in seeking Him, not having found Him; while the remainder live without seeking Him, and without having found Him.
The first are reasonable and happy, the last are foolish and unhappy; those between are unhappy and reasonable.
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_Unusquisque sibi Deum fingit._[101]
Disgust.
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Ordinary people have the power of not thinking of that about which they do not wish to think. "Do not meditate on the pa.s.sages about the Messiah," said the Jew to his son. Thus our people often act. Thus are false religions preserved, and even the true one, in regard to many persons.
But there are some who have not the power of thus preventing thought, and who think so much the more as they are forbidden. These undo false religions, and even the true one, if they do not find solid arguments.
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They hide themselves in the press, and call numbers to their rescue.
Tumult.
_Authority._--So far from making it a rule to believe a thing because you have heard it, you ought to believe nothing without putting yourself into the position as if you had never heard it.
It is your own a.s.sent to yourself, and the constant voice of your own reason, and not of others, that should make you believe.
Belief is so important! A hundred contradictions might be true. If antiquity were the rule of belief, men of ancient time would then be without rule. If general consent, if men had perished?
False humanity, pride.
Lift the curtain. You try in vain; if you must either believe, or deny, or doubt. Shall we then have no rule? We judge that animals do well what they do. Is there no rule whereby to judge men?
To deny, to believe, and to doubt well, are to a man what the race is to a horse.
Punishment of those who sin, error.
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Those who do not love the truth take as a pretext that it is disputed, and that a mult.i.tude deny it. And so their error arises only from this, that they do not love either truth or charity. Thus they are without excuse.
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Superst.i.tion and l.u.s.t. Scruples, evil desires. Evil fear; fear, not such as comes from a belief in G.o.d, but such as comes from a doubt whether He exists or not. True fear comes from faith; false fear comes from doubt.
True fear is joined to hope, because it is born of faith, and because men hope in the G.o.d in whom they believe. False fear is joined to despair, because men fear the G.o.d in whom they have no belief. The former fear to lose Him; the latter fear to find Him.
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"A miracle," says one, "would strengthen my faith." He says so when he does not see one. Reasons, seen from afar, appear to limit our view; but when they are reached, we begin to see beyond. Nothing stops the nimbleness of our mind. There is no rule, say we, which has not some exceptions, no truth so general which has not some aspect in which it fails. It is sufficient that it be not absolutely universal to give us a pretext for applying the exceptions to the present subject, and for saying, "This is not always true; there are therefore cases where it is not so." It only remains to show that this is one of them; and that is why we are very awkward or unlucky, if we do not find one some day.
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