A Critical Exposition of the Popular 'Jihad' Part 1

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A Critical Exposition of the Popular 'Jihad'



A Critical Exposition of the Popular 'Jihad' Part 1


A Critical Exposition of the Popular 'Jihad'

by Moulavi Geragh Ali.

NOTE.

I here take the opportunity of removing a wrong idea of the alleged injunction of the Prophet against our countrymen the Hindus. The Hon'ble Raja Siva Prasad, in his speech at the Legislative Council, on the 9th March, 1883, while discussing the Ilbert Bill, quoted from Amir Khusro's _Tarikh Alai_ that, "Ala-ud-din Khiliji once sent for a Kazi, and asked him what was written in the Code of Mehammadan law regarding the Hindus.

The Kazi answered that, the Hindus were _Zimmis_ (condemned to pay the Jizya tax); if asked silver, they ought to pay gold with deep respect and humility; and if the collector of taxes were to fling dirt in their faces, they should gladly open their mouths wide. G.o.d's order is to keep them in subjection, and the Prophet enjoins on the faithful to kill, plunder and imprison them, to make Mussulmans, or to put them to the sword, to enslave them, and confiscate their property....'" [_Vide_ Supplement to the _Gazette of India_, April 21, 1883, page 807.]

These alleged injunctions, I need not say here, after what I have stated in various places of this book regarding intolerance, and compulsory conversion, are merely false imputations. There are no such injunctions of the Prophet against either _Zimmis_, (_i.e._, protected or guaranteed) or the Hindus.

INTRODUCTION.

[Sidenote: Object of the book.]

1. In publishing this work, my chief object is to remove the general and erroneous impression from the minds of European and Christian writers regarding Islam, that Mohammad waged wars of conquest, extirpation, as well as of proselytizing against the Koreish, other Arab tribes, the Jews, and Christians;[1] that he held the Koran in one hand and the scimitar in the other, and compelled people to believe in his mission. I have endeavoured in this book, I believe on sufficient grounds, to show that neither the wars of Mohammad were offensive, nor did he in any way use force or compulsion in the matter of belief.

[Footnote 1: "He now occupied a position where he might become the agent for executing the divine sentence, and at the same time triumphantly impose the true religion on those who had rejected it." The Life of Mahomet, by Sir W. Muir, page 211. London, 1877. (New Edition.)

"The free toleration of the purer among the creeds around him, which the Prophet had at first enjoined, gradually changes into intolerance.

Persecuted no longer, Mohammad becomes a persecutor himself; with the Koran in one hand, and scymitar in the other, he goes forth to offer to the nations the three-fold alternative of conversion, tribute, death."--Mohammed and Mohammedanism, by Mr. R. Bosworth Smith, page 137.

Second Edition.]

[Sidenote: Early wrongs of the Moslems.]

[Sidenote: Justification in taking up arms, if taken.]

2. All the wars of Mohammad were defensive. He and those who took interest in his cause were severely oppressed at intervals, and were in a sort of general persecution at Mecca at the hands of the unG.o.dly and fierce Koreish. Those who were weak and without protection had to leave their city, and twice fly to the Christian land of Abyssinia, pursued by the wrathful Koreish, but in vain. Those who remained at Mecca were subject to all sorts of indignities, malignity and a deprivation of all religious and social liberty, because they had forsaken the inferior deities of the Koreish, and believed in the only ONE G.o.d of Mohammad, in whose mission they had full belief. Mohammad and his followers had every sanction, under the natural and international law, then and there to wage war against their persecutors with the object of removing the (_fitnah_) persecution and obtaining their civil rights of freedom and religious liberty in their native city.

[Sidenote: Commencement of the state of war.]

[Sidenote: The Koreish being public enemies were liable to be treated as such.]

3. The fierce persecutions renewed by the Koreish at the time of the expulsion of the Moslems from Mecca were acts of hostility tantamount to a declaration of war. From that time commenced the state of war between the parties. In the Arab society at Mecca there was neither an organized Government, nor any distinction between a public and private person and property. There was no regular army in the State, and what existed was not a permanently organized body, so provided with external marks that it could be readily identified. The form of Government at Mecca was patriarchal, and the chiefs of the Koreish and the citizens of Medina themselves const.i.tuted an army when occasion arose. Therefore, since the commencement of hostilities or the state of war, every individual of the Koreish or the Meccans was a public enemy of the Moslems, and liable to be treated as such in his person and property, except those who were unable to take part in the hostilities, or, as a matter of fact, abstained from engaging in them. Therefore it was lawful for the Moslems to threaten or to waylay the caravans of the enemy, which pa.s.sed to and from Mecca close to Medina, and also to attack the Koreish at Mecca, if they could possibly do so.

[Sidenote: But the Moslems could not take up arms to redress their wrongs under certain circ.u.mstances.]

4. But as the people amongst whom the Prophet and his fugitive Moslems now sojourned had only pledged to defend them at Medina, the flying Mohammadans could not take up arms against their aggressors, the Koreish, to defend their rights of religious liberty and citizenship, much less of taking arms to compel the non-believers to believe in Moslem faith, and so they preferred to live in peace at Medina, and enjoy the blessings of their new religion without any disturbance from without, if possible.

[Sidenote: Moslems otherwise engaged at Medina had no intention of suffering the horrors of war by taking the initiative.]

[Sidenote: But were in imminent danger from the enemy.]

5. In fact, the Moslems, after suffering so long such heavy persecutions at Mecca, had at length got an asylum of peace at Medina, where they had very little desire left to entertain any idea of commencing hostilities or undergoing once more the horrors of war, and were too glad to live in peace after their last escape. The people of Medina had only agreed to defend the Prophet from attack, not to join him in any aggressive steps towards the Koreish. The attention of Mohammad and his followers who had fled with him was mainly occupied in preaching and teaching the tenets of Islam, in establishing a fraternity between the refugees and the citizens, in building a house for prayer, in providing houses for refugees, in contracting treaties of neutrality with the Jews of Medina and other surrounding tribes, Bani Zamra (a tribe connected with Mecca) and also with Bani Mudlij (a tribe of Kinana related to the Koreish), in antic.i.p.ation of the impending danger[2] from the Koreish, who had pursued them on the similar occasions before, and in organizing, above all these, some of the religious and civil inst.i.tutions for the Moslems, who were now fast a.s.suming the position of an independent society or commonwealth. Under such circ.u.mstances, it was next to impossible for Mohammad or his adherents to think of anything like an offensive war with their inveterate foes, or to take up arms for proselytizing purposes.

[Footnote 2: See Sura XXIV, verse 54.]

[Sidenote: The Koreish first attacked the Moslems at Medina. They could not forbear the escape of the Moslems.]

6. The Koreish, seeing the persecuted had left almost all their native lands for a distant city out of their approach, except by a military expedition, and losing Mohammad, for whose arrest they had tried their utmost, as well as upon hearing the reception, treatment, religious freedom and brotherly help the Moslems received and enjoyed at Medina, could not subdue their ferocious animosity against the exiles. The hostility of the Koreish had already been aroused. The severity and injustice of the Koreish was so great, that when, in 615 A.D., a party of 11 Moslems had emigrated to Abyssinia, they had pursued them to overtake them. And again, in 616 A.D., when the persecution by the Koreish was hotter than before, a party of about 100 Moslems had fled from Mecca to Abyssinia, the Koreish sent an emba.s.sy to Abyssinia to obtain the surrender of the emigrants. There is every reason to believe that the Koreish, enraged as they were on the escape of the Moslems in their third and great emigration in 622 A.D., would naturally have taken every strong and hostile measure to persecute the fugitives.[3]

It was in the second year from the general expulsion of the Moslems from Mecca that the Koreish, with a large army of one thousand strong, marched upon the Moslems at Medina. Medina being 250 miles or 12 stages from Mecca, the aggressive army, after marching 8 stages, arrived at Badr, which is 3 or 4 stages from Medina. Mahommad--with only 300 Moslems, more being from among the people of Medina than the refugees--came out of Medina in self-defence to encounter the Koreish, and the famous battle of Badr was fought only at thirty miles from Medina. There could be no doubt that the affair was purely and admittedly a defensive one.

Sura XXII, verses 39-42, copied at page 17 of this book, was first published in the matter of taking up arms in self-defence after the battle of Badr.

[Footnote 3: The idea of forbearance on the part of the Koreish, as entertained by Sir W. Muir, is not borne out by their former conduct of persecuting the believers and pursuing the fugitives among them. He says: "Mahomet and Abu Bakr trusted their respective clans to protect their families from insult. But no insult or annoyance of any kind was offered by the Coreish. Nor was the slightest attempt made to detain them; although it was not unreasonable that they should have been detained as hostages against any hostile incursion from Medina"[A]. They were contemplating a grand pursuit and attack on the Moslems, and had no reason to detain the families of Mahomet and Abu Bakr as hostages whilst they could not think that the Moslems will take the initiative, as they were too glad to escape and live unmolested.]

[Footnote A: Muir's Life of Mahomet, Vol II, page 265.]

[Sidenote: The three battles waged by the Koreish against Mohammad.]

7. The Koreish carried on three aggressive battles against the Moslems at Medina. The first, called the Battle of Badr, took place at thirty miles from Medina, the Koreish having come down 250 miles from Mecca.

The second, called the Battle of Ohad, was fought at a distance of one mile from Medina, the enemy having advanced 250 miles from Mecca. The third was the battle of confederates, in which they had mustered an army of ten thousand strong. The city was besieged for several days, and the Moslems defended themselves within the walls of Medina which they had entrenched. These were the only battles between the Koreish and Mohammad, in each the latter always acted on the defensive. Neither he attacked the Koreish offensively to take revenge, nor to compel them by force of arms to accept his religion.

[Sidenote: These wars were purely in defence, not to redress their wrongs or to establish their rights.]

Even these three battles were not waged by Mohammad to redress wrong or establish imperilled rights. They were only to repel force by right of self-defence. Had Mohammad and his Moslems invaded Mecca and fought battles against the Koreish there, he would have been justified for waging war to redress the injuries of person and property inflicted by the Meccans on the Moslems whom they were tormenting for their religion and had expelled them from their homes, and had even barred their yearly visitation to the shrine of Kaaba. A war which is undertaken for just causes, to repel or avert wrongful force, or to establish a right, is sanctioned by every law, religious, moral or political.

[Sidenote: The battle of Badr was defensive.]

8. Sir W. Muir, the great advocate for the aggressive Koreish, holds that the war of Badr was "brought on by Mahomet himself,"[4] and that he intended to surprise the caravan of the Koreish returning from Syria under the charge of Abu Sofian, and had come out to Medina to waylay it.

Abu Sofian sent for an army of the Koreish for his aid, and thus commenced the battle of Badr. I have given my reasons at pages 74-76 of the book to show that this is a false account. I will point out from contemporary records, _i.e._, the Koran, that Mohammad neither meant, nor had he come out of Medina, to attack the caravan.

[Sidenote: Reasons for the same.]

I. The verses 5 and 6 of Sura VIII[5] show that a part of the believers were quite averse to Mohammad's coming out of Medina on the occasion of the battle of Badr. Had their mission been one of plundering rich caravans, as it is generally alleged, there could be no reason for that aversion of a party of believers who are accused so often of a hostile att.i.tude towards the Koreish, and possessed of that great love of booty and adventure so prominent among the Arabs. The fact is, a party of believers had disputed with Mohammad the necessity of the combat and its probable result outside Medina. They preferred to defend themselves within its walls. This argument is against the allegation that Mohammad with his followers had started to waylay the caravan, and the Koreish had come only to rescue it.

II. The 43rd[6] verse of the same Sura shows that it was by a mere accident or coincidence that all the three parties of the Moslems, the Kores.h.i.te army and the caravan had arrived, and encamped close to Badr in front of each other. This is an argument against those who say that Mohammad had intentionally come to Badr to waylay the caravan there.[7]

There was, in fact, no predetermination on the part of Mohammad either to waylay the caravan, or encounter the Koreish army at Badr. Mohammad with his followers had come out only to check the advancing enemy in his self-defence.

III. The seventh[8] verse of the same Sura shows that while the parties had so accidentally encamped close to each other, the Moslems had desired then and there only to attack the caravan, as a reprisal or by way of retaliation, instead of combating with the Koreish army. This is an argument in support of my contention that there was no previous arrangement to attack the caravan.

IV. The same verse also shows that Mohammad had no intention of attacking the caravan either before his coming out of Medina, as it is alleged by ignorant people, or after coming at Badr in front of the enemy's army.

V. Sura VIII, verse 72,[9] which treats of the prisoners of the war taken at Badr, expressly notes the treachery of the Meccans before their being taken prisoner, and refers obviously to their aggressively setting out of Mecca to attack the Moslems at Medina.

VI. Sura IX, verse 13,[10] at a subsequent event of the violation of the truce of Hodeibia by the Koreish, very distinctly charges them with attacking first and waging offensive war and being aggressive. As there was no war or attack from the Koreish on the Moslems before Badr, I conclude that in the war of Badr the Koreish were aggressive.






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